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This thesis investigates how problems for policy become defined as well as how
policy responses are subsequently designed to address these problems. It was motivated
by the substantive concern that existing literature on digital divide policy is derived from
Western countries, and embedded within Western rationales. In contrast, the way in
which digital divide policy is made in developing countries had received relatively little
attention. In light of this gap in the literature, empirical research was carried out on the
development of digital divide policy-making, highlighting policies from two developing
countries as examples: Cun Cun Tong (providing every village with a telephone and
internet connection) Policy in China and Digital Opportuniry Centre/APEC Digital
Opportunity Centre in Taiwan.
Theoretically, this research adopts an interdisciplinary rationale, combining an
interpretative approach from the field of policy research and key concepts from Science
and Technology Studies. It aims to overcome a shortcoming of much traditional
research on the digital divide which, in its commitment to its substantive concerns has
been un-reflexive in its approach. This thesis demonstrates how an interpretative
approach can produce new insights into digital divide policy from a more critical
perspective. It elucidates how understandings of the digital divide are articulated
(initially in discussions in the USA and the European Union) and become promulgated
through international organizations during the early 1990s to the year 2005, and how
they are then ultimately 'domesticated', becoming embedded within particular national
contexts and policy discourses.
Methodologically, this research adopts a strategy of triangulation. It combines
various modes and methods of enquiry: discourse analysis of policy documents is
supplemented with interviewing policy-makers. Interviews are used to obtain first-hand
materials which throw light on the orientation and context of the various actors who
participate in policy-making and their concerns/discourses during policy-making. Finally,
there is an analysis of policy outcomes. This research also contributes to opening the
black box of policy-making, particularly in China, a context which presents particular
challenges for the researcher.
Empirically, the findings provide an in-depth understanding of digital divide
policy-making in developing countries. Firstly, it is demonstrated that international and
national contexts matter in digital divide policy-making. Policy similarities can be
explained by both the international context and local context. International policy
discourses provide commonly available intellectual resources, whereas similarities in
local contexts, for example a shared technocratic tradition. These international and
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national contexts also impact on the participants who are involved in digital divide
policy-making, for example, the technocratic tradition of China and Taiwan is a factor
underpinning the choice of policy participants with science and technology
backgrounds. These participants then learn and exchange experiences from international
organisations and other countries through international conferences, official policy
websites, and personal contacts. Secondly, the study found that the relationship between
discourses and policy-making is by no means as straightforward and linear as some
interpretations of discursive shaping might imply. Discourses may have influences on
policy development; however some inclusion strategies arose within domestic
departments in advance of alignment with international digital divide discourses, as a
result of pre-existing concerns within the national policy settings. A third, and related
finding is that there is a gap between policy formation and policy implementation, the
exploration of which reveals the complexity of policy discourses. For example, some
policy texts were found to emphasise social development, whereas the implementation
predominantly centres on the equipment of infrastructures. Finally, the most crucial
contribution of this thesis is its development of an interdisciplinary interpretive
approach to scrutinise digital divide policy. This provides a basis for future research in
this area, as well as a means to address the limitations of existing approaches.
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A Note on Romanisation of Chinese Terms and Names
In this thesis, two systems of Romanisation of Chinese terms and names are used: the
Wade-Giles system and the Pinyin system. The Wade-Giles system is most frequendy
used in Taiwan, as well as in the traditional and pre-Communist China era. The Pinyin
system is used in China and in academic work in post-1949 China.
With respect to the style of writing personal names in the Romanised system, China
tends to place the surname before the first name, while Taiwan places the surname last.
In order not to confuse my audience with first names and surnames in this thesis, the
Chinese system of 'surname before first name' is used whenever personal names are
mentioned both in China and in Taiwan. However, where there are differences between
Chinese and Taiwanese spellings of personal names, the spelling used rejects the
individual's nationality. Taking the author's name for example, in China, it is written as
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This research was motivated by the observation that existing literature on digital divide
policy is derived from Western countries, and embedded within Western rationales,
while the developing countries had received relatively little attention. Western discourses
have achieved global reach—for example through espousal of the Global Information
Infrastructure (1994) and the organisation of the World Summit on the Information
Society (2003, 2005). It might be argued that the issues surrounding the digital divide are
of global applicability—that Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are
universal, globally available technologies, and that effectively the same policies will be
needed in all nations to promote adoption and access to them and the information they
carry. This is however to ignore the crucial role that the specific histories, cultural,
political context and institutional structures of nations play (Norris, 2001) in the
character of inequalities in access to ICTs; in the ways that these divides may be bridged;
in the policies needed to pursue this. These specificities underpin differences between
developed and developing countries, and amongst developing countries in the goals, and
processes and outcomes of digital divide policy-making and implementation. As a result,
the discourse made by technological elites in advanced countries 'has litde meaning in
many regions of the globe where even intermediate telecommunications are
underdeveloped' (Loader, 1998: 3). Using specific examples as illustrations, this research
focuses on digital divide discourse1 in two developing countries, China and Taiwan; it
investigates how the digital divide has been defined and translated into the national
policy and into further policy implementation in individual countries. Moreover, as the
term of the digital divide originated from the West, this research seeks to understand
how its original definition has been interpreted and/or reshaped by the political,
economic and social agendas of these two countries.
The concept of the digital divide in its origin and its popular understanding has been
always associated with information and communication technologies (ICTs), in
particular the Internet, which became the technology which led to the widespread
adoption of ICTs—and thereby paradoxically focused attention to non-adoption. The
1 In this research, I use a broad definition of 'discourse' so as to indicate both texts and practice, thus
following Hajer's approach for analysing environmental issues (1995). By definition then, 'discourse' here
is useful for framing a policy problem. It refers quite particularly to the analytical term 'storyline' as
created by Hajer (1995): this 'is a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various
discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomenon' (Hajer, 1995: 56).
1
Internet, by definition, can indicate different dimensions, e.g. the infrastructures,
applications, services, etc. The 'Internet' here refers to 'the electronic network of
networks that links people and information through computers and other digital devices
allowing person-to-person communication and information retrieval' (DiMaggio et al.,
2001: 307). It is regarded by both developed and developing countries and international
organisations as being crucial for national development, including defense, academia,
and commerce (Norris, 2001). Developing countries are aware that this is an
unprecedented opportunity for them to catch up with developed countries in this third
industrial revolution2 (Hu, 2002).
Alongside the desperate effort made by governments across the world to develop the
Internet, the widening gap between developed and developing countries and between
communities within developing countries, looms large. This is the phenomenon
commonly referred to as the digital divide. Although almost every state is trying its best
to afford or build the infrastructures needed to increase the penetration rate of the
Internet, the digital divide still exists. Some scholars even warn that the divide is not
reducing, but deepening (e.g. van Dijk, 2005). This implies that governments first paid
attention to building the physical infrastructures, but that they now need to pay
attention to other excluding factors, e.g. uneven economic development.
The warning of a deepening divide highlights the need to scrutinise the uptake of the
digital divide concept as well as the policy-making processes surrounding it. In the
existing literature, most discussion predominately focuses on the 'phenomenon' of the
digital divide, and measures to deal with the problem (Gigler, 2004). Little effort has
been made in investigating how the discourses pertinent to the digital divide are
constructed, and further how these discourses influence the development of policy for
reducing the divide. Neither is attention paid to the participants who get involved in the
policy-making. The macro/micro context for policymaking is too often neglected. In
this research, I will demonstrate that an interpretive perspective can usefully address
these problems.
2 The Industrial Revolution, which began in the latter half of the eighteenth century in the United
Kingdom, witnessed steam engines and other mechanical innovations dramatically increasing industrial
output and drastically changing established social systems. The second wave of industrialisation at the
beginning of the twentieth century brought with it mass production methods, characteristically embodied
in the electrical and automotive industry. Since then, society has witnessed a third industrial revolution,
which came to the fore during the 1980s, driven largely by technological breakthroughs taking place
within the computer industry. See also Litan & Niskanen (1998).
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1.1 A Changing/Ongoing Metaphor: the Digital Divide
When I explain my research to colleagues and to interviewees, I always encounter the
question, without any exception, 'what is the digital divide'? At the beginning, I was
shocked that a term so common in policy texts and media coverage sounded so
unfamiliar to the people I talked to. However, although I have been immersed in this
issue for around four years, I cannot give a very definite and quick answer to their query
because the term has multiple meanings and it is a moving target (Compaine, 2001).
Therefore, before discussing my research, I will present the complexities and changing
use of this term from its emergence to its latest usage in Western countries, particularly
in the US. Selecting the US as the case to depict the changing use of this term does not
mean that only the US government is concerned about the digital divide. However it
was the first country to conduct and publish national reports pertinent to the digital
divide. From the first report onwards, we can see the explicitly historical transformation
of this term in the policy context, which has had consciousness-raising impacts on
international and regional organisations and other countries.
1.1.1 Origin and Changes of the Meanings of the Digital Divide—Five National Surveys
in the US
The origin of the term 'digital divide' remains uncertain and ambiguous (Gunkel, 2003:
501). Its original conception can be traced back to the US National Information
Infrastructure (Nil) in 1993. The first appearance of this term was in 1995 when
journalists Jonathan Webber and Amy Harmon of LA Times started using it. They used
it to describe a gendered phenomenon in a family, where the husband used a computer
very frequently to surf online, whilst the wife did not. In a broader sense, in their article,
they 'invented the term to describe the social division between those who were very
involved in technology and those who are not' (Gunkel, 2003: 501).
We can selectively chart the evolution of this term by looking at the changing
conceptualisation of the digital divide in the US before the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) 3 reports officially
3 According to its official website, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) is the President's principal adviser on telecommunications and information policy issues, and in
this role ffequendy works with other Executive Branch agencies to develop and present the
Administration's position on these issues. For more information please refer to http://www.ntia.doc.gov/.
Accessed on 22/08/2007.
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adopted this term (see Figure 1.1). Throughout the conceptualisation of the digital
divide in a series of NTIA surveys from 1995 onwards, the definition changed in two
respects—the associated technological instruments, and the dimensions of divide. With
regard to technological instruments, it originally referred to personal computer
ownership, and later came to incorporate the Internet. The detailed transformation of
this definition is discussed below.
The five reports conducted in the US have respective characteristics, which are
elucidated in the remainder of this sub-section. Although the first published survey in
the US in 1995, tided Falling through the Net:A Survey of the 'Have Nots' in Fural and Urban
America, does not precisely use the term 'digital divide', the implication of a
dichotomy—haves and have-nots—appears. The survey aims to unveil the so-called
'information have-nots', a term which means there is a group without access to the
information in contrast to the 'information-haves'. After this term is first defined in the
1995 survey, subsequent discussions of the digital divide predominantly centre on this
bilateral definition and receive much criticism.
The critics argue that the term—the digital divide—is often used simplistically,
indicating a bipolar societal split (Warschauer, 2002; Gunkel, 2003; Cisler, 2003). 'This
dichotomous portrayal of "haves" and "have nots" has been reinforced by a host of
official statistics and academic studies over the last decade' (Selwyn, 2002: 5). The
examples are quite a few; such as those who have access to IT and those who do not
(NTIA reports), those who can use technology and those who cannot (The Benton
Foundation, 2001), techno-utopians and techno-dystopians (Harmon, 1996; Moore,
1995), and the gap between information haves and have-nots in K-12 education (Poole,
1996). Whatever the definitions of the digital divide, they 'organize things into two,
dialectically-opposed types' (Gunkel, 2003: 505). The critics argue that there is no binary
division between haves and have-nots, but rather a gradation based on different degrees
of access to the ICTs (Warschauer, 2002; Cisler, 2003). The digital divide is not merely a
problem of beginning with or without technology, but a problem with existing social
differences.
Access to the Internet and the digital divide are 'hierarchical' rather than dichotomous
concepts (Selwyn, 2002: 8). Gunkel (2003) argues that the problem with the binary
distinction 'is not simply the inability of a linguistic dichotomy to represent a complex
state of affairs. The difficulty resides in its structure' (Gunkel, 2003: 507). Selwyn
reminds us that this will 'raise concern over the dangers of over-relying on such a basic
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conceptualisation of such a complex social issue' (Selwyn, 2002: 6).
Additionally, the report highlights the divide between domesdc regions, i.e. rural and
urban areas in America, which may have influences on the subsequent national digital
divide reports and relevant policy-making of other countries, which also focus on
domestic regional divides.
In the 1998 report, titled Falling through the Net II: New Data on the Digital Divide, the
concerns extend from universal service to information service (the first paragraph of
the introduction in the report). This extension implies the technological instrument
when considering the gap between haves and have-nots has been expanded from the
telephone to other technologies which also function in providing information, because
'Universal Service' was historically invented to apply to the telephone service. It is in
1996 that this concept was extended in the Telecommunication Act to online services
including the Internet. Although in this report, the technology of concern explicitly
expands to include personal computers, the dichotomous conceptualisation of the
divide is still employed.
A breakthrough in the 1999 report, titled Falling through the Net: Defining the Digital Divide,
is that for the first time the Internet is taken into account in the survey. This report
announced that 'ensuring access to the fundamental tool of the digital economy is one
of the most significant investments our nation can make'. The fundamental tool
includes three types of technology access—telephone, personal computers and the
Internet. It also indicates that 'the Internet is a nascent, rapidly diffusing technology that
promises to become the economic underpinning for all successful countries in the new
global economy' (NTIA, 1999: 27).
The 1999 report is aware of another novel point—the dropouts. Dropouts refer to
those who became connected to the Internet but then discontinue their use of it. In this
survey, people are asked to state the reasons why they discontinue Internet use. The
answers they provide overwhelmingly concern their 'unwillingness' to continue to be
connected to the Internet. The high cost of access is cited as the main reason.
In spite of these two novel aspects of the 1999 report, the concerns are again with
merely physical connection to the Internet. For example, the last sentence of the first
paragraph in the introductory letter of this report is 'access to such tools is an
important step to ensure that our economy grows strongly and that in the future no one
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is left behind'. There is no improvement in the 2000 report where even though the goal
is to promote full participation in the digital economy, the focus is still on physical
access.
The 2002 report, tided A. Nation Online, investigates how Americans are expanding their
use of the Internet. Although this latest survey predominantly focuses on Internet
access, the definition and dimensions of the digital divide are fluid with different ICTs
emphasised in different surveys. Moreover, from the title, we can observe that this
report has a positive, optimistic attitude towards ICTs. In contrast to the emphasis on
bridging the digital divide in the previous four reports, the latest report displays an
optimistic goal of giving all people access to the Internet, 'transforming the digital
divide to digital opportunity.'4 It is clear that the definitions of the digital divide are by
no means exclusive, and that they vary so as to meet the goals of research or political
actions.
4 This is a prominent slogan proposed in APEC 2001. I will provide a more detailed analysis in Chapter 4
when dealing with the programmes and conferences regarding the digital divide in regional and
international organisations.
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When Who Where What
1995 Jonathan Webber
& Amy Harmon
LA Times The social division between those who were very
involved in technology and those who were not
1995 Moore To distinguish between advocates and detractors in
debates about the value of IT
1996 Jonathan Webber
& Amy Harmon
LA Times Difference in opinion about new technology. The
difference of opinion that exists between those who
are deeply suspicious of a new generation of
engineering solutions to the world's problems, and
those who insist that, this time around, the
enlightenment promise of better living through
rationality and science will be realised.
1996 Howard Wolinsky Chicago Sun Times Not referring to the gap between information haves
and have-nots, but to a voluntary partition galvanised
by strongly-held views about whether today's
technology is a force for progress or destruction.
Publish 'The Digital Divide', which examined how
'unequal computer access for students is creating
tomorrow's haves and have-nots'.
1996 Vice-President
A1 Gore
A public speech Name the gap between the information haves and
have-nots in K-12 education.
1996 The Clinton-Gore
Administration
Employ the trope of the digital divide to justify
^^various^educationaH^
Figure 1.1 Selected Relevant Accounts of the Digital Divide in the US before the NTIA Reports
Were Offdally Adopted (Source: Synthesizedfrom Gunkel, 2003: 501-505')
0 For further sources please refer to Gunkel (2003).
7
1.1.2 Two Perspectives on the Digital Divide
During the heated debates on the digital divide within the past decade, we can see two
perspectives on the digital divide—'existing/deepening' vs. 'disappearing' (see Figure
1.2). The 'exisung/deepening divides' perspective admits the existence of the digital
divide. This perspective is enthusiastic for government involvement in bridging the
divide, and advocates the development of variables to measure the changing divides
within society.
However, this perspective includes slightly divergent opinions on the 'novelty' of the
digital divide. Some scholars, following Marxist traditions, argue that the digital divide is
no different from existing social inequalities. Others argue that the digital divide is a new
social inequality, which emerges only in the information society. The split between the
two camps originates from a fundamental difference of opinion about the emergence
of the information society; namely, whether the so-called information society is a
continuum of the industrial society or a break from the industrial society.6 However, in
spite of their different opinions on the novelty of the digital divide, these two camps
agree that the digital divide needs to be bridged.
By contrast, the 'disappearing-divide' perspective based on neo-liberalism adopts the
position that no government intervention is necessary and supposes that the market will
solve the problems. The neo-liberal stance once dominated perceptions of the digital
divide, particularly in the US, where the digital divide is taken to be a temporary lag. The
former US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Powell's
replacement of the term digital divide with that of the 'Mercedes divide' ('some people
can afford expensive luxury cars, some cannot, but that is the American way') is the
classical neo-liberal understanding of the digital divide. Simply put, this position does
not perceive the digital divide as a pivotal social problem in need of solutions from the
government. It is based on the theories of 'trickle-down effect', 'late-comer' and
'S-curve'. The trickle-down theory implies that the divide may exist, but will disappear
very soon as long as the price of the technology goes down (Loader, 1998; Selwyn,
2002). Late-comer theory has a similar explanation to trickle-down theory, and argues
that the early adopters pay a higher price for the innovation, and when the original price
goes down, the late-comers will benefit. The 'S-curve' concept was developed by Rogers
(1995) in his theory of innovation diffusion. He theorises that the innovation diffusion
6 Frank Webster (2006) in his book Theories of the Information Society has a thorough discussion drawing on
contemporary scholars' opinions about the information society.
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will spread through a society and, when charted over time, will be represented by an
S-shaped curve, as small numbers of early adopters use the technology first, and are
then followed by the majority until the technology is common for the whole society.
Figure 1.2 Two Perspectives on the DigitalDivide
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1.2 Rationale—Interpretive Policy Research
This research seeks to combine two fields—Science and Technology Studies (STS) and
interpretive policy research. While interpretive policy research provides a comprehensive
policy research framework for this project, STS offers insights that are useful for
scrutinizing the relationship between technology and society. For example, it reminds
the researcher that there is 'interpretive flexibility' (Social Construction of Technology,
SCOT, from the STS literature, Pinch and Bijker, 1984) in interpreting the relationship
between technology and society. Moreover, 'domestication' as it has been developed by
STS scholars (e.g. Sorensen, 1996, 2000) provides a useful analytical concept for
investigating how the idea of 'the digital divide' has been selectively employed in my
case countries. While this concept has traditionally been applied to the analysis of the
adoption of technologies, Sorensen has demonstrated that it can be successfully be
applied to the analysis of policy-making (see Aune and Sorensen, 1998; Brosveet and
Sorensen, 2000).
The approach to interpretive policy research in this thesis is based on the epistemology
of social constructivism. The idea of social constructivism has its origins in the
sociology of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Mannheim, 1936), which refers
to the ways in which the social realities of the world are shaped and interpreted (Gergen,
1999; Fischer, 2003). Two reasons justify the use of this epistemology within the
analytical framework adopted in this thesis. Firstly, it has particular influence on the
sociology of technology, which regards the technology as a socially constructed artifact.
This influence may help me analyse how my interviewees and documents (together)
interpret technology and the digital divide. Secondly, social constructivism plays an
important theoretical role in researching social problems, and this is relevant for related
policy research (Fischer, 2003). Adopting the perspective from interpretive policy
research will benefit the analysis because this approach does not take the definition of
the 'problem', e.g. the digital divide, for granted. Rather, this approach insists that the
definition of the 'problem' is incorporated into the analysis.
Interpretive policy research focuses on the discursive dimensions of policy. It considers
the key concept of 'values' from an interpretive perspective in terms of 'values, beliefs,
and feelings as a set of meanings' (Yanow, 2000: ix), and it considers 'human action(s) as
expressive (of meaning)' (ibid). By adopting an interpretive policy perspective, this thesis
aims to answer the following questions: How and in what context is the digital divide
framed as a problem that needs to be solved? What does digital divide policy mean?
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Who is involved in this policy?
The work of Robbin and Courtright (2002) serves as an example of one instance when
the adoption of an interpretive policy analytic perspective is used to deconstruct the
digital divide in the United States. Drawing on the data collected from published reports,
press releases, newspaper interviews and other materials produced by organizations in
the U.S. that were involved in the 'digital divide' as a policy issue, they examine U.S.
policy stakeholders' competing conceptions of the 'digital divide', including their
problem definitions and the policy solutions they envision.
Robbin and Courtright argue that 'digital divide' is a new metaphor for describing
phenomena that do not answer precisely to prior experience. They indicate that the term
'digital' normally refers to modern information technologies and to their positive
implications for everyday life. In the US context, the term 'divide' implies certain
normative assumptions about equality and social inculsion. Reference to a 'divide' is full
of urgency in a republic that takes pride in the designation 'one nation, indivisible'
(Robbin and Courtright, 2002:5), and serves as a call to action. Characterizing the
'divide' as 'digital' stretches the conceptualization of digital phenomena to embrace
social implications, where the technology is not only seen to be related to social
inequality, but considered to be a cause of it. In this sense, stakeholder solutions tend to
privilege technological solutions in order to remedy the digital divide, e.g. focusing
predominantly on physical acess to technology.
Robbin and Courtright conclude that the interpretation of the digital divide in the U.S.
focuses on technological discussion. Their findings reveal that the digital divide is taken
as a technological issue in the then U.S. discussion. They use a story to demonstrate how
a technological solution is privileged in order to resolve the digital divide. During the
course of their research, one school administrator recalled those low-income students
who lack the resources to realize their full potential but who, once they receive major
assistance from leading technology corporations, then have the potential to become the
future leaders of the US (Robbin and Courtright, 2002: 11). This story creates a
'technological frame' (Robbin and Courtright, 2002: 11) and assumes that the digital
divide is predominantly an issue of the technology 'haves' and the technology
'have-nots'; the solution to solving this digital divide is to provide the students with
improved technology. Only rarely does a stakeholder suggest that such provision
(physical access to technology) may not actually be enough.
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Robbin and Courtright argue that the debates over the digital divide can never be
isolated from the context, e.g. the political context. They argue that the above story
reflects concepts of modern liberal theory. The narrative frames the problem as one of
equal opportunity: once the school students are provided with equal technology-enabled
opportunities, they will have the chance to become leaders.
Drawing on the interpretive approach and on Robbin and Courtright's work, my analysis
is separated into two stages. The first stage analyses the perception and interpretation of
the digital divide. I am looking at how the issue of the digital divide is framed, within
the contexts in which my case-study countries are situated and in the wider global
environment. The second stage demonstrates how the interpretation of the digital
divide may lead to actual action, and uses specific examples in order to illustrate the
relevant points (see case selection in the later section). In this research, understandings
of the digital divide are shown to have impacts on digital-divide policy-making and
implementation, including which institutions are involved, what actions are taken, etc.
As different definitions of the problem come into play, different policy frameworks and
policies may be revealed and presented. The participants in policy-making may change
from one context to the next. This thesis opens by acknowledging this as a concern, and
asks how the digital divide policies are interpreted within international and national
contexts.
Normal ICTs encompass two characteristics. One focuses on 'technology' and the other
on 'information and communication'. Heeks has a similar delineation of ICTs, arguing
that they 'undertake both processing and communication of information' (Heeks, 2004:
1, emphasis in original). Focusing discussion of digital divides merely on the
technological dimension, what I label as 'technology-driven policy', may risk narrowing
the issue in question to a matter of physical acess, and lead the policy merely to
concentrate on providing technological hardware. However, digital divides do not only
have to do with physical access, but also desire, skills, literacy and so forth.
Technology-driven policy may tacitly place technical choices at centre-stage. As a result,
the digital divide is treated as a technological issue rather than as a communication or
(human) rights concern (as might be raised in the field of communication policy).
Because of this, policies that are related to solving the digital divide often parallel real
technological development. When they intertwine with economic growth and
development, they have a tendency to completely ignore alternative dimensions of the
digital divide, e.g. the individual rights of all citizens. Such policies may narrow the issue
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in question to a matter of mere physical access, and may result only in a determination
to provide technological hardware. This situation echoes what Robbin and Courtright
(2002) have already argued: that using a 'technological frame' to define the digital divide
will inevitably privilege technological solutions.
For developing countries, the tendency to think this way is understandable. Almost all
technological innovation and development is placed in the context of national
development/national competition. Focusing only on the competition at an
international level may distract attention from the domestic distribution of technical
facilities and wealth. This may actually widen the gap which already exists, because it
ignores the fact that the digital divide is embedded within a wider context in which
technology and information are unevenly distributed. The adoption of an interpretive
policy research approach provides an opportunity to highlight this problem.
In adopting this interpretive perspective, I do not mean to trivialise the issue of the
digital divide. However, the study is developed with the expectation that, by addressing
how different definitions are constructed within a fundamentally constructivist
dimension, an alternative means of investigating the issue (from the angle of developing
countries in particular) can be found. Although there is a rich body of literature on the
digital divide, it for the most part 'documents the empirical problems of unequal access'
to technology (Gunkel, 2003: 499) and emphasises how to bridge the digital divide in
practice, e.g. by solving technical problems. This approach is adopted by international
digital divide conferences and reports, as well as by national digital divide reports. This
means that it does not address the most fundamental aspect of the digital divide. That is,
it lacks any 'critical examination of the digital divide' (Gunkel, 2003: 500) and ignores
the fact that the digital divide as a problem is a socially constructed process.
To sum up, the adoption of this approach can open up the process behind
policy-making, including the ideologies embedded within it. No-one can live in an
isolated and empty context. Therefore, the ideologies behind the policy-making are
embedded in a much wider social context; here it is political and economic contexts that
are particularly relevant. And for an interpretive policy analyst, as Yanow suggested, the
task 'is to map the "architecture" of debate relative to the policy issue under
investigation, by identifying the language and its entailments used by different
interpretive communities in their framing of the issue' (Yanow, 2000: 12).
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1.3 The Units ofAnalysis
The decision about the units of analysis in this research is made in terms of the settings
that are examined and the quesdons that are addressed. Since I am interested in the
digital divide policy process in developing countries, two developing countries with
distinct political and economic characteristics—China and Taiwan—are used as the
units of a comparative analysis. The detailed reasons for selecting these two countries
are elaborated in the following subsection.
The purpose of comparison between China and Taiwan is to display two different cases
of digital divide policy in developing countries, with the hope that the analytical results
from both countries can contribute to the development of digital divide policy in other
developing countries, which may be at earlier or later stages in this process.
1.3.1 Why Developing Countries?
Two developing countries are chosen as my broad research objects on the following
basis:
Firstly, most of the existing research on the digital divide focuses on the Western
countries/developed countries, but without an in-depth concern for developing
countries. Studies coming from the United States attract most attention; however, the
Internet conditions outside of the US may be structurally different (van Zoonen et al.,
2003).
Secondly, there are crucial policy questions facing developing countries in bridging the
digital divide as well as in drafting the policies concerned with this issue. As Kluver and
Banerjee (2005) argue, digital access is among the factors that are influential for
developing countries to open up democracy via the Internet.7 Namely, the digital divide
policies adopted have political implications given that the Internet may influence issues
such as the speed of democracy.
Thirdly, after the 1997 Asia Economic Crisis, most Asian/developing countries have
7 Kluver and Banerjee (2005) proposed three factors, and the other two factors are political culture and
regulation.
8 The economic crisis that erupted in Asia in mid-1997 has led to sharp declines in the currencies, stock
markets, and other asset prices of many Asian countries. The countries included in this crisis, were
Thailand, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and China.
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been suffering from difficulties to a greater or lesser extent. Thus, the development of
the Internet to a mature level has been viewed as an efficient and important investment,
economically, politically and socially, for catching up with developed countries.
1.3.2 Why Compare China and Taiwan?
1.3.2.1 China in Brief
Technological development, in particular the Internet, has given China an opportunity
to catch up with industrialised countries, and alleviate domestic economic development.
Since 1978 onwards, Deng Xiaoping opened a new era of development in all aspects in
China, highlighting the importance of technological development, in particular the
contribution of technology to economic growth. The slogan 'the mastery of modern
science and technology as the key to modernisation' has been the highest ranked
principle in all policy fields.
To achieve economic growth, China has been undergoing a series of significant
revolutions in informatisation. In China, 'informatisation' indicates 'process, progress,
duration all the way from the industry society to the information society', as well as 'all
the means to accelerate the process from the information society'. 9 Figure 1.3 provides
the timetable of informatisation in China. In December 1993, the Chinese government
launched a 'Joint Committee for Informatisation of Domestic Economy'.10 To
emphasise the importance of this committee, the Vice-President of the State Council
took the chair position. During the course of this conference, 'enforcing informatisation
and further boosting industrial development by informatisation' has been assigned as
the key issue. The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese
government proposed the initiatives of informatisation construction, which symbolised
a new era of domestic economic informatisation. The far-reaching projects of
informatisation, such as 'Golden Card', 'Golden Bridge' and 'Gold Customs'11 were
9 Zhou Xiaofang, Director General of Department of IT Application Promotion, State Council
Informatisation Office of China, defined how the term 'informatisation' is used in China in a
presentation in Shanghai on 18/10/2006. For more information, see
http://unpan 1 .un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN025040.pdf. Accessed on
22/08/2007.
10 In Chinese tide, Guo Min Jing Ji Xin Xi Hua Lian Xi Hui Yi (SI it ilk)-
11 These three informatisation projects were carried out in the early stages of China's development
strategy in 1993. 'Golden Card' aimed to develop cash cards and a national credit card system. The aim of
'Golden Bridge' was to develop a national infrastructure for the informatisation of the national economy.
'Golden Customs' was expected to transform the nature of foreign trade administration and promote the
development of electronic trading (Dai, 2002).
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activated after the conference.
The informatisation process has been underway since the first conference mentioned
above. In January 1996, the 'Informatisadon Committee of State Council' 12 was
launched, which was staffed by twenty-two ministers and led by the vice president of
the State Council. It is an important organisation that assured the content and systems
of national informatisation in China. Moreover, it proposed the direction and principles
of informatisation constructions, as well as building the Ninth Five Year" development
plan for national informatisation. In April 1997, another significant conference was held
to implement national informatisation.
Meanwhile, the Chinese government underwent reorganisation of information-related
official institutions. The Ministry of Information Industry (Mil) was established in
March 1998 according to the decision on the reshuffling of institutions by the State
Council. Mil has taken over the responsibilities and tasks under the Informatisation
Committee of the State Council as well as having the main responsibility for the
telecommunications and electronics industries. To achieve the goal of development of
information technology and informatisation economics, under the scheme of Mil the
Department of Informatisation Promotion was launched. China has thus experienced a
series of reorganisations in official institutions in attempt to produce better
development in technology, informatisation and the final objective of economic growth
to lift its people out of poverty.
12 In Chinese title, Guo Wu Yuan Xin Xi Hua Gong Zuo Xiao Zu (IS $r?rL\% JtAbmTMS 'h &!■)•
13 The Five Year Plan was an attempt by China to boost her industrial development and set her on the
path to become a world-class power. The plan was initiated in 1953. At the end of 2006, China was
drafting the Eleventh Five Year Plan. For more detailed accounts please refer to Chapter 5.
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Time Event Detailed Content
1993/12 'The joint conference of National 1. The Vice-Premier took the position of chairman.
Economy Informatisation under the State 2. The directive thought 'enforcing informatisation industry',
Council was launched. realising industrial development through informatisation'
was assured.
3. The projects of informatisation construction were
proposed by the leaders of the ruling party and the state.
4. The significant projects of 'Golden Card', 'Golden
Bridge5, 'Golden Customs', etc. were activated.
5. The national economy informatisation was opening up.
1996/01 CInformatisation Leading Group under 1. Consisting of 22 ministries and departments; Vice-Premier
the State Council was launched. took the position of chairman of the board.
2. The spirit and system of national informatisation was
established.
3. The direction and principles of national informatisation
construction was proposed.
4. The planning of 'Nine-five' strategy of national
informatisation was made.
5. Local informatisation leading groups were launched
afterwards.
1997/04 National Informatisation Work 1. The tasks of national informatisation have been deployed
Conference was organized. completely.
1998/03 The Ministry of Information 1. Mil was lunched based on the reform programme
Industrywas established. approved by the Ninth National Committee of the
National People's Congress (NPC).
2. The responsibility had been shifted from the Informatisation
Leading Group under the State Council to MIL
3. Postal Department and Electronic Industry Department
are two main units.
4. In charge of national electronic product industry and
telecommunication and software industry, promoting
relevant sub-organisations for national economy and social
service informatisation under State Council
5. The Department of Informatisation Promotion was
established.
1998/03 The State Science and
Technology Commission (SSTC)
changed its name into the
Ministry of Science and
Technology (MOST).
1999/12 The National Informatisation Leading 1. Vice-Premier took the position of chairman.
Group was established; meanwhile, The 2. Aiming to distinguish the developing informatisation industry
National Informatisation Office was and promoting informatisation, for blocking the interest
closed. The National Informatisation exchange inside the informatisation industry.
Promotion Office was established.
2001/08 Upgrading the National
Informatisation Leading Group.
Figure 1.3 Timetable of Informatisation in China (Source: Complied by the Author)
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1.3.2.2 Taiwan in Brief
Taiwan proposed a slogan called 'Transfer digital divide to digital opportunities' during
the conference period in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 2000. The
Minister of Economic Affairs (MOEA), Lin Hsin-i and the Chairperson of the Council
for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), Chen Po-chih suggested bringing
the issue of bridging the digital divide into the long-term agendas ofAPEC, and set two
stages of enforcement. The first one of these was held by the Taiwanese government in
July of 2001, and the second one focused on providing all members of APEC with
assistance in reducing the digital divide; all provisions would be made to meet the
demands of individual countries. Both schemas were handled by the Taiwanese
government. Meanwhile, CEPD were conducting research on digital divides between
rural and urban areas, and also between different industries within individual member
countries (United Daily News, 05/12/2001). Figure 1.4 provides the timetable of
informatisation in Taiwan.
In 2002, the Executive Yuan14 of Taiwan proposed a policy, which aimed at
constructing Taiwan as 'e-Taiwan', designed to make Taiwan a number one country in
the Asian area (United Daily News, 21/03/2002). A government officer of the committee,
who is responsible for the construction of e-Taiwan, argued that the reason why
different minorities exist within a society is in fact due to the uneven distribution of
resources, in particular with the advanced development of ICTs. He also argued that
current problems would be exacerbated if no actions were taken to solve the problem.
Hence, what should be done to avoid the problem is narrowing the divide, making ICTs
evenly distributed throughout the whole society (United Daily News, 13/03/2002).
The National Information and Communication Initiative (NICI) launched a committee
on June 27th 2003 to bridge the digital divide in Taiwan, and was entided 'The
Instruction Committee of Bridging the Digital Divide'. It is the first well-organised
committee to consider the issue of the digital divide. It consists of all relevant
governmental institutions, with the aim of solving the increasingly serious digital
inequality within the country. The establishment of this committee fully expressed the
government's determination to bridge the digital divide inside Taiwan.
14 Executive Yuan is the highest administrative level of the State. The Executive Yuan has a president
(often referred to as the premier), a vice president (vice premier), a number of ministers, heads of
commissions, and ministers without portfolio.
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Subsequently, in 2004, the Executive Yuan of Taiwan promoted a plan titled 'An Acdon
Plan of Reducing the Digital Divide', the budget of which package is US $ 2.1 billion,
spread over four years, with the purpose of bridging the digital divide between different
races and areas within Taiwan. The programme includes providing residents in rural
areas with used computers and other equipments. Additionally, the Taiwanese
government also announces that Taiwan will assist neighbouring countries to tackle this
issue of the digital divide {United Daily News, 29/07/2004).
Time Event Detailed Content
2000 Proposed a slogan 'Transfer digital divide to The minister of Ministry of Economic
digital opportunities' during the conference Affairs, Lin Hsin-i and the Chairperson of
period in APEC in 2000 the Council for Economic Planning and
Development, Chen Po-chin suggested
bringing the issue of bridging digital
divide into the long-term agendas of
APEC, and set up two-staged
enforcement.
1. Stage one: held by Taiwanese
government in July of 2001.
2. Stage two: providing all members
of APEC with assistance in
reducing the digital divide, and all
provisions will be made to meet
the demands of individual
countries.
2002 e-Tciiwan programme proposed by the Aims to make Taiwan a number one
Executive Yuan of Taiwan. country in the Asia Area.
2003 'The Instruction Committee of Bridging the The first official institute regarding
Digital Divide' was founded by National reducing the digital divide
Information and Communication Initiative
Committee (NICI)
2004 'An Action Plan of Reducing the Digital 1. The budget of the whole package
Divide' is US $2.1 billion to be spread
over the coming four years.
2. Aims to reduce digital gaps
among races and geographical
areas with Taiwan.
Figure 1.4 Timetable of Informatisation in Taiwan (Source: Complied by the Author)
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1.3.2.3 Similarities and Dissimilarities between China and Taiwan
Historically and Culturally
In general, China and Taiwan shared the same history and culture until the year 1949
when civil war took place. After losing the war, the National Party (Kuomingtang, KMT)
retreated to Taiwan and ruled Taiwan for more than fifty years until it regained power in
the 2008 presidential election. The population of Taiwan is largely composed of
Chinese emigrants from the southeastern provinces, e.g. Fujian and Guangtong. Most
people in Taiwan practice a mixture of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. The
Chinese practiced similar religions before the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to
rule China in 1949 (Cheung and Chow, 1999: 371).
After 1949, the social and cultural aspects of Taiwan have been influenced by Japan and
by the US: Japan had colonized Taiwan for half a century and the US had supported
Taiwan financially throughout the 1950s and 60s. While in China, the Cultural
Revolution of the late 1960s altered longstanding systems of Chinese values. Chinese
people were not given religious rights until 1978. The culture of China was pushing
toward Marxism-Leninism and Maoist Communism and the CCP was eliminating
organized religion and Confucian values from the late 1960s to 1978 (Cheung and Chow,
1999: 371). These histories may have influenced later technological development in both
countries. More details on these histories/national contexts are provided in Chapters 5
and 7 respectively.
Politically
The spread of the Internet has been driven by neither purely technological nor purely
economic factors. Political factors, especially the type of domestic institutions, have
exerted a powerful influence. Democratic governments facilitate the spread of the
Internet relative to autocratic ones, even when controlling for economic, technological,
sociological, and other political factors (Milner, 2006).
The attitude of the Chinese government on opening up the Internet is paradoxical. On
the one hand, the Chinese government is eager to develop the Internet so as to grasp
the chance for the third industrialisation and not lag behind the advanced countries.
However, on the other hand, it hopes to keep its authority, and not find itself
overthrown by the greatly increased access to information enabled by the Internet.
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Therefore, the regulation of Internet use through political means is often enforced. For
example, in 1995, the Chinese government blocked the search engine Alta Vista for a
few days and, as of 2005, China requires bloggers and owners of personal Web sites to
register with the government or be forced offline (New York Times, 08/06/2005).
>
Economically
Within the democratic polity, the economic development of Taiwan follows the
capitalist market rationale, while the Chinese government adopts a socialist market
economy within an authoritarian polity. However, the relationship between technological
development and economic development in these two countries has much in common.
Firstly, in both polities, science and technology are seen to be driving national
development - especially economic development. Secondly, political influence on
technological development in both cases is obvious. These observations will be shown
in Chapters 5 and 7, and can be further evidenced when comparing the similarities
between Cun Cun Tong (providing every village with a telephone and internet connection)
policy in China and Digital Opportunity Centre (DOC) programming in Taiwan.
These two countries provide good case studies for comparing different political as well
as economic systems—democratic vs. communist, free market economy vs. socialist
market economy.
1.3.3 Which Digital Divide Policies in China and Taiwan Are Examined?
This research starts with a general analysis of digital divide discourses in China and
Taiwan, and ends with a comparison between specific case studies from each country so
as to demonstrate the impact of policy framing on policy-making and implementation.
In line with the my decision to make the main unit of analysis a comparison between
these two countries, the research design is determined to investigate a digital divide
policy at the state-level. In this research, a state-level digital divide policy means the
policy which is made and implemented/regulated by the central government.
This decision to investigate state-level digital divide policies stems from the literature
reviewed, as well as the data available. The large scale of state-level digital divide policies
means that they are automatically significant for policy-makers. They are also large
enough and well known/documented enough for the researcher to be able to follow
discursive process and policy implementation. Additionally, the literature reviewed in
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this thesis shows that most programmes and initiatives drafted in advanced countries
and international organizations emphasise national competition and economic growth.
In some senses, it is typical to investigate a digital divide policy at the state-level.
However, the research design of comparing specific policy implementations in each
nation necessitated the selection of particular policy domains. More discussion on the
process of selecting policy domains is provided in Chapter 3, section 3.5.1.2.
The reasons provided above justify the selection of state-level digital divide policies for
comparison in this research. The decision to select only two cases for detailed analysis
reflected a pragmatic trade-off between breadth and depth of analysis (and as we shall
see in the methodology discussion in chapter 3, detailed qualitative analysis posed
particular challenges when investigating the Chinese situation).
This research sought to identify and analyze the area of policy implementation that
could best reflect the current development of digital divide policy-making in specific
countries. After reviewing the various possibilities, I chose the Cun Cun Tong policy in
China and the Digital Opportunity Centre (DOC) programme in Taiwan for specific case
study in this research.
The Cun Cun Tong policy is useful for the following reasons. First of all, it is a state-level
digital divide policy which fits the criteria mentioned above. Secondly, this policy is
currently the most significant national policy in bridging the digital divide; it is
recurrently mentioned by national leaders in different national speeches and is one of
the main goals of the Tenth and Eleventh Five-Year Plans. Thirdly, this policy serves as
a good example of the embodiment of national development discourse pertinent to
bridging the digital divide. Fourthly, this policy has been carried out across the
borderline of China's transition from a socialist economy to a more market-oriented
economy; this transition may to a large extent influence the profit performance of the
state-owned private operators13 in charge of this policy. That is to say, this policy
represents a paradox worthy of attention: the Chinese government is on the one hand
creating a free telecom market via liberalisation (see Chapter 5), while on the other hand
it is intervening in the free market via the fen pian bao gan (frfjf/Ell£) mechanism in
order to achieve the policy goal of universal service. Fen means separating, pian means
sections, bao means obligation, and gan means taking actions. Therefore, y£/z pian bao gan
means to separate the task into several geographical sections, with each section
15 Regarding the definition of state-owned private operators, please refer to Chapter 5.
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delegating an obligator to operate. Facing this paradox, the Chinese government still
stands in-between two styles of government—socialist and capitalist—when it comes to
overcoming barriers to 'development', i.e. the digital divide.
Similar criteria have been used to select a digital divide policy for examination in Taiwan.
First of all, the Taiwanese government has initiated a nation-level policy to bridge the
digital divide in 2003: Ce-Taiwari. Since I chose a state-level digital divide policy bridging
the digital divide between regions in China, I also chose a state-level digital divide policy
from the 'e-Taiwari programme in Taiwan, thus allowing me to conduct a comparative
study. Secondly, the 'Digital Opportunity Centre' programme comes from the slogan of
'transfer the digital divide to digital opportunity' as was proposed by the Taiwanese
officers during the conference period in APEC in 2000. This slogan and the consequent
DOC programme gained a great deal of attention in the media report. Thirdly, in the
course of data collection, interviewees debated the interpretation of the term 'digital
divide' when mentioning it in the DOC programme. For this reason alone, the DOC
programme provides a sufficient case study for investigation.
Every choice inevitably entails opportunity costs. My choice for this research
undoubtedly sacrifices other interesting digital divide policies. This is particularly clear in
the case of China where other policies include those addressing the regulation of
internet cafes, IT skills training in schools, participation in a UNDP programme on rural
technology centres, and bridging regional digital divide projects initiated by city
administrations. However, the regulators of internet cafes are police departments
gong an) in the local governments — not in the central government. The UNDP
programme on rural technology centres in China is still in the trial stage shi dian)
and is neither well developed nor completely implemented. The city-level digital divide
policy does not meet the criteria this research sets up in the investigation of nation-level
digital divide policy. Thus, these policies are not appropriate case studies for this
research.
1.4 Research Questions
The goal of this thesis is to answer the core question: how has the digital divide been
framed and defined in its original social and economic context in the industrialised
world, especially in the US, in Europe, and in international organisations? How have the
broader social and economic contexts in a specific country, in this research, China and
Taiwan, shaped digital divide policy? The sub-questions include: How has the meaning
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of the digital divide been framed within China's and Taiwan's contexts and how is the
policy formulated? How have these been translated to implementation? Who are the
actors? What are the similarities and dissimilarities of digital divide policy making in my
case countries, and what specific examples apply?
•PolicyDefinitions- How is the digital divideframed as a problem that needs to be solved within
the international and national context?
This main question deals with the interpretation of the digital divide internationally and
nationally. It is divided into a set of sub-questions (as outlined below) and uses specific
policies to illustrate or set up a specific time frame:
a. How is the digital divide framed internationally daring the time periodfrom the early 1990s to
2005?
Policy-making is conditioned by the broader process of framing and defining the
problem within the context. Therefore, the first question raised in this research is how
the issue of the digital divide emerged internationally. The time period this chapter
investigates stretches from the early 1990s when the US launched National
Infrastructure Initiative, to 2005 and the second phase of the World Summit of
Information Society. I do not attempt to outline all the existing organisations involved in
information-related and digital divide issues during this time span. Rather, in order to
meet the interests of this doctoral study in a discursive framework, the organisations
discussed in this research are those that explicitly mention the definition of the term
'digital divide' in their official documents as well as those suggested by my interviewees.
Some other international organisations or sub-institutions, such as the United Nations
Development Programme and the World Bank, which serve as the main funding bodies
for reducing the digital divide, are not selected for analysis, because they devote little
space in their documents to discussing the definition of the digital divide.
b. How is the digital divideframed at a national level?
Apart from the international context, national contexts may have impacts on digital
divide policy-making. Therefore, the second question is how the digital divide is framed
at a national level within domestic contexts.
Since social scientific knowledge plays a significant role in framing policy discussion,
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social scientific knowledge can help structure the problem and discourse about the
problem, as well as clarify the problem and the available solutions. In order to unveil the
knowledge that is employed in the policy process, the question raised here is how the
digital divide is perceived as a problem that requires attention.
• Actors and Policy Outcomes- Which ministries/institutes participate in poliy-makingfor
Cun Cun Tong in China and for the Digital Opportunity Centre/\APEC Digital Opportunity
Centre in Taiwan?
The framings of the digital divide may influence the selection of ministries/institutes
involved in digital divide policy-making. This research will investigate
ministries/institutes involved in policy-making, and divide them into three groups as
policy-makers, policy implementers, and researchers.
• Comparison- Where are the similarities/divergences between digital divide policy-making in
China and in Taiwan? How do they relate to specific international/national contexts?
Interpretive policy analysts are to a large extent interested in the disputed dimensions of
policy-making processes and in differences between nations. For example, one of the
central questions for interpretive policy analysts is 'how is the policy issue being
conceptualized or "framed" by the parties to the debate?' (Fischer, 2003: 143). Less
literature exists on similarities in policy between nations and the harmonisation of policy.
However, policy convergence is a prospective topic while researching digital divide
policy in developing countries. The questions turn out to be: why and how is policy
convergence achieved internationally?' In answering these questions, the international
context will be considered simultaneously.
Apart from the similarities, there may be also divergence between national policies, since
there exist different national contexts within each country. Therefore, in answering this
question, the national context will be taken into account. I will draw upon the
differences within my case study countries to provide the answer to this question.
1.5 Conclusion
Most discussion on the digital divide and relevant policy has taken place in relation to
the developed economies. This thesis will overcome the lack of systematic knowledge
of these issues in developing economies by examining the cases of China and Taiwan. A
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comparison between these two settings will throw important light on the influence of
the economic and political context on the emerging Information Societies.
With the advancement of Internet usage, concerns have been voiced in many
fields—governments, academic scholars, and industries. Among these concerns, the
issue of the digital divide is attracting more and more attention. In the developed world,
for example, the European Union and North America, surveys and programmes
pertinent to the issue of bridging digital divides bloom like bamboo shoots after a
spring shower.16 For the developing countries, from the mid-1990s onwards, the issue
of bridging digital divides occupies a significant position in drafting national
development programmes.'' The programmes related to bridging digital divides to a
very large extent are drafted in terms of national development and national competition.
Furthermore, almost all of these programmes are designed in the context of
technological innovation and implementation, which are always combined with
economic growth. There is a conspicuous absence of alternative considerations, e.g.
communication rights.
However, while more attention has been paid to the issue of the digital divide, less
analysis has been directed to the programmes or policies that address it due to unclear
delineation of policy fields. Most digital divide policies are taken-for-granted and
classified either into the area of technology policies or subordinate to the policies aimed
to upgrade economic growth/national development, which will be evidenced in my case
studies.
Nevertheless, some researchers are now transferring their attention to a micro level on
the rhetorical forms of digital divide policies, albeit in an unsystematic fashion. This
thesis attempts to combine these two levels, seeking to combine macro and micro levels
and also the meso level of the policy institutions. The scope of the thesis therefore does
not only encompass an analysis of the macro structure of political and economic
backgrounds, but also the micro discourses and participant institutions' dynamics within
policy-making.
16 USA five NITA surveys—Falling through the net: a survey of the 'have nots' in rural and urban
America (1995); Falling through the net II: new data on the digital divide (1998); Falling through the net:
defining the digital divide (1999); Falling through the net: toward digital inclusion (2000); A nation online:
how Americans are expanding their use of the Internet (2002).
17 For example, the Taiwanese government proposed a six year national development programme, which
definitely drafted a sub-programme to promote the penetration rate of the Internet usage. The Chinese
government announced the importance of bridging digital divides in public at both international and
national occasions, though the issue is still at an early stage in China.
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1.6 Thesis Structure
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 will present the synthesised theoretical
approaches of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and interpretive policy research,
the second of which is composed of a systematic/critical analysis and synthesis from
the point of view of two main disciplines—policy research and discourse analysis. The
mapping of this research is proposed at the end of this chapter (see Figure 1.5).
Chapter 3 presents the methodology adopted in this thesis. This research adopts a
strategy of triangulation. It combines various modes and methods of
enquiry—discourse analysis of policy documents with interviewing policy-makers.
Interviews are used to obtain first hand materials which throw light on the orientation
and context of the various actors who participate in policy-making and their
concerns/discourses during policy-making. Finally, there is an analysis of policy
outcomes. This research also contributes to opening the black box of policy-making,
particularly in China, a context which presents particular challenges for the researcher.
Chapter 4 synthesises relevant activities, programmes, conferences, etc. of regional and
international organisations to establish the discursive frameworks for the thesis. The
established discursive frameworks serve as the points of reference when I analyse the
digital divide discourses in China and in Taiwan. Therefore, the changing definition and
discursive frames of the digital divide in these documents will be analysed. The
international organisations and relevant documents are of great importance because
they play a role as the context for my two case countries. However, these frameworks do
not suffice to encompass the varieties of frameworks of digital divide discourses in
China and Taiwan. To bridge this gap, the case-study chapters 5-8 will display and
propose complementary interpretations of the digital divide in China and in Taiwan.
Chapters 5 to 8 outline the empirical studies and analysis in China and Taiwan in terms
of the questions proposed in Chapter 1. Chapter 5 sketches the map of the historical
context of China, which is embedded within the wider international/global context and
serves as the background understanding of the digital divide policy-making in China.
Following Chapter 5, Chapter 6 presents digital divide policy-making and
implementation in China, in response to the research questions raised in Chapter 1.
Chapter 7 and 8 present Taiwan's case and follow a similar structure to Chapter 5 and 6.
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Chapter 9 serves as a condensed comparison of the case studies in China and Taiwan.
Chapter 10 concludes this research and proposes potential contributions to policy
research theory as well as further digital divide policy-making in developing countries.
Reflections on the methodology will also be presented here.
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This interdisciplinary research straddles two academic fields, Science and Technology
(STS) and policy making, and it investigates the relationship between technology and
society. In order to complete this research, Science and Technology Studies (STS) and
policy research are combined so as to provide an analytical framework for the project.
While literature from (STS) provides insight into the relationship between technology
and society, interpretive policy research offers an analytical approach for analysing
policy-making.
In this chapter, I begin by presenting a selective review of important concepts, which
are generated from Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Policy Research to create
an interdisciplinary literature review, and conclude with my own analytical framework
for this thesis. The arrangement of this chapter is as follows. First of all, I pinpoint a
need to borrow certain insights from STS so as to assist in Policy Research (section 2.1).
In section 2.2, I summarise an STS discussion of the relationship between technology
and society, in particular the concept of 'interpretive flexibility' as taken from the Social
Construction of Technology (SCOT). Furthermore, I present three different discursive
framings of the relationship between the Internet and society in order to apply the
concept of interpretive flexibility. This discussion provides insights for the empirical
analysis of storylines in this research.
In section 2.3,1 start to show the linkage between STS and Interpretive Policy Research
by introducing 'context'. I argue that the policy is situated within specific contexts
(problem definition, policy making and implementation), both international and national.
In this section, I critically review the literature pertinent to the concept of 'context'
from the theoretical fields of policy research and STS. I discuss the concept
'contextuality' as developed by the policy specialist Harold Lasswell in the 1950s.
Afterwards, I present the work from STS scholars to reveal why a technological issue
becomes a policy issue, and I consider how STS scholars appropriate and operationalise
the concept 'context' in their research. Jasanoff's term 'co-operation' (2005) will serve as
an example that uses 'culture', in particular the political culture, to operationalise the
context within which technology policy is made.
In section 2.4, I discuss and develop the concept of domestication, which is highly
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related to 'context' as mentioned in section 2.3; this proves a useful concept when
investigating how the 'digital divide' has been appropriated by policy-makers in my case
countries. I first introduce this concept from Silverstone's work (1991) on technology
adoption in the household. I then discuss how Sorensen (1996) and Brosveet and
Sorensen (2000) point out the symbolic dimensions of this concept. Furthermore, I
draw on one working paper (Graham et al., 2008) from the PRECEPT project18 in order
to show that this concept has been developed so as to analyse how an idea is selectively
taken up and may be transformed as it moves between/among actors and contexts. This
also shows that the concept of domestication is no longer confined to analyzing
technological adoption in contrast to its original use in household studies. At the end of
this sub-section, I explain how the concept of domestication is useful for my analysis.
In section 2.5, I draw upon the literature from interpretive policy research and discuss
the role of discourse in interpretive policy research, arguing that public policy could be
taken as discourses by drawing on works from Gusfield (1984), Hajer (1995), and
Gottweis (1998). I explain why the concept of 'storylines' is a middle-range idea (see
page 52 for a more precise explanation) for my analysis, which connects the theoretical
and empirical aspects of my research. This middle-range concept in Hajer's work is a
conceptual innovation, which is inspired by Foucault's theory of discourse. Hajer sought
to bridge the gap between Foucault's abstract work and the study of concrete political
events. He states that through the middle-range concepts, 'the interaction between
discourses can be related to the role of individual strategic action in a non-reductionist
way' (Hajer, 1995: 51-52). I also discuss how storylines are activated in terms of
framings alongside the theories of social problems, policy learning, policy research, and
the Information Society. I use this literature to describe how an interpretation of the
issue at stake may influence a government's decision to recruit certain institutions to
participate in policy-making, policy implementation, and policy outcomes. Following
this discussion, I present the analytical framework for my research. This combined
analytical framework will guide me in the design of my research methodology in
Chapter 3, e.g. the identification of research objects—what documents to search, what
institutes/individuals to interview, and so forth. It will also frame my analysis in later
chapters.
18 This project provides abundant research findings for the idea of Business Process Re-enginnering
(BPR) uptake study. The data for this project were collected from academic and industrial press in
Denmark, Germany, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK, including content analysis of the
BPR literature in English, French and Spanish language. This working paper summarises the findings of
the PRECEPT project in relation to the different national and professtional uptake and appropriation of
a claimed 'global' prescription for business and technology best practice of BPR.
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2.1 The Need to Borrow Insights from STS to Assist in Policy Research
This section explains why there is a need to include insights from STS in policy research.
The reason comes from the complex problem that ICTs present to policy-makers, e.g.
uncertainty due to its novelty and the unknown features of a fast-developing technology.
On the one hand, policymakers are fascinated with the impacts new technology may
have and welcome it. On the other hand, possessing insufficient knowledge about the
new technology, policymakers are anxious about the possible negative effects it may
bring.
STS scholars Spinardi and Williams (2005) observe this ambivalence and find a recurrent
fear expressed across many science and technology policy statements about the risks of
nations and regions getting left behind in the global technology race. They argue that
this recurrent fear stems from a dilemma that policymakers recognise that science and
technology are important for social and economic development, but they do not have
enough capability to completely understand the speedy advancement of, or predict the
potential outcomes from the development of science and technology (Spinardi and
Williams, 2005: 45).
Spinardi and Williams propose the term 'discontinuity' to explain the phenomenon of
mismatch between new science and technology and an old policy framework. They use
this term to flag the policy challenge facing policy-makers in the science and technology
policy area, which cannot be just 'new wine' (new science and technology) in an 'old
bottle' (old policy framework), even if this framework was successfully applied to
previous innovations.
With regard to 'discontinuity', Spinardi and Williams mention two types of science and
technology—normal and radical. Normal science and technology means 'where changes
involves incremental improvement based on established "paradigms", and are therefore
reasonably predictable and relatively easy to manage' (Spinardi and Williams, 2005: 47);
whilst radical science and technology indicates changes which 'do not build
incrementally on existing paradigms and are thus difficult to predict and to manage'
(Spinardi and Williams, 2005: 47).
In light of the anxiety of policymakers, and the need to ameliorate this anxiety, there is a
need to incorporate theoretical and analytical concepts from STS into policy research to
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underpin a better understanding of the issues at stake for policy-making. In this case the
digital divide policy deals with both technology and policy.
The selective literature reviewed from STS for this thesis focuses on the debate about
the relationship between technology and society, ranging from the simplified notion of
technological determinism to social construction of technology and social shaping of
technology. This review not only provides a comprehensive background to the
theoretical discussion on technology and society, but underpins the analysis in later
chapters of this thesis that describe policy-makers' perceptions of the social
implications of the Internet. Furthermore, it equips me with insights with which to
criticise the discursive practices which are employed during the course of policy making
and implementation in my case countries.
2.2 Insights from STS Literature: Technology and Society
This thesis is concerned about how ICTs, in particular the Internet, and a tightly related
concept 'the digital divide' to ICTs, are interpreted. Literature from STS provides the
insights, e.g. different interpretations of the relationship between technology and society,
for conducting analysis of discourses on the Internet and the digital divide.
This section provides in general a theoretical background of the understanding of
technology In the first sub-section, I summarise the understanding of technology from
the theoretical perspective found within the STS literature. The second sub-section is
devoted to the three divergent perceptions of the Internet, which serves as an
underpinning for the analysis of empirical data pertinent to the interpretation of the
digital divide in Chapter 6 and in Chapter 8 respectively
2.2.1 Approaches to the Understanding of the Relationship between Technology and
Society
2.2.1.1 Technological Determinism and its Critiques
A generalised definition of the term 'technological determinism' encompasses two main
ideas. 'First, there is the notion that technological change follows a logic of its own
which, at least to some extent, is independent of human will. Secondly, there is the
belief that changing technology brings with it social changes' (MacKenzie, 1999: 39).
Discussions about the advent of 'the information society' or 'the information
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technology revolution' often 'attributes some such casual role to technological change'
(Mackenzie, 1999: 39). As MacKenzie observes, the reason that technological
determinism (here he is drawing on the second notion of technological determinism)
remains 'is partly because most people experience technological change in their everyday
lives as an external process, in which they have no involvement and over which they
have no control' (MacKenzie, 1999: 39).
Similar to the generalised definition mentioned above, Wyatt et al (2000) propose three
aspects of the relationship between technology and society, in which they also address
the idea of 'technological determinism'. They furthermore apply this to the information
society and the digital divide. The three types of relationship between technology and
society that he outlines are as follows (Wyatt et al., 2000: 8-9):
a. technological determinism: 'in which technologies emerge as if from nowhere
and then proceed to transform the society into which they are diffused'
b. technological as neutral: 'also has the technology emerging from nowhere, but,
in this perspective, the implication is that people choose how they want to use it'
c. constructivism: 'emphasises the origins and development of technology,
demonstrating how people are involved in the creation of technological
networks, not only in how they are subsequently used'
The criticism of Wyatt et al. (2000) parallels MacKenzie's summary. He mentions 'the
first part of technological determinism, that technologies simply follow an internal,
technical logic free of social forces' (Wyatt et al., 2000: 10). Moreover, the technological
determinism approach is 'usually associated with the notion that technological progress
represents social progress' (Wyatt et al., 2000: 9), and 'the problem with technological
determinism is that it leaves no space for human choice or intervention and, moreover,
absolves people from responsibility for the technologies they make and use' (Wyatt et al.,
2000: 9-10).
2.2.1.2 Social Construction of Technology fSCOT)
'Interpretive flexibility' is a key concept of the SCOT approach which is employed to
rebut the 'technological determinism' discussed above. 'Interpretive flexibility' stems
from the Empirical Programme of Relativism (EPOR), which comes from the
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) and 'has produced several studies
demonstrating the social construction of scientific knowledge in "hard" sciences' (Pinch
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and Bijker, 1984: 409). This term means that there is flexibility in how technology is
designed and developed (Pinch and Bijker, 1984; Williams, 2002) and how people think
and interpret technology (Kling, 1991a; Pinch and Bijker, 1984).
Regarding how people think about and interpret technology, Woolgar and Grint
(Woolgar, 1991; Grint and Woolgar, 1997) have further developed this argument and use
the metaphor of a 'technology text' to show that, like texts, technologies can be flexibly
interpreted (Sismondo, 2003: 82). A series of debates about technological determinism
and the effects of technology change, i.e. the guns and roses debate between Kling and
Woolgar, serves as a classical example of interpretive flexibility (see Kling, 1991a;
Woolgar and Grint, 1991; Kling, 1991b; Woolgar, 1991; Kling, 1992a; Grint and
Woolgar, 1992; Kling, 1992b). In response to Kling's question (1992a): What's so social
about being shot?' Grint and Woolgar argue that 'a gun being shot is not nearly as
simple a thing as it might seem' (Sismondo, 2003: 82). They continue that 'the act of
shooting a gun is intensely meaningful' (Sismondo, 2003: 82) and 'even injuries by
gunshot can take different meanings' (Sismondo, 2003: 82). Furthermore, even death
has cross-cultural differences (Sismondo, 2003: 82-83). Therefore, 'no matter how
unmalleable a technology might look, there are always situations, some of them highly
theoretical, in which the technology can take on unusual uses or interpretations'
(Sismondo, 2003: 83). This provides inspiration for my research to adopt a discursive
approach within an interpretive policy research that will be introduced in section 2.5.
Wyatt et al. (2000) also elucidate the concept of social construction of technology. They
state that 'the essence of the constructivist argument is that technologies are objects
made by people—Whereas technological determinism presents social change as being
the result of technological change, social constructivism explains technologies as being
actively shaped by different social groups. Moreover, social constructivism sometimes
regards the distinction between society and technology as an arbitrary one, if sometimes
an analytically and practically useful distinction' (Wyatt et al., 2000: 10-11).
According to Wyatt et al (2000), there are three ways of saying that technologies are
socially constructed. First of all, 'technologies are the material embodiment of the
values and interests of particular social groups or classes'; secondly, 'cultural meanings
of technologies are elements in languages and in symbolic universes'; and thirdly, 'the
workings of technologies are the outcome of negotiation between individuals, groups
and institutions' (Wyatt et al., 2000: 10).
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The first proposition is sometimes referred to as the 'social shaping of technology'
approach (Wyatt et al., 2000: 10). The second proposition 'is informed by Pierre
Bourdieu that the social and cultural meanings given to technical artefacts through the
processes of consumption or use are emphasised' (Wyatt et al., 2000: 11). For example,
'at a national level, weapons systems are not merely collections of warheads and missile
launchers; they provide a country with a sense of prestige and give signals to other
nations about intentions and capabilities. Here, technologies are not primarily material
objects but constitute an arena for contesting meaning' (Wyatt et al., 2000: 11).
They continue that 'the third type of constructivism somewhat resembles the first,
although the construction of meanings predominant in the second also has an
important role to play. It differs from the first in that the contingent nature of
technological change is stressed. The notion in the social shaping approach that
technologies physically embody political or other values can be as reductionist as
technological determinism The third form of constructivism differs from the second
in that the process of stabilising meaning, itself always dynamic and contingent, is
central to the process of creating the artefact and does not only occur after the artefact
enters a wider world of consumption and use. This notion of interpretative flexibility
has been one of the major contributions of the social construction of technology
approach' (Wyatt et al., 2000: 12).
2.2.1.3 Social Shaping of Technology (SST)
The SST approach is developed and advanced so as to respond to the criticism of
earlier STS literature. The criticisms arise from several issues: firstly, early STS work
gives undue attention to technology developers and prior technological design. Secondly,
the appropriation of already-developed concepts to analyse different technologies as
well as contexts in which the technologies are designed, developed and used may reveal
the incompetence of these concepts. For example, the concept of interpretive flexibility,
which emphasises the negotiability and interpretive flexibility in the early development
of novel technical fields and explains the eventual stability (closure), is neither
competent to account for a more comprehensive context in which the technology is
fostered (Williams, 2002: 5-6) nor sufficient to allow 'operafionalisation of the
relationship between the wider milieu and the actual content of technology' (Russell,
1986: 335)19. One of the contributions of SST is bridging the gap between the research
19
Russell quoted Pinch and Bijker's (1986) original sentence to make his criticism.
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on local actors and that on broader social and institutional structures (Williams, 2002: 7).
From the SST perspective, Sorensen (2002) summaries the following concepts of the
understanding of technology. The first one regards technology as a catalyst, which sees
'social change as neither made through new technologies nor through new social
strategies or juxtapositions of structures, but rather through new socio-technical
constellations' (Sorensen, 2002: 22). He explains that 'neither technology nor culture
suffices; the result is achieved through interaction and the weaving together of material
and non-material elements' (Sorensen, 2002: 22-23). This first concept, with its
emphasis on weaving and interaction, relates to the second one, domestication, which
argues for the important role that social actors play in the appropriation of technology.
Additionally, SST researchers see themselves not merely as academic scholars but also
practitioners who can apply STS perspective on the policy field. This enthusiasm helps
alleviate the lacuna existing between two currently separate bodies of literature, i.e.
technology studies and policy research. Although the research outcomes may not have a
straightforward carry-over into policy, social shaping research may help 'develop a
knowledge base for policy' (Sorensen, 2002: 24). Sorensen states that the policy
relevance of knowledge stems from the fact that knowledge can help structure the
problem and discourse about the problem as well as clarify the problem and available
resolution (Sorensen, 2002: 24). In light of this, SST 'could be used to change the
understanding of the problem' (Sorensen, 2002: 25) and further draw out different
policy outcomes.
2.2.2 Perspectives on the Internet and Society
This section describes three strands of debates on the social implications of the
Internet which best exemplify the theoretical debate about the relationship between
technology and society and underpin the discursive practices I will appropriate for
analysis in this thesis. The first two, technological utopianism and dystopianism are
ascribed to technological determinism (Wyatt et al, 2000). 'Underpinning both the
Utopian and dystopian futures is a very linear sense of the unfolding trajectories of
technology development and of their social, economic and environmental implications'
(Spinardi and Williams, 2005: 52).
While discussing the digital divide, attention and rhetoric overwhelmingly focus on the
digital technologies. However, 'what the "digital" in digital divide actually refers to'
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(Selwyn, 2002: 7) should be considered in advance. In this research, ICTs are the main
concern, in particular the Internet.
The advent and development of the Internet has been viewed as a by-product of the
post-Cold War era (Moschovitis et al., 1999), and participants involved in creating the
Internet were from such fields as the military, research institutes, academia, and
commercial firms. The space race between the Soviets and the US had begun with the
first satellite Sputnik sent into orbit by Soviet scientists in 1957. So as not to lag behind
their Cold War competitor, the US Congress passed the National Defense Education
Act in 1958, providing a loan to students to foster a new generation of scientists.
Meanwhile, the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) was created to bolster
national security. Later on, the first multicomputer network, ARPANet, was set up,
which consisted of initial research sites in late 1969; in the next two years, more
participant sites were involved (Moschovitis et al., 1999). The history of the
development of the Internet implies that the motivation for constructing it was not for
civilian use, but for the military and national defense.
From the 1960s onwards, Internet development has progressed at a very fast pace.
Programmes related to the Internet did not narrowly focus on military defense, but
expanded to a wider variety of fields. During the 1970s, with the advent of personal
computers, a new array of possibilities for Internet use opened up (Moschovitis et al.,
1999), such as the first electronic mail (e-mail), bulletin board system (BBS), and so
forth. The Internet gradually became a communication tool which circulated in and
between universities and research institutions. However, the public was still excluded
during this period. It was not until the 1980s that, alongside the growing user population,
the issues relevant to the Internet transformed with the encouragement of commercial
use and participation. During the 1990s, commercial use in the US meant that the
Internet stepped into a new era.
With the increasing popularity of the Internet, more and more attention has been paid
to its advantages and disadvantages. The positions on the social impacts of the Internet
are categorised into three common groupings—1) technophile, optimistically treating
the Internet as an panacea for political liberation; 2) technophobia, taking the opposite
position of worrying about chaos in all aspects of life as a result of the Internet; 3) an
in-between position, taking the more moderate attitude of waiting to see how the
Internet will perform. Below is a detailed discussion of these three positions.
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2.2.2.1 Technophile (Utopian)
The term 'technophile' was coined by Neil Postman in his work titled Technopolj in 1993,
and means the advocates who support the technology, and are always looking at the
positive and encouraging side of the Internet. These advocates believe that this
technology is a cornucopia that will remedy all ills (Graham, 1999). Technophiles expect
a more open political environment online than that in existing democracy. It is expected
that the features of trans-time and trans-space of the Internet can engage as much of
the public as possible in political discussion and participation in society. This camp
projects Utopian imaginations onto the Internet. The famous publications by futurist
Alvin Toffler—Future Shock (1970), The Third Wave (1980), Pomrshift (1990), etc.—are
categorised in this camp.
Enthusiasts anticipated that 'the Internet would boost efficiency, making people more
productive and enabling them to avoid unnecessary transportation by accomplishing
online tasks like banking, shopping, library research, even socialising online. The result
would make individuals more fulfilled and build social capital for society at large'
(DiMaggio et al., 2001: 314). They also regard the Internet as a means for promoting
democracy (e.g. Ott, 1998; Ferdinand, 2000)
However, the technophile position overstates the positive side of the new technology,
ignoring the fact that it is used in a structured environment, and technology use requires
relevant knowledge, skills, literacy and the like. In addition, in most cases, new
technology is no more than equipment; existing social status has significant impacts on
technology use and creates diverse consequences. For example, the ability to use the
Internet does not only include technological skills, but also competence in language
(English literacy). A beginner, who is not familiar with the technological skills of the
Internet, not equipped with language ability, or has no relevant knowledge about the
topic he is surfing, is not capable of using the Internet in a satisfying way.
2.2.2.2 Technophobia (Dystopian)
Dystopian responses usually follow Utopian hopes. Opposed to the standpoint
mentioned above, the unavoidable problems brought by the Internet have been noticed
by technophobes. Technophobia is a term applied to those people who are against
technology, and are often afraid that new technology will have negative consequences
for society. These worries concern many fields of life, such as anarchy, surveillance,
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child abuse20, pornography, and the like. The scholars in this camp argue that even
though a network society is emerging, and people are much more dependent on ICTs
than before, society still consists of individualist pairs, groups and organizations (van
Dijk, 1999). The networks in a network society have been establishing external and
internal relationships; however, they do not construct an ideally equal society (ibid.).
Studies have suggested that 'the Internet may induce anomie and erode social capital by
enabling users to retreat into an artificial world' (DiMaggio et al., 2001: 314).
2.2.2.3 In-between
The third camp standing in-between adopts an eclectic standpoint. It regards the
Internet as a catalyst, rather than a positive or negative force with direct impacts on
society. 'The relationship between technology and society is never unidirectional'
(DiMaggio et al., 2001: 327). 'Thus, the social impact of the Internet depends on the
impact of society on what the Internet becomes' (DiMaggio et al., 2001: 327). For
example, it is contended that the Internet indeed opens up a new communication era in
terms of two-way communications on the hand; however, it is also argued that the
apparently democratic digital communication depends very much on the political
situation rather than merely the adoption of the Internet. The participants in the new
digital democracy cannot be easily distinguished from those who are politically
privileged in the real world. Hence, the Internet at best is a catalyst to create a
democratic society, with little power to change our life world dramatically and
completely.
A similar but slightly different view of the Internet is what Warschauer calls 'neutralist'
(or instrumental) theories of technology (Warschauer, 2003a: 202). This perspective
views the technology as a neutral tool, being devoid of content or values. From this
viewpoint, the Internet is not particularly good or bad, but just a place for any purpose.
However, all of the perspectives on the Internet mentioned above ignore the social
context in which the Internet is embedded. Whether technophobia, technophile, or
in-between these two, these views fail to account for the 'social embeddedness of
technology' (Warschauer, 2003a: 203). 'Technologies may not be good or bad in
themselves, but neither are they neutral; rather, they carry with them certain values
20 To protect children from online sexual abuse, the UK government launched Child Exploitation and
Online Protection Centre on 24th of April 2006. Please refer to the website for more details of this center,
http://www.ceop.gov.uk/
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based on their own history and design' (Warschauer, 2003a: 203). This brings my
discussion to the important role that contexts play in the interpretation of the digital
divide in policy-making. Thus, next section will proceed to the interpretive policy
research, and will firstly discuss the concept 'context' and its use in this thesis.
2.3 A Linkage between STS and Policy Research: Context
'Context' serves as the linking point between STS and interpretive policy research for
this thesis. These two disciplines agree that the 'context' in which human actions take
place (the interpretation of the digital divide issue and digital divide policy in my
research) should be considered when social scientists conduct social and political
research.
'Context' is exchangeably used with 'structure' in social sciences. In this thesis, I prefer
'context' to 'structure' to underscore the mutual shaping of structure and agent.
'Structure' implies that there are pre-existing physical or more usually, social frames into
which agents become fixed. Gusfield (1984) argued that 'structure' 'lends itself too
much to a distorted sense of public events as having a fixed, permanent, unchanging
character'; instead, 'ideas and events are contained in an imprecise and changing
container' (Gusfield, 1984: 9). In this thesis, I argue that policy is not just out there, but
a contextualised cooperation between agent and structure.
2.3.1 'Contextuality' in Policy Research
The conception of contextuality was coined by an American political scholar, Harold D.
Lasswell, and has been influential through the process of this research. For Lasswell,
policy research is an interdisciplinary task and must take the entire context into
consideration. Harold D. Lasswell was also the pioneer who proposed an integrated
perspective for policy analysts. He called for a 'policy orientation', taking policy research
as a combination of multidisciplinary academic enterprises (Lasswell, 1951). For him,
the orientation is twofold, which includes 'developing knowledge pertaining to two
separable though entwined frames of references, namely, knowledge in and of the
policy process' (Fischer, 2003: 3; Lasswell, 1970: 13). Hence, this knowledge is both a
goal and means of analysis, and 'provides an orientation to context that is necessary for
the conduct of investigation (Torgerson, 1985: 245). Lasswell's main characteristics of
policy orientation are as follows: a multidisciplinary approach, a problem-orientation
focus that was contextual in nature, and an explicitly normative orientation (Torgerson,
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1985; cited in Fischer, 2003: 3).
In Lasswell's terms, 'contextuality' means the shaping of a 'cognitive map', which is
interwoven with social developmental process as well as the environment inside and
outside the policy process. The importance of contextuality in policy research is due to
'the entire context of events which may have an impact upon the future problems of
policy' (Lasswell, 1951: 4), and 'the world as a whole needs to be kept as the focus of
attendon' (Lasswell, 1951: 4). Moreover, 'the meaning of any detail depends upon its
relation to the whole context of what it is a part' (Lasswell, 1976: 218).
Torgerson, who interpreted and summarised Lasswell's works, stated that 'Lasswell
considered such contextual orientation indispensable to the conduct of rational inquiry,
and he argues the use of contextual-configurative analysis in the development of a
policy science profession' (Torgerson, 1985: 242). 'While Lasswell holds that the policy
sciences are to be concerned with particular problems in specific arenas of action, he
also maintains that the total configuration must be grasped by the analyst as a relevant
object and context of analysis' (Torgerson, 1985: 242).
Some research concerning the issue of the digital divide and how to bridge this divide in
the past few years has transformed the focus from highlighting the need for physical
access to reassessing the significant influences of local context. The journal of The
Information Society devotes considerable space to remapping the digital divide, which goes
well beyond issues of access, and challenges the symbolic, opportunistic, and even the
practical ways we have used to address the digital divide to date (Strover, 2003: 276).
Additionally, 'their attention to political, social, and economic contexts allows us to see
the digital divide as far more than access to equipment' (Strover, 2003: 276).
Contextuality was not only central to Lasswell's initial conception of the policy sciences
but has also influenced the subsequent development of interpretative approaches to
policy analysis (Swaffield, 1998: 199). For an interpretive policy analyst, discourses are
the foci for analysis. The researchers widely adopt this concept of contextuality in the
research to 'accept that meanings of words and concepts in public policy vary according
to the setting in which they are used' (Swaffield, 1998: 199).
Although Lasswelll proposes a very promising concept for policy analysts to conduct
policy research, the operationalisation and conceptual framework for adopting his
concept into empirical research is unclear. Here, I borrow Rein and Schon's work (1993:
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154-155) to serve as an example of applying 'context' into empirical research. Rein and
Schon embark on the recognition that the framing of a policy issue is always carried out
within a 'nested context', which can be distinguished on at least four levels. The first
level is the policy programme, which may serve as its own internal context, adjusting
through changing situations and the replacement of its personnel, sponsors or clients.
The second level is the proximate context in which one programme may interact with
other policies. The third level is the macro context which includes institutional changes,
such as the institutions designed to carry out policy, realignment of party politics, and
economic fluctuations. The last level is situated in the global context, where a shift of
perception concerning one issue may 'have a striking impact on the framing of policy
issues' (Rein and Schon, 1993: 155).
Rein and Schon's operationalisation of 'context', divided into four levels, from micro,
meso to macro, offers a clear-cut framework for conducting empirical analysis. The third
level that they engage with in their work will serve in my own analytical framework as
the national context, and the fourth level as international contexts in which the digital
divide issue and digital divide polices are fostered. I will return to this point and develop
it in detail in the final section of this chapter.
2.3.2 STS Perspectives on 'Context'
STS also pays attention to context, focusing especially on the intervention of the state.
From the Social Shaping of Technology (SST) perspective, as Schneider (1997) argues,
the questions becomes 'why a technological project does not remain solely with
technologist or business firms, but becomes a matter of public pokey and state
decision-making' (Schneider, 1997: 341). He subsequently provides three possible
answers to his question. He explains that, firstly, from an economic perspective, it is
because 'market-guided economic activities fail to provide an autonomous and
self-regulated solution to a particular social need' (Schneider, 1997: 341-342), and
technological infrastructure is an example (Schneider, 1997: 342). Secondly, from a
macro sociological perspective, the reason for poktical intervention is because
'non-economic governance mechanisms have the status of "devices of last resort'"
(Schneider, 1997: 342). Finaky, it is because of 'core interests of ektes, classes, or other
power groups which capture and instrumentakse the state apparatus to achieve their
goals' (Schneider, 1997: 342-343).
Another STS scholar, Sheila Jasanoff, also emphasises the importance of poktical
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culture in science and technology policy. She proposed the idiom 'co-production' in
2004, and in 2005 she furthered this idiom in her comparative research in biotechnology
politics and policy in Britain, Germany and the United States. In her definition, 'political
culture refers to systematic means by which a political community makes binding
collective choices' (Jasanoff, 2005: 21). She argues that political culture is crucial because
it 'matters in shaping the politics of science and technology' (Jasanoff, 2005: 21).
Political culture in her interpretation is not an empty concept, but 'encompasses
institutionally sanctioned modes of action such as litigiousness in the United States, but
also the myriad unwritten codes and practices with which a polity supplements its
formal methods of assuring accountability and legitimacy in political decision making'
(Jasanoff, 2005: 21). Therefore, the application of political culture in contemporary
knowledge societies includes three components—including 'the tacit, but nonetheless
powerful, routines by which collective knowledge is produced and validated' (Jasanoff,
2005: 21); embracing 'institutionalised approaches to reasoning and deliberation'
(Jasanoff, 2005: 21); and including 'the moves by which a polity, almost by default, takes
some issues or questions out of the domain of politics as usual' (Jasanoff, 2005: 21).
Without these components, culture is merely a 'notoriously slippery concept' (Jasanoff,
2005: 22).
2.4 Domestication
Connected with my endeavour to understand the influence of context is the concept of
'domestication', which I use to analyse how policies and discourses are transformed as
they move between different contexts of policy debate and into contexts of policy
implementation. Silverstone (1991) coined the concept of domestication to explain how
technologies were brought into the home and everyday life. Sorensen develops this
concept further in ways relevant to my purposes. He broadens its application from the
home to all aspects of life (1996). In contrast to a linear reception model, he states that
the term 'domestication' metaphorically shows 'the need to "tame" facts and artifacts
that are taken form a "wild" outside world and put into a domestic setting' (1996: 8). He
proposes four elements of domestication in order to make the application more
concrete. Firstly, artifacts have to be acquired and in some way made available. Secondly,
artifacts have to be placed and situated in a physical, symbolic and mental space. Thirdly,
artifacts have to be interpreted and given meaning within a local context. Fourthly,
artifacts have to be integrated into socialpractices of action (Sorensen, 1996: 8). Drawing
upon literature from anthropological analysis as well as from consumption and media
studies, Sorensen (1996) elucidates that meaning is vital and that people need meaning in
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order to make sense of their own lives, both within their local context and within their
'social learning' context of new science and technology. He also applies the idea of
domesticadon to the policy domain to show that the multimedia is domesticated in
different ways at different policy levels and locations (Aune and Sorensen, 1998;
Brosveet and Sorensen, 2000).
Following Sorensen, some scholars have sought to develop the concept of
'domestication' to analyse how ideas have been selectively appropriated (and discursively
transformed) in different local contexts. In their analysis, 'domestication' is no longer
confined to analysing technology adoption (in contrast to its original use in household
studies). For example, Graham et al. (2008, PRECEPT working paper) investigate how
the change management programme of Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) has
been unevenly taken up and interpreted as it has moved into various nations and
linguistic regions. They emphasise that the uptake of ideas is not a linear process — as
might perhaps be conveyed by concepts like 'diffusion' with its template of physical
movement of an unchanged physical entity. Instead it is 'an active process of
appropriation in which ideas are selectively adapted and may be transformed as they
move between actors and contexts' (Sorensen, 1996: 8).
The PRECEPT working paper traces the origin of the concept of BPR back to the US
in the early 1990s. These scholars find that the concept of BPR starts to obtain wide
attention from a paper by Hammer and Champy in 1993 along with some other
contemporaries, and that it is quickly promulgated to the European countries. It shows
that gurus, consultants, and mass media play an important role in the initial
promulgation of BPR. Consultants and user organizations are important components in
the applications stage. Consultants transform BPR based on the demands of the user
organizations, because the managers of the user organizations know what they need
from the consultants and have knowledge of BPR prior to asking for help from
consultants. The managers of user organizations are not just passively waiting for help
from the consultants without having any ideas in their minds.
The PRECEPT working paper finds that there are complex patterns of appropriation
of BPR. Prior alignment with BPR concepts emerges around certain kinds of problem
definition and solutions. However there are differences in the way in which BPR is
appropriated and domesticated within various national contexts. For example, in Spain,
BPR is incorporated in the more evolutionary Human Resource Management models.
In Slovenia, other labels (e.g transformation, restructuring, etc.) replace BPR to indicate
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the renovation of business processes in order to get rid of the stigmatized definition of
BPR—downsizing—in Hammer's concept of BPR. In Germany, BPR is selectively
reconfigured and reinterpreted within more established concepts of business
improvement under the label Lean Production, emphasing the co-determination culture
in German industry. These cases illustrate the different ways in which BPR concepts are
appropriated and domesticated.
The development of the concept 'domestication' in the PRECEPT working paper has
analytical salience for the issue under scrutiny in this thesis. First of all, as a helpful
analytical concept, 'domestication' is extended and developed from the research on
technology appropriation in the household so as to analyse how an idea is selectively
taken up and interpreted in different contexts. Secondly, the importation of BPR from
the US to European countries and then selectively taken up by different countries
inspires my anaylsis - how an ambiguous idea, the 'digital divide', is exported from the
western countries and is selectively taken up by policy-makers in my case countries.
The PRECEPT working paper recognizes that the concept of BPR is transformed in
different contexs, where the actors choose a more established concept to replace BPR.
However, the aforementioned research lacks any analysis of how a concept has been
taken up linguistically between different languages. This is obvious in the literature of
digital divide research. The linguistic element of domestication/appropriation may be
easily overlooked by English speaking scholars, who may take for granted widespread
fluency and accessibility. They ignore the fact that the linguistic translation of one
concept is part of the process of domestication. In my study, interesting processes of
linguistic translation are at play—selecting a Chinese term to describe the 'digital divide'
involves linguistic domestication. The process through which policy-makers look for
appropriate terms in their own language—linguistic translation—should be regarded as
performing the first stage of domestication. Thus, linguistic domestication will come
under scrutiny in this research.
In addition to the linguistic domestication, I will also investigate how the concept of the
digital divide is interpreted within the local context in two case countries. This is
inspired by the work of Brosveet and Sorensen (2000: 263), which applies the idea of
domestication in order to analyse how generic accounts of multimedia are taken up
within particular national contexts of Norwegian education policy. Brosveet and
Sorensen first look at the localized definition of multimedia in Norway, which defines
multimedia by its locally produced contents rather than by its technical components
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(2000: 266). They thereafter investigate the realignments and restructuring of
participating actors to domesticate multimedia in Norway (2000: 270). They finally
investigate the practices the Norwagian government has made to show how the
domestication of multimedia takes place in Norway. Drawing upon the application of
the concept of domestication by Brosveet and Sorensen, as well upon the PRECEPT
working paper, I will examine the local understanding of the digital divide in my case
countries. Furthermore, I will use specific examples to illustrate the precise practices
these countries use to bridge the digital divide.
2.5 Interpretive Policy Research: Analytical Framework
As mentioned above, STS provides certain insights that are useful for the researcher
when he/she is scrutinizing the relationship between technology and society. It reminds
the researcher that there is 'interpretive flexibility' when interpreting the relationship
between technology and society. While STS provides insights for my investigation and
the main lines of analysis for this thesis, I have turned to interpretive policy research to
provide a comprehensive policy research framework for this project. I also draw upon
information and concepts from STS to aid my interpretive policy enquiry whenever it
becomes relevant.
In addition to the concept of 'context' as discussed earlier in this section, I will present
the interpretive policy research framework by linking together several other elements:
discourses, actors, and outcomes. The combination of these elements comes with the
consideration that discursive accounts of digital divide policy may prove elusive if they
are not investigated empirically within international and national contexts (this is also
emphasized in the SST approach). By the same token, however, empirical analysis that
simply assumes that international and national contexts logically influence policy-making
and implementation fails to see that policy-making and implementation follow from the
discourses/storylines that are used to frame the digital divide. The discourses in terms
of storylines serve as the mediator that connects contexts and policy. Each subsection
will discuss relevant concepts and their advantages and disadvantages for this thesis.
This provides a linkage to my selection and development of the analytical framework of
this thesis.
2.5.1 Adopting Discourse Analysis in Policy Research
This subsection deals with the adoption of discourse analysis in interpretive policy
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research. It firstly explains the reason why discourse matters in policy research. Then I
distinguish three approaches of language-centred analysis to explain why I adopt
discourse analysis, instead of content analysis and conversation analysis, for this
research.
2.5.1.1 Why Discourse Matters in Policy Research
Parsons (1995) in his constructivist policy analysis textbook Public Policy: an Introduction to
the Theory and Practice of Polity Analysis articulates the relationship and interaction between
policy analysis and discourse. He states that 'the focus of the argumentative approach is
the study of how language comes to shape the way we make sense of the world. From
this perspective, the analysis of public policy involves exploring the way in which
"policy discourse" comes to frame the arguments in which problems and agendas are
constructed. The starting point for the mode of analysis is the notion that the language
we use to talk about policy problems is not neutral' (Parsons, 1995: 151).
When discourse analysis is adopted in policy research, it is 'defined as a specific
ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and
transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to
physical and social realities' (Hajer, 1995: 44). 'Social and political scientists now widely
accept that the meanings of words and concepts in public policy vary according to the
setting in which they are used. This increasing attention to the meaning of particular
terms used in policy discourse reflects a wider "linguistic turn" in the social sciences'
(Swaffield, 1998: 199). In this sub-section, I argue that discourse functions on two levels.
First of all, discourse functions in the role of making a phenomenon visible. Secondly,
in order to activate the first role, discourse defines and frames the phenomenon and
further suggests the way to solve the phenomenon.
In the first place, I use Gusfield's example of drink-driving to present the importance of
discourse in defining a social problem and in influencing public policy. Then, I move on
to discuss another two scholars' works to show how discourse analysis is of great
significance in interpretive policy research. One is Hajer's work on the politics of
environmental discourse (1995), and the other is Gottweis's work on the discursive
politics of genetic engineering (1995; 1998). Both of their works have informed the way
that the relationship between discourse and policy is investigated in this thesis.
Gusfield (1984) argues that a phenomenon cannot be a social problem if there is no
48
problem-owner to define the phenomenon at stake as a problem. Before the problem
owners connect the two actions of drinking and driving, and give them a causal
relationship, car accidents are merely a countable cause of death juxtaposed with other
causes such as cancer. At this moment, car accidents are regarded as motorists'
individually uncontrollable behaviours, which draw public attention to the 'un-safety' of
cars, and ascribe responsibility to individuals. In this sense, car accidents are not public
problems; individuals are responsible for the accident instead of policy. However, when
the mass media, and the mothers of the victims in car accidents announce that car
accidents are nothing to do with car safety, but with drinking, then the phenomenon is
defined as a drink-driving problem which the government should take action to tackle.
In this case, interpretation has the power to change the understanding of an issue, and
alters the way it is dealt with.
Gusfield's work reveals that social problems are not just 'out there', but are the outcome
of interpretation. Hajer furthers this point and proposes an analytical framework
'discourse coalition' to underscore the role of discourse in understanding the
phenomenon in question. Hajer (1995) is concerned with the emergence of the
discourse of 'ecological modernisation' in environmental discourses within global and
national contexts. He proposes two analytically middle-range concepts 'discourse
coalition' and 'storylines' to investigate the case of acid rain in two countries—the UK
and the Netherlands. He argues that policy research should focus on the impact of
discourse on institutional changes, because policy change and institutional change are
interwoven with the way that people interpret the environment where they live. His
'discourse coalition' is divergent from Sabatier's 'advocacy coalition' (Sabatier, 1988;
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Hajer admits that there is major overlap between his
and Sabatier's analytical frameworks and that in several points he agrees with Sabatier.
Firstly, he agrees with Sabatier that investigation should focus on the process of
coalition formation at the level of a policy subsystem or policy domain and emphasis
should be placed on the shared ideas/beliefs between various actors. Secondly, he agrees
that the interaction between coalitions should be analysed. Finally, he agrees that the
controversies between coalitions should be understood against external parameters such
as social and institutional structures (Hajer, 1995: 69). However, Hajer argues that 'what
people say differs according to the practice in which they engage' (Hajer, 1995: 69). In
this sense, the key point which influences whether people choose to stay in a coalition is
not advocacy, but what coalitions say, the discourse. Language in terms of storylines
changes people's beliefs, and belief determines whether people choose to stay in
coalitions. In practical and analytical terms, discourse coalitions conduct storylines to
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change the way people understand this world. Eventually, discourses foster institutional
changes.
Gottweis's work is an exemplar that illustrates the significant role that language plays in
policy making. Gottweis (1984) investigates the changing interpretations of genetic
engineering between two case studies—Europe and the United States—chronologically
from the 1930s onwards. He also scrutinises other pertinent discourses to explore how
these discourses interrelate/intertwine/interact to foster the politics of genetic
engineering in Europe and the United States. Gottweis finds that genetic engineering is
embedded in a broader modernisation discourse, which underpins science and
technology policies in contemporary times. Gottweis also discusses the impacts of
international biotechnological discourse in Europe; 'the European "politics of genetic
engineering" is part of a larger political texture interwoven with images, development,
and myths of American biotechnology' (Gotteweis, 1998: 6).
To sum up, the aforementioned scholars' works all share several key concerns: they all
emphasise the critical role that discourse plays in policy making and social change; they
are all aware of the interactive/mutual shaping between action and structure, say, the
context. They all flag up an important element in investigating the process of
policy-making, which is the context. This existing literature supports the articulation of
context and interpretation into digital divide policy.
2.5.1.2 How is Discourse Analysis Defined in this Research?
As mentioned in the previous section, 'context' plays a role of great importance in
interpretive policy research. I argue that policy should be regarded as a socially
constructed text embedded in the context (s); simply focusing on the mechanical
structure of texts or frequencies of representations de-contextualise the words from the
discourse being examined (Wilson, 1993) and does not suffice to scrutinise the
interpretive process of policy definition and formulation. 'Under some circumstances
mere counting can lead to misleading conclusions' (Billing, 1988: 206). Therefore, in this
section, I distinguish my approach of discourse analysis from two other frequently-used
approaches in language-related research to elucidate which approach is suitable for my
research in terms of the definition of 'context' that I appropriate in this research. One
is Content Analysis of texts, which is a positivist approach that calculates the
frequencies of coded terms, and the other is Conversation Analysis, which concentrates




Content Analysis is a popular quantitative method in the field of mass communication
studies. It involves coding predetermined categories that are then used to count the
content of mass media products (Silverman, 2004: 27). Researchers use this method to
'establish a set of categories and then count the number of instances that fall into each
category' (Silverman, 2004: 12). In order to make sure that the same result can be
reached by different coders while they examine the same data, the crucial requirement is
that the categories are sufficiently precise (Silverman, 2004: 12). This is also the
advantage of content analysis—reliability of measures (Silverman, 2004: 12). However,
the disadvantages of content analysis overshadow its advantages in three respects: the
theoretical basis is unclear; the conclusion may be trite, and it draws the attention away
from materials which do not fit the predetermined categories (Silverman, 2004: 12).
ConversationAnalysis
In contrast, Conversation Analysis is commonly used in the analysis of spoken texts.
Conversation analysis is based upon three assumptions (Silverman, 2004: 167). The first
assumption regards talks as stable and organised patterns, which are independent of the
psychological or other characteristics of particular speakers. The second assumption is
that a speaker's actions have sequences, which means each action is following the
preceding sequence and cannot be read without referring to the previous action. This
assumption is used to defend Conversation Analysis against criticism that it pays scant
attention to 'context'. I put quotation marks around the concept 'context', because the
concept of 'context' used for defense by conversation analysts is not identical to that in
interpretive policy research. The concept 'context' in conversation analysis refers to the
sequence of talk, rather than the broader social, cultural and political contexts that I
adopt for analysis in this thesis. The final assumption of Conversation Analysis is its
empirical grounding of analysis, which means that the empirical studies of Conversation
Analysis should be conducted in terms of precise analysis of detailed transcripts; any
premature theory construction should be avoided.
DiscourseAnalysis
Grillo (1989) provides an explanation of the difference between conventional linguistics
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analysis, e.g. Conversation Analysis, and Discourse Analysis, and argues that the term
discourse is employed in a variety of senses, which for convenience may be reduced to
two. 'In conventional linguistics, discourse refers to verbal exchanges, the flow of
speech in conversations. This is what "discourse analysis" in linguistics actually studies.
But discourse may also refer to a wide range of higher-order linguistic practices, of
which conversation is but one sentence' (Grillo, 1997: 12). Moreover, 'the discourse
analysis has to cover all that is socially and culturally worked through language. Yet this
must involve a detailed process of contextualisatiort (Grillo, 1997: 12, with emphasis in
original). Therefore, the major distinction between conversation analysis and discourse
analysis is that, as mentioned above, 'context' in conversation analysis refers to the
sequence of talk, but in discourse analysis, it takes wider social contexts into account
while conducting analysis. This concern with 'contextualisation' in discourse analysis is
much more suitable for this thesis and is illustrated by the following definitions of
'discourse':
...it refers to language use anchored in an institutional context, expressing
a fairly structured understanding or a line of reasoning with active,
productive effects on the phenomenon it claims to understand 'neutrally.
[...] Discourses are not produced or mastered by the individuals: they
speak him or her, in what available discourses position the person in the
world in a particular way and at a given time, prior to the individual having
any sense of choice' (Alvesson, 2002.)
Discourse must be set in institutional context, not only as one factor
among a range of salient factors, but also in terms of its institutional
settings, that is, in terms of the vast range of rules—culturally framed,
path dependent, or interest-based on the national level, institutionally
agreed (Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004: 184).
2.5.2 Middle-Range Concept for Analysis—Framing a Storyline
Hajer argues that there is a need to create 'middle-range' concepts through which the
'interaction between discourses can be related to the role of individual strategic action in
a non-reductionist way' (Hajer, 1995: 52). In his work, 'storylines' serve as what he
identifies as 'middle-range' concepts. In this section, I concentrate on the 'storylines',
discuss how storylines are mobilized in policy discourse by means of framing, and then
elicit the core elements in framing.
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2.5.2.1 What is a Storyline?
Hajer uses 'storyline' to serve as the middle-range concept in the analysis of discursive
practice in environmental discourse. The following are the definitions he gives for his
research:
'A story-line, as I interpret it, is a generative sort of narrative that allows
actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to
specific physical or social phenomena.' (Hajer, 1995: 56)
'Story-lines are narratives on social reality through which elements from
many different domains are combined and that provide actors with a set of
symbolic references that suggest a common understanding. Story-lines are
essential political devices that allow the overcoming of fragmentation and
the achievement of discursive closure.' (Hajer, 1995: 62)
Following the definition used by Hajer, 'the point of the story-line approach is that by
uttering a specific element one effectively reinvokes the story-line as a whole. It thus
essentially works as a metaphor' (Hajer, 1995: 62-63).
Hajer further outlines the utilisation and the functions of story-lines. 'First of all
story-lines have the functional role of facilitating the reduction of the discursive
complexity of a problem and creating possibilities for problem closure. Secondly, as
they are accepted and more and more actors start to use the story-lines, they get a ritual
character and give certain permanence to the debate. They become "tropes" of figures
of speech that rationalise a specific approach to what seems to be a coherent problem.
Thirdly, story-lines allow different actors to expand their own understanding and
discursive competence of the phenomenon beyond their own discourse of expertise or
experience' (Hajer, 1995: 63).
The concept of 'storyline' is also adopted by others, such as Pal Nsesje, who argues that
'the use of stories and story-telling has been studied quite extensively in organisational
settings, as a part of narrative processes in organisations. It seems uncontroversial to
hold that stories are a part of an organisation's symbolism and culture, and can act as
vehicles for communication and learning. It is held that stories are one of the artifacts
that generate and sustain meaning and, more importantly here, underpin world-views
and rationality in organisations. As such, these stories can also play an important, if
neglected, role in policy-making processes' (Ntesje, 2002: 278).
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Hajer further explains the advantages of using storylines as a middle-range concept for
analysis. 'Story-lines fulfill an essential role in the clustering of knowledge, the
positioning of actors, and, ultimately, in the creation of coalitions amongst the actors of
a given domain. Story-line is the analytical term that unites several established concerns
in research in the constructivist tradition' (Hajer, 1995: 63).
'Story-lines, in other words, not only help to construct a problem, they also play an
important role in the creation of a social and moral order in a given domain. Story-lines
are devices through which actors are positioned, and through which specific ideas of
"blame" and "responsibility", and of "urgency" and "responsible behaviour" are
attributed' (Hajer, 1995: 65). 'They determine the interplay between physical and social
realities. Storylines are seen as the vehicles of change and are analysed in connection to
the specific discursive practices in which they are produced' (Hajer, 1995: 65).
For Hajer, 'argumentative discourse analysis holds that the power of story-lines is
essentially based on the idea that it sounds right' (Hajer, 1995: 63). And this
interpretation of storylines is very similar to the idea of 'myths' that will be discussed
later.
Jasanoff also applies the concept of 'storyline' in her research. She states that 'the
regulation of science and technology, whether to further innovation or control risk, can
fruitfully be seen as a kind of storytelling by communities situated in particular times
and places who are attempting to deal with unsettling or disruptive changes in their
environments' (Jasanoff, 2005: 23). She further argues that 'stories told in the policy
arena attempt to order and make sense of complex experiences; they enable people to
take meaningful action and so reduce their feelings of helplessness and alienation'
(Jasanoff, 2005: 23-24). The elements of storylines 'often embedded in material objects
and routinised social practices, impose discipline on unruly events by creating
understandable causal relationships, identifying agents of harmful behaviour, and
finding solutions that convey a sense of security and moral order' (Jasanoff, 2005: 24).
2.5.2.2 The F^mplovment of Storylines in Policv-Making—Framing
Here, I use a verb 'framing' instead of a noun 'frame' to indicate that, perceiving an
issue as problematic and further making decisions to resolve the perceived problem is a
recurrent process, undertaken by participants. Yanow (2000) makes similar distinctions
between these two usages in terms of the form of the analytic study. According to
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Yanow, '"frame" as a noun suggests a comparative analysis across communities of
meaning at a (relatively) fixed point in time, of the various ways in which a policy issue
has been "framed", that is, interpreted and understood' (Yanow, 2003: 13). In contrast,
'"frame" as a verb suggests a more dynamic analysis of changes in issue "framing" over
time, possibly within a single community of meaning' (Yanow, 2003: 13).
In the policy literature it is believed that the quality of resolution to a perceived social
problem depends on the way it is framed (Jasanoff, 2003: 240). In this subsection, I
selectively draw on discussions which are pertinent to my research interests in the
process of 'framing' from the areas of literature on policy research, claim-making, and
boundary work.
Social learning in Policy—Two Distinctive Meanings
Policy-making usually begins when something is perceived to be 'wrong' by people.
'Something' could be either a social phenomenon, or current policy. From a satisfying
perspective, policy changes begin because the policy-makers feel dissatisfied with
current policy arrangements, and a gap between present aspirations and achievements
needs to be bridged (Rose, 1991).
Heclo (1974) described this dissatisfaction as 'collective puzzling', which 'stands as the
original construct of political learning' (Freeman, 2005: 372). Drawing on social
learning21 theory, he also pinpoints the awareness of problems as a necessary element
of policy-making; and further identifies the crucial role that the state plays as the main
actor of social learning, challenging the 'black box' image of the state from 'earlier
pluralist conceptions of policy making' (Zarkin, 2003: 284). That is, policy changes take
place when 'government decision-makers become dissatisfied with previous policy and
search for new solutions to societal problems' (Zarkin, 2003: 284).22
Heclo also emphasised the role of ideas in policy-making, but not elicited the way ideas
acting in policy process (Hall, 1993). For an extension and modification of Heclo's
21 There are at least two distinctive meanings to 'social learning'—one is a narrow cognitive approach,
and the other sees social learning as involving not only cognitive processes but also processes of
negotiation and struggle (e.g. Brosveet & Sorensen, 2000; Williams, 2000). This research takes these two
meanings into consideration when dealing with policy actors' social learning in policy. Now I will begin
with the first narrow meaning.
22 Here, Zarkin uses 'social learning theory' for an analytical framework. However, the implications are
the same as the conception of 'lesson-drawing' and 'policy learning'. He obviously mixed these three
terms for indicating the same meaning in theoretical application.
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concept of learning, Hall borrowed the term 'social learning' from psychology to
explore the common understanding of the goal of policy, instruments and the nature of
problems to which policy is addressed (Hall, 1993) in an interpretive policy research
framework. Rose further proposed the concept of 'lesson-drawing' to answer the
following question: 'under what circumstances and to what extent can a programme that
is effective in one place transfer to another?' (Rose, 1991: 3).
Rose (1991) argued that the motivation for lesson-drawing stems from the
'dissatisfaction' of policy-makers with current programmes fading to solve emerging
problems; policy-makers then search for new solutions from the past or other countries.
Rose listed several reasons for dissatisfaction as follows: 1) uncertainty in the minds of
policy-makers due to the increasingly complex relationship between programmes and
society; 2) changes in the policy environment, which make the existing programme
incapable of solving the new problems; 3) changes in political values, which lead the
government to do something it never thought to do under the scheme of existing
programmes; 4) if the policy-makers do not do anything about the issue at stake, then
they may lose their political positions.
Claims-Making
When dissatisfaction is strong enough to motivate people to look for solutions, problem
defining/framing would be the next step to stimulate policy-making. From the social
constructivist perspective on social problems, Best (1995) strongly emphasised the role
of claims-making in the process of problem framing, and made two critiques of
dominant, objectivist social problem research. First of all, he criticised the traditional,
objectivist social problem perspective which 'ignores the subjective nature of social problem
(Best, 1995: xvi). Social problems are perceived and defined by people. This can also
illustrate why 'not all harmful conditions are considered social problems' (Best, 1995:
xvi). Secondly, he argues that even though an issue is defined as a social problem, 'the
objective conditions that people define as a social problem have relatively little in
common' (Best, 1995: xvii). Thus, Best, from a social constructivist standpoint, has
indicated that the way in which an issue is designed as a social problem is not a
self-evident phenomenon.
In Best's claims-making framework, claims-makers and the claims-making process are
two other foci to be considered. In order not to be 'distracted by the social conditions
about which claims are being made' (Best, 1995: xvii.), the focus in his proposal is on
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how the claim is being made, rather than claim-makers and the claim-making process.
Lasswell's aforementioned conception of 'contextuality' can be used to address this gap
in Best's analysis.
Along with the claims-making, Best (2001, 2004) in his later work singled out 'statistics'
as a key element in the process of problem-defining. He stated that statistics/numbers
are favoured by claims-makers, for whom the numbers can be a resource used to include
or exclude an issue from the list of social problems. These statistics/numbers/surveys
may be conducted by the governmental administration or private companies, academic
scholars, etc. For most national surveys, the government usually takes the initiative to
conduct or delegate academic/survey organisations to make a report. In the process of
conducting surveys, especially while deciding the variables, the issue at stake is being
categorised, labeled and constructed. The task of conducting a survey is to condense a
complicated social issue to a concrete/simple map, which helps people sketch the
problem in an easy way. This is also the role that statistics/surveys play in the process of
claims-making, or problem-framing in the course of policy making.
In this research, numbers/statistics are not the focus for analysis. In other words, the
authenticity of the numbers is not the concern of this research. Rather, the focus is on
the way an issue is defined by the variables chosen to measure it, e.g. the penetration of
ICTs. The utilisation of survey reports in this research is further discussed in Chapter 3
for methodological reasons.
Myths
Some researchers use the term 'myth' to extend the middle-range concept of 'storylines'.
They argue 'stories about the world never originate in a void: they always represent a
pre-selected point of view embedded in an existential position' (Hamelink, 1986: 7).
These scholars give 'myths' definitions based on their empirical work. For example,
Hamelink states that 'a myth is a story through which the world is explained to us'
(Hamelink, 1986: 7). Neufville and Barton argue that 'myth, [...] fits Webster's primary
definition, "a usually traditional story of ostensibly historical events that serves to
unfold part of the world view of a people or explain a practice, belief, or natural
phenomenon'" (Neufville and Barton, 1987: 182).
For these scholars, a myth plays a critical role in the policy process, in particular in the
course of problem defining—'behind widely accepted problem definitions are myths,
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stories wliich draw on tradition and taken for granted knowledge' (Neufville and Barton,
1987: 181).
What characterixes a myth? Berger and Luckmann (1967) argue that 'first, the logic of
myths is a magical one. Second, though a myth may be part of shared knowledge in a
community, it exists in different versions, and even a single version has meanings which
differ according to the personal experience through which individuals interpret it.
Because the moral of a myth is not explicit, ambiguity is inherent in its public use. Third,
myths change very slowly. Fourth, because a myth has a primary function of helping to
maintain the political and social structure in a community, it also can provide
rationalisations to cover tensions and contradictions inherent in the structure (Berger
and Luckmann, 1967). Finally, rather than the myths being designed to support policy
strategies, policies may be designed to support the myths (Neufville and Barton, 1987:
184).
How are myths applied in problem framing? Neufville & Barton (1987) argue that 'these
myths, which may or may not be true in a factual sense, are important to the definition
of problem because they link public issues to widely accepted ways of understanding
the world and to shared moral evaluations of conditions, events, and possible solutions
to problems. Such myths perform a double-edged function in a policy or planning
process. On the one hand, they can provide creative inspiration for policies, a way of
translating community values into action proposals, and a powerful means to
communicate to a broad public and rally support. They can mediate social and
economic change by allowing new policies to carry familiar meaning. On the other hand,
a myth can conceal crucial contradictions and realities, legitimise policies that benefit the
powerful and support anachronistic perceptions of policy problems' (Neufville and
Barton, 1987: 181).
When myths are used in policy, they 'are an important source of meaning, even in
modern societies. They provide analogies that help make sense of events and provide
simplifications of a more complex reality. Because they are well known in a community
they provide shared rationales to behave in common ways. They are created in a
particular culture from its repertoire of images, symbols, characters and modes of
action' (Neufville and Barton, 1987: 182).
Thus, myths play 'a simultaneously conservative and creative role in problem definition.
They can provide new ways of seeing issues and point toward policy directions. But they
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can also blind people to alternative ways of seeing a problem and to alternative solutions.
The myths provide the basic assumptions and thus helped limit controversy through
agreement on problem definition' (Neufville and Barton, 1987: 198). 'The myth frames
both problem and solution and it means that goals or criteria are not explicit' (Neufville
and Barton, 1987: 202).
In relation to my research, Hamelink's application of 'myth' that intends to unveil the
information society discourses serves as an example. He argues, 'this myth offers a
normative implication of its historical interpretation. It suggests that the "information
revolution" is the most significant historical development of our time: a revolutionary
transition to a fundamentally different age' (Hamelink, 1986:7). He furthers this
argument that 'rather than thinking in terms of revolutionary change from the past, the
information society could be described as a logical successor to previous historical
phases. What is termed "information revolution" could, in a more sober analysis, be
seen as equally »o«-revolutionary as its predecessor, the industrial revolution' (Hamelink,
1986: 8).
Hamelink's (1986) argument provides insights for my research in the way he regards the
information society as myth. He proposed three dimensions: economic, political and
cultural. The economic myth indicates that 'the information society will witness the end
of the capitalist, industrial production with its inherent vices of centralisation,
expansion, standardisation, synchronisation, and exploitation. There will be a shift from
industrial production to the provision of services in a de-monopolised and diversified
market.' The political myth says that 'the political arena of the information society is
participatory. Its decision-making is decentralised and its insistence on greater access to
information for all its citizens equates with the shifts of power from the governing elite
to the real democratic process of the push-button referendum.' The cultural myth
promises that 'in the information society, the misery of labour is taken away from the
human being and appropriated by the electronic system; flexible and smart robots create
unprecedented leisure time' (ibid).
Miranda (2005) also pinpoints how 'technological myths' (Miranda, 2005: 11) are
appropriated by the media and by policy-makers when they portray the relationship
between technology and social change. Firstly, they ignore the fundamental nature of
the creation of technology by society. Secondly, it involves the myth of the 'technical
fix', 'the implicit assumption that technology provides the only feasible solution to
complex social problem' (Miranda, 2005: 3). 'The third is the use of myths about
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technology in order to promote particular policies and help create particular ideologies'
(Miranda, 2005: 3). 'This makes use of the power of myth in mobilising human
imagination to engender commitment to particular policies' (Miranda, 2005: 11).
As mentioned above, myths serve as core mechanisms in storylines when framing an
issue at stake. Hamelink's and Miranda's analyses of 'myth' pay particular attention to
'information society' and relationship between technology and social change, which are
of great use for this thesis in investigating how ideas and myth are applied in empirical
analysis pertinent to the discourses/storylines of the Internet, information society, and
the digital divide in China and Taiwan.
Boundaries
I argue that framing a policy problem may be regarded as drawing the boundaries
between policy fields. Here I take two examples to demonstrate the impacts of framing
on drawing the boundaries between policy fields—one is Bennett and Raab's (2006)
proposition of 'privacy protection as social policy' and the other is Lyon's work on
surveillance. These two cases may provide theoretical and empirical support for my
argument.
Bennett and Raab raise an important but long ignored question about the 'privacy
subject' in privacy protection—is privacy protection taking equal care of all categories
of citizens within society—to question the common assumption that privacy protection
is an enforcement of a Right or attributable to individuals' choices (Bennett and Raab,
2006). If the answer to Bennett and Raab's question is no, then the issue related to
privacy protection should be considered from the perspective of social equality. Why are
some people well protected, but not others? Why are private data that are used in some
circumstances well protected, but not in others? The policy agenda following these
questions from this perspective of equality may turn out to be how to make policy to
achieve this goal of 'equality' in privacy protection and attribution of privacy, rather
than developing more advanced technologies to protect privacy. In other words, by
drawing attention to social equality in privacy protection the corresponding policy about
privacy protection may fall into the social policy field or other fields instead of merely
the technology policy field.
Now we turn to the other case—surveillance. Lyon argues that surveillance 'is not
merely about new technologies' (Lyon, 2003: 151), nor merely about 'endangering
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personal spaces of freedom' (Lyon, 2003: 151). The technological perspective falls into
the trap that it ignores surveillance as a representation of power, and the personal
freedom perspective is over-individualistic. Both miss the point that surveillance is a
social question and contributes to 'social-sorting' (Lyon, 2003:151). In this sense,
surveillance could be categorised into the social policy field.
These two cases present us with an alternative view of the multiple frames a policy issue
may hold. By providing these two examples I do not mean to suggest that privacy
protection or surveillance should be categorised into the social policy field rather than
other fields. Rather, I utilize them to show how problem framings can influence policy
making. Selection of one of the framings involves drawing boundaries. In the next
subsection, I discuss the mechanisms in framing.
2.5.3 Actors
In this section, I discuss the works from Yanow, Sabatier, Hajer, and Wilson to show
how they apply the concept of actors in their research. I will adopt the advantages from
their works to apply in my analytical framework.
In Sabatier's (1988) approach, the participants in policy-making are composed of
advocacy coalitions and are political elite-oriented, which highlights the interactive
process of actors from different institutions. These actors are professionals in science,
technology, politics, journalism, etc.
Furthermore, he extends the list of actors in the policy process, 'from
"iron-triangles"—administrative agencies, legislative committees, and interest groups at
a single level of government—to include actors at various levels of government active
in policy formulation and implementation—journalists, researchers, and policy analysts
who play important roles in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy
ideas (Sabatier, 1988: 131)
Hajer uses an alternative term/concept—discourse coalitions—which contrasts with
Sabatier's 'advocacy coalitions'. He pinpoints three essential differences between
advocacy coalitions and discourse coalitions, which are as follows: 1) an individualist
ontology vs. a relational ontology; 2) the central role of beliefs in advocacy-coalitions vs.
an emphasis on the constitutive role of language and the role of storylines and
discursive affinities in discourse coalitions; 3) Sabatier's notion of policy-oriented
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learning differs from Hajer's theory of social change (Hajer, 1995: 69).
For Hajer, based on his research on environmental politics, beliefs are fluid, rather than
fixed; language plays an important role in beliefs and values change. 'New discourses
may alter existing cognitive commitments and thus influence the values and beliefs of
actors' (Hajer, 1995: 71). Hence, coalitions do not have definite boundaries; coalitions
do not unite on the basis of the physical roles that they play in policy process, i.e. the
roles of advocacy and brokers are sometimes intertwined (Hajer, 1995: 71). Hajer also
argues that Sabatier overstated a 'rationalist idea about cognitive change' (Hajer, 1995:
71). Hajer further 'operationalises the idea that discourse is constitutive of the realities
of environmental politics' (Hajer, 1995: 72).
Yanow's use of 'interpretive communities' is similar to Hajer's 'discourse coalition'
(Yanow, 2000). In Yanow's analysis, the term 'interpretive communities' accommodates
three characteristics. First of all, interpretive communities share thoughts, speech,
practices and their meanings. Second, such communities may be fluid, changing from
issue to issue. Third, there are at least three communities of meanings: policymakers,
implementing agency personnel, and affected citizens or clients (Yanow, 2000).
Wilson (2004) creates another term for pointing out who is doing the interpretation of
the phenomenon of ICT diffusion. He uses 'ideological leadership' to identify the
similar work that interpretive communities do. In his definition, based on the empirical
studies he undertook in developing countries, 'ideological leadership frames important
ICT concepts. For example, if ICT is defined as an economic issue, it will mobilise one
constituency, creating a particular kind of agenda. If ICT is defined as a matter of
national sovereignty under assault, other constituencies and institutions are mobilised'
(Wilson, 2004: 95). He further singles out those who are playing the role of issue
definition in developing countries; they are 'government officials and senior people in
the research and scientific communities' (Wilson, 2004: 95).
In addition to the above theories, elitist and technocratic models may contribute to our
ability to analyse actors in the digital divide policy-making process. In the Chinese case,
this elitist model will be considered in Chapter 5 alongside the political context. From
the insight of the elitist model, it 'holds that power is concentrated in the hands of a
few groups and individuals' (Parsons, 1995: 248). Here, the elitist model points out the
composition of policy-makers by a few groups; this may (particularly in China's case)
prove insightful when it comes to empirical analysis. As for the technocratic model, it
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emphasises that the role of knowledge is dominant and that 'decision making would be
influenced by those who possessed the technical knowledge vital to understanding the
modern world' (Parsons, 1995: 267). This tendency may also be revealed in digital divide
policy-making.
The theorists mentioned above provide a wide range of roles for participants in the
policy-making process. Sabader described the conceptions of participants from an elitist
perspective, which is proper for mapping the policy participants in some situations.
Sabatier's conception may be relevant in analysing digital divide policy in Taiwan and
China for two reasons. On the one hand, digital divide policy is still an emerging issue
circulated around the administrative staff and in academia. On the other hand, digital
divide policy related knowledge is to a large extent restricted to technological, instead of
social aspects. Hajer acknowledges that physical meetings or coalition-creating in terms
of participants' identities are not necessary for coalition-building. Yanow extends and
deepens the concept of participants in traditional policy research and regards them as
an interpretive community, which increases the flexibility for practical analysis. This fits
with the tendency in the information society for information flow and exchange to take
place without physical space for policy participants. I will take the insights of these
scholars' perspectives to analyse the actors in the digital divide for this thesis.
2.5.4 Policy Outcomes
In this section, I discuss some concerns as to the policy-field demarcation and policy¬
making and implementation based on the discussion in the previous section. I draw on
the concept of 'convergence' discussed by Bennett (1991a, 1991b, 1992, and 1997) (see
Figure 2.1) to further my consideration on digital divide policy outcomes in China and
Taiwan.
In the policy research field, policy convergence has been a crucial topic within
comparative public policy. Policy convergence argues that 'the convergence of public
policy can occur through a number of distinct processes' (Bennett, 1991b: 217).
Working on the convergence of data protection, Bennett summarises five explanations
for convergence, which are technological determinism; the emulation of the pioneers in
the field; the close interaction of a transnational elite of experts; the harmonisation
efforts of international organisations; and penetration, where states are forced to make
their policies conform to those of others' (Bennett, 1992: 116-117). As Bennett stated,
this is an open framework for specifying alternative propositions, which operate at
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different levels of analysis. Therefore, these explanations may be appropriated for
analysis of the convergence in digital divide policy.
Framework Cause Condition
Emulation A collective insecurity under conditions of
policy innovation; the diffusion of
knowledge about problems and solutions
The sharing of knowledge
Elite networking The desire to share expertise The sharing of knowledge
Harmonization Interdependence and the perceived need to
co-operate
An international regime
Penetration An expression of power The recognition of externalities
Figure 2.1 Four Frameworks of Policj Convergence (Source: Bennett, 1991: 229; complied by the
author)
In Bennett's work, the emergence of computers resulted in the data protection
movement due to two further conditions. 'First, we must be able to identify the intrinsic
properties of this technology that would force policy makers to treat the dangers in a
similar manner. Second, these qualities must be recognised by the key policy makers in
different states. In other words, it is not enough that the technology is the same; the
perception of the technology must be also the same' (Bennett, 1992: 118, emphasis in
original).
With regard to the 'technological determinism', Bennett (1992: 122) suggests that 'we
should qualify the word "deterministic". While the technology frames the contexts of
policy choice, authoritative decisions are made only by political actors who undoubtedly
develop a variety of interesting views about that technology' (ibid.). He concludes that
'the argument for technological determinism excludes politick (Bennett, 1992: 123).
To sum up, Bennett's work is helpful for comparing digital divide policy-making in
China and in Taiwan within a wider international context. As mentioned earlier, if the
context does matter, particularly the international context in terms of globalising digital
divide discourses and initiatives of the international organisations, then a convergence
of digital divide policy-making in both countries will emerge. Bennett's four frameworks
of policy convergence will provide insights for the analysis of convergence of the
digital divide policy in this thesis.
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2.6 Conclusion
This section combines the abovementioned four elements into a complete analytical
framework (see Figure 2.2). It starts from the main concern of this thesis: How
developing countries interpret the digital divide and make digital divide policies within
international and national contexts? Following this main concern, as well as the
observation from the gap in the existing literature that relatively less attention is paid on
developing countries than developed countries, two developing countries—China and
Taiwan—are selected for this thesis. The main research questions become: How the
interpretation of the digital divide has been transferred from international context to
developing countries, such as China and Taiwan; How the broader social and economic
context in a specific country, in this case China and Taiwan, has shaped digital divide
policy; How the issue of the digital divide has been framed within China's and Taiwan's
contexts and the policy is formulated; Which ministries/institutes are involved; How
these have been translated in implementation; What are similarities and dissimilarities
between digital divide policy-making in China and in Taiwan?
The first element 'context' includes two levels: international and national. The
international context refers to global digital divide discourses carried out and framed by
advanced countries, e.g. US and EU, and international organisations. The national
contexts refer to political, economic and social aspects in China and in Taiwan
respectively frame the digital divide discourses and relevant policy.
When the contexts have been set up and analysed, the next step is to summarise and
analyse the policy discourses in terms of storylines that are composed of detailed
operationalisation for framing the digital divide, e.g. social learning, claim-making, myth
and boundaries that are mentioned in section 2.5.2. Then, I will investigate the actors
that participate in framing the digital divide and making digital divide policy I discussed
in section 2.5.3. From the analysis, I hope to show how the digital divide is interpreted
as well as which institutions are recruited to participate in policy making. Finally, I will
conduct a comparison to look at the similarities and dissimilarities of digital divide
policy-making in China and Taiwan.
This analytical framework will help to answer the questions I raised in Chapter 1, and
allow for an analysis that is intended to connect context and policymaking and
implementation by means of an interpretive approach. In the next chapter, I will
develop a methodology through which this analytical framework can be implemented.
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(From western countries, e.g. US, UK, EU to international orgs, e.g. G8, APEC, UN,
etc)









This chapter deals with the methodology of this research. A comparadve case study is
chosen to be the research framework. Two settings—China and Taiwan—are selected
for the cases. The detailed methodology will be elaborated below. Following an outline
of the data collection methods, I provide the analytical scheme of this study.
The analytical framework described in the previous chapter has direcdy influenced the
research design outlined in this chapter. In order to understand, from an interpretive
approach, the three main sections in Figure 2.2 in the last part of Chapter 2—what are
the international and national contexts {Context), how the issue of digital divide is
defined (by Actors) as a social problem within international and national contexts
(Discourses!Storylines), and what the policy is (Policy Outcome)—the data collection
methods adopted below are inevitably qualitative, rather than quantitative.
3.1 Entering the Field
This section provides an understanding of my preparation for the research journey in
China and in Taiwan. Section 3.1.1 introduces my three phases of tieldwork in China
and in Taiwan respectively. Section 3.1.2 describes how I looked for the data that would
be useful before I began my fieldwork.
3.1.1 Three Phases of Fieldwork
I conducted three phases of fieldwork in China and in Taiwan respectively during the
research period of 2004 to 2006. Each phase of fieldwork lasted around one month. It
was necessary to conduct three phases of fieldwork in order to deal with the problems
of accessing interviewees in policy-making, which is particularly challenging in China.
Regarding the problem of accessibility, I provide a detailed account of my own
experience in the reflection section of this chapter.
In the case of China, my first phase of fieldwork was conducted in April 2005. The
objective was to have a comprehensive understanding of the Chinese context, including
its political and economic development, and special attention is paid to the realisation of
ICT development and the conception of the digital divide. I spent three weeks in the
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newspaper archive of the National Library of China (Beijing) compiling the historical
events and polices pertinent to ICT development and the digital divide. Additionally,
some of the interviews for this research were conducted during the first phase of
fieldwork. However, I encountered unanticipated difficulties in setting up and
conducting interviews with Chinese respondents, especially policy-makers (see section
3.5).
Learning from the difficulties suffered during the first phase of fieldwork, I conducted
the second research trip half a year later in January 2006 with the identity of Visiting
Scholar in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the third research trip in
September 2006 as Visiting Student in the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). This
new official academic identity enabled me to make appointments with my target
interviewees in the second and third phases of fieldwork. I also made efforts to
understand the 'ritual rules' of communicating with Chinese people, and discussed the
structure and wordings of my interview questions with my supervisors beforehand. In
order not to irritate my interviewees in China, we matched the questions to
interviewees' backgrounds word for word to create a polite and comfortable scenario
for interviewees. This meant that the second and third phases of fieldwork went more
smoothly than the first one. Detailed accounts of the experiences of fieldwork as well as
self-reflection will be presented in section 3.5.
With regard to the Taiwanese case, I also conducted three phases of fieldwork to collect
data and conduct interviews, which were in April 2004, March 2005, and November
2005, respectively. I collected relevant documents, e.g. newspapers and policy texts, and
started to make personal contacts with my target interviewees. In contrast to the
challenges in China, I had less difficulty in accessing my target interviewees in Taiwan.
This is because I have already built some networks in Taiwan before my embarking on
my research. I will provide detailed accounts in section 3.3.2.3.
3.1.2 Looking for a Needle in a Haystack
I was entering the field with an image of how the digital divide and digital divide policies
would be in China on the basis of the literature I reviewed. However, as soon as I
arrived in Beijing, I was forced to face the reality that the term 'digital divide' is far
removed from people's daily life, even for my friends who are in academic fields. In
China, the term 'digital divide' is just in its infancy, and there is no policy title which
directly focuses on bridging the digital divide. In contrast, as mentioned in Chapter 1,
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the Taiwanese government has a very clear-cut policy entitled 'bridging the digital divide',
and a corresponding task force NICI has been launched to be in charge of the policy¬
making and implementation, which saved me much time in outlining the policy map.
Thus, in order to sketch the policy I wanted to research, thoroughly examining the
newspapers page by page is necessary. As I mentioned earlier, I spent three weeks in the
National Library of China in Beijing to look for any possible information related to my
topic, i.e. the debate about the digital divide, relevant policy texts and discussion, and
actions taken to bridge the digital divide. The reason to do so was not only because this
was a safe way to have a comprehensive understanding of the digital divide and polices,
but because this was the most 'efficient' means to map the policy area, participant
institutes and storylines of bridging the digital divide for my research. This searching
process was time-consuming, but a necessity. The process of data collection served as
the process of building up the policy map for this research.
This section reflects my research journey of fieldwork. In the first place, I describe the
feeling of being a junior Taiwanese researcher in China and the difficulties I
encountered. This is followed by the way how I overcame these difficulties.
3.2 Comparative Studies
I have discussed the empirical concerns of comparative studies in Chapter 1, along with
the selection of nations and policies used for analysis. In this chapter, I am dealing with
theoretical concerns about doing comparative studies, which is conflated in my research
design.
'Comparative studies' is a popular approach in the research fields of politics and social
policy, and the aim of doing comparative studies is as follows: having a better
understanding of the domestic policy environment, learning lessons from foreign
countries, and advancing the depth and width of theoretical concerns (Jones, 1985: 4).
In this research, comparison is employed to investigate the international and national
contexts, the process of digital divide policy-making in China and Taiwan, and refer to
the theoretical concerns I discussed in Chapter 2.
What is to be compared is the core concern in comparative studies. In this research,
'context' is to be compared in the first place. I will compare the models of digital divide
policy-making in China and Taiwan within international and national contexts. Secondly,
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the interpretations of the digital divide in China and Taiwan are compared. As far as the
digital divide is concerned, the definitions of digital divides vary in different
time-periods within/and between individual countries. When the term 'digital divide'
first appeared in the official documents in the US, as mentioned in Chapter 1, it was
referred to the technical/equipment gap between groups in the US. As time went by, the
definition has altered to fit the situation in other settings. The interpretation of 'digital
divide' is an objective for investigation in this research. The detailed systematic
discussion of this issue is provided in Chapter 1 (the history of the term 'digital divide'
in the US) and 4 (the international contexts for fostering, and subsequent frameworks in
framing this term).
Thirdly, ministries/institutes involved in digital divide policy are compared. I will
investigate who are involved in digital divide policy-making by referring to Yanow's
three categories (Yanow, 2000) that are mentioned in Chapter 2, and show if China and
Taiwan has different categories of participants in digital divide policy-making. Fourthly,
policy outcomes are compared. As I mentioned earlier, if the international context
matters, a policy convergence will emerge. Furthermore, since China's and Taiwan's
domestic contexts differ, it may be expected that there is divergence between their
digital divide policy-making.
3.3 Methodological Implications and Limitations ofHajer's Approach
Discourse analysis is often adopted as a method for conducting interpretive policy
research. The theoretical definition of 'discourse,' however, varies between different
researchers and their audiences, 'from strictly linguistic approaches that focus on
communications to approaches that embrace ideas and actions as integral to discourse'
(Sharp and Richardson, 2001: 193). FFajer's discourse analysis, following a Foucauldian
definition, defines 'discourse' in a broader sense, including textual materials and practice
(Sharp and Richardson, 2001: 196). For example, in his analysis of environmental
modernisation with discourse analysis, he not only analyses textual/spoken materials,
but also the practice itself (policy making influenced by how the policy problem is
framed). This offers my research the first methodological implication relevant for
investigating both discursive aspects (interpretation of the digtal divide) and practice
(digital divide policy) in the course of policy-making: 'tracing initial problem
construction through to the development of (apparent) "solutions'" (Sharp and
Richardson, 2001: 197). For example, I not only investigate the framings of the digital
divide, but also extend my research to the events/programmes on bringing the digital
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divide. Additionally, this approach directs me to a triangulation method of data
collection (discussed in section 3.3) instead of to a single source of data for analysis.
A related concern in conducting discourse analysis is that the concept 'discourse' is
either sometimes too abstract or is not given an analytical definition. Hajer's discourse
theory makes an effort to solve this confusion. He proposes 'storylines' as a
middle-range concept to take the context into consideration for analysing the
construction of an issue in question. A storyline, in his definition, is 'a generative sort
of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give
meaning to specific physical or social phenomena' (1995: 56). The innovation of this
concept lies in its operational definition, which is helpful in connecting context and
discourses. It provides an operational definition of what a storyline is; in his words it is
'a discourse-analytical approach that is both theoretically sophisticated and practically
operationable' (Hajer, 1995: 52). This offers my research the second methodological
implication for taking the context into consideration when dealing with discourses on
bridging the digital divide.
Discourse coalition is another promising analytical concept in Hajer's approach. In his
research (1995), he argues that the boundary between coalitions is fluid; the
establishment of one coalition is based on the discourses that unite them. This concept
further enhances the role of discourse in policy making, and it is useful for the research
to categorise the coliations in terms of different discourses.
However, it is worth noting that any theory has certain limitations in practice. For
example, while an analytical concept is being adopted in a different topic or context
from that wherein the concept is being developed, there may be a gap between the ideal
theory and its application. Hajer develops the concepts of 'storyline' and 'discourse
coalition' on the topic of environmental modernisation in the context of western
countries. This raises two practical issues for the current study. One concerns the topic
in question while the other is the context wherein the topic is embedded. Hajer's
research focuses on a debatable topic (e.g. ecological modernisation) in open societies
(e.g. UK and EU). In applying his concepts in my case studies, a couple of concerns
begin to emerge. First of all, in a less open society, e.g. China, policy debates may not
fully emerge during the course of policymaking and discourse coalitions may not be able
to form or may be invisible to the researcher insofar as they take place in essentially
closed circles (for example discussions within the Chinese Communist Party).
Additionally, the issue of the digital divide has been a relatively marginal policy debate,
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especially in China and Taiwan. For example, in the case of Taiwan, it provides only
modest opportunity to observe the operation of discourse coalitions.
I bear these concerns in mind throughout the course of my analysis. The middle-range
concept 'storylines' is useful in bridging the wider contexts with policy-making and
implementation. I will include more discussion on the difficulties/limitations in applying
Hajer's concepts for analysis in Chapter 10. Drawing on Hajer's discourse analysis theory,
I take a series of practical stages for data analysis and justify how material from science
and technology studies (discussed in Chapter 2) usefully combines with interpretive
policy research literature (section 3.5).
3.4 Data Collection—Triangulation
Because this research encompasses the policy text itself, the context of policy making as
a whole, and the participant ministries and institutes in the course of policymaking, a
single data collection method does not suffice to answer all my research questions. Thus,
a triangulation of methods is adopted in this research for access to data and answering
the research questions proposed in Chapter 1. The data collected in this research are
mainly from interviews and documents.
Multi-disciplinary research is becoming the mainstream trend in social science studies,
both in quantitative and qualitative research. Triangulation means to design a study that
combines different techniques in order to explore one set of research questions. The
triangulation method stems from the idea that data are obtained from a wide range of
different and multiple sources, using a variety of methods, investigators or theories'
(Arksey & Knight, 1999: 21).
Triangulation can be applied both in quantitative and qualitative research. For the
former, triangulation serves two main purposes: 'confirmation' (Denzin, 1989) and
'completeness' (Jick, 1983). When the approach is used for the purpose of confirmation,
the individual strengths, weaknesses and biases of the various methods must, first, be
known and, secondly, applied in such a way that they counterbalance each other' (Arksey
& Knight, 1999: 21). While for the latter, 'the completeness of triangulation is also
relevant to work that adopts an explicitly qualitative stance, where investigators tend to
dislike structured approaches and instead welcome any information that adds depth and
breadth of understanding' (Arksey & Knight, 1999: 22).
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Denzin (1989) introduced Lire notion of 'multiple triangulation', referring to a typology
of strategies that can be combined in one investigation: methodological triangulation;
data triangulation; investigator triangulation; and theoretical triangulation (Arksey &
Knight, 1999: 22). Drawing on Denzin's classifications and definitions of each category,
this research will adopt a methodological triangulation, applying two methods
(interviews and documentary analysis) to complete the investigation. The adoption of
between-method triangulation in this research may contribute to the completeness of
data collection and the depth of interpretation.
3.4.1. Documents and Archives
For a better understanding of the framing of the digital divide and relevant policy, the
first step I adopted was searching a news archive created by the main news agencies in
my two case countries. By so doing, I built up the fabric of the contexts, policy, and
participant ministries and institutes in the topic I researched, which offered me a clear
outline as well as providing me the information about which key individuals to interview.
This preliminary background understanding allowed me to present myself as
knowledgeable to my interviewees and enabled me to ask 'insider' or 'professional'
questions.
Technically, 'documents are things that we can read and which are related to some
aspect of the social world' (Macdonald, 2001). Following this definition, in this study,
documents are public records, such as policy texts and official reports. This provides me
the entry point to conduct preliminary analysis. Along with the interviews, all possible
documents related to digital divide discourses and digital divide policies were the data
being collected for this research. Documents collected for analysis in this research
consist of newspaper interviews, public discourses presented in the mass media
(newspapers in particular, including straight news coverage and editorials), primary
documents (policy texts), secondary literature and conference materials. Each source will
be explained below.
3.4.1.1 Newspaper Interviews
The newspaper interviews were seen as a complementary tool for eliciting
policy-makers' ideas, particularly when some influential policy-makers have passed away
or cannot be easily contacted for personal interviews. Additionally, digital divide policies
are still ongoing both in China and in Taiwan, however some participants may have
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already left their previous positions; therefore newspaper interviews can be useful
historical sources in this research.
One concern that needs to be addressed in this research is the 'completeness' and
'distortion' or 'biases' of the newspaper interviews, which means whether the media text
represents the 'truth'. This is a heated and ongoing subject and has accumulated a great
volume of literature in mass communication studies, which are concerned whether the
media 'represent' or 'reproduce' the 'truth'"3. This issue did come cross my mind before
I embarked on collecting data from newspapers. However, the debate itself is beyond
the scope of this thesis, and not really a matter for this research. I provide two accounts
to explain why I am neither following this debate nor justifying my choice of using
newspaper coverage in discussing the 'truth' of media sources for this study.
First of all, in principle, there exist differences between media report in China and
Taiwan. In China something will appear in the media if the government wants it to be
there; Taiwan will exhibit political influence over content, but there are competing
sources. Either in the theory or the practice of journalism, controversy is news
worthiness; therefore newspaper discourse has a different status and significance.
However, after I finished browsing newspaper sources, I surprisingly found that the
digital divide policy is a little-debated issue in public. Secondly, the interview transcripts
are completely printed and published in the newspapers, particularly in an authoritarian
country, China. This indicates that the interviewer (journalist), the editor, and the media
agency did not conduct interpretation before the interview transcript was imprinted.
Another source of skepticism about the reliability of mass coverage may stem from the
different political positions the press agencies hold, and also from other reasons, such as
editorial policy. A great volume of literature on research in mass communication and
journalism has focused on this issue24. After going through the print media coverage, I
found that the newspapers of different political angles presented the data concerning
the digital divide in a similar way. Therefore, I will skip the oft-discussed questions
mentioned above, and go into the criteria of selection and types of coverage I searched
in this research.
In terms of the time-period, the collected newspaper interviews will be those published
23 When using 'media representation' and 'truth' as keywords in the search engine 'google scholar', there
comes out more than 13 thousands results. Access on 24/11/07.
24 For example, Breed and White are two of the classical books on this topic. For more details, see Breed,
W, 1950 and White, D. M., 1950.
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from 1995 to 2006. For Taiwan, two main national daily newspapers were chosen for
data collections—UDN news and Chinatimes online. For China, two online versions are
chosen—China Daily, and People's Daily. Additionally, because the news pertinent to the
issue of the digital divide are mostly covered in technology-related newspapers, I spent
three weeks in the National Library of China in Beijing during my first research trip
manually searching the newspaper Technology Daily (paper version).
3.4.1.2 Primary Documents (including national and global)
The primary documents used in this research include published policy texts, survey
reports, academic research, and the declarations of international organisations and
policy texts of China and Taiwan. The detailed explanations are provided below.
• Published policy texts
In order to conduct discourse analysis on policy research, policy texts undoubtedly are
the main resource for analysis. This primarily refers to the texts of relevant digital divide
policy in China and Taiwan.
For China, the relevant policy texts collected for analysis in this research include:
—Five Year Plans
-Go West (Explore and Develop the Western China)
—Cun Cun Tong & Cun Cun Tong Dianhua (Get Every Village Online)
—E-School
— The Construction of Socialist New Villages
For Taiwan, the relevant policy texts collected for analysis in this research include:
-E-Taiwan, in Challenge 2008: The Six YearNational Development Plan.
• Survey reports
The surveys used as data in this research are not taken as a proof of the 'true' situation
of the digital divide in the two cases, but as references and research objects for analyzing
how these reports help to construct definitions of the digital divide. Thus, the
oft-mentioned deficiencies and criticisms of survey data, in particular of China (e.g.
Giese, 2003), are not a concern of this study.
In this research, survey reports collected for analysis include: 1) CNNIC Internet Survey
Reports (1997-2007) in China, and 2) Digital Divide Reports (2002-2006) in Taiwan.
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Although there are many different kinds of Internet surveys conducted by private
survey companies, here I only collect those that provide references in the course of
policy-making, which are identified by my interviewees.
Researchers themselves, including administrative researchers (e.g. CNNIC of China) and
academic researchers (e.g. researchers conducted digital divide reports in Taiwan) may
not think their research findings will have impacts on the definitions of an issue and
policy-making, however, it depends on the 'impact' they conceive of, and whether the
impact is defined directly or indirectly. In most cases, the 'impacts' are incremental or
diffused, rather than linear or systematic. In the interviews I conducted, the interviewees
in policymaking did mention that they benefited from academic research to some extent,
including the ideas of the digital divide in general and the definitions of the digital
divide in particular. This too resonates with what Clarke (2001) called the 'conceptual'
utilisation of social research2', and fitted into the 'enlightenment model' he proposed.26
Thus, academic research concerning the digital divide has also formed a source of data
in my research.
• The declarations of international organisations
Interpretive policy research emphasises the importance of contexts, be external or
internal contexts. While embarking on literature review, I realised that foreign countries
and international/regional organisations had great impacts on the policy-making of
individual countries, in particular developing ones. After the three phases of fieldwork
in Taiwan and in China had been carried out, the accounts of my interviewees proved
my concerns correct. Almost every interviewee told me they were highly inspired by
foreign countries and regional/international organisations. Thus, the documents from
foreign countries and regional/international organisations are included as data in this
research. The detailed sources and documents are presented in Chapter 4.
3.4.1.3 Other Sources
25 Clarke (2001) discusses the relationship between social research and policy-making in his article, which
distinguishes two types of utilisation—'instrumental' and 'conceptual'. The former indicates that
policy-makers did make policy modification based on the findings of specific research studies. Whilst the
latter indicates that research influences the way policy-makers view and interpret an issue or a social
problem.
26 Clarke (2001) further proposes four models to explain the relationship between research and
policy-making. The fourth one, the enlightenment model, explains the research input into policy is
indirect, and the 'conceptualisations and generalisations emanating from the social sciences can influence
the way in which policy problems are defined and solutions identified'.
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Apart from that was listed above, other documents include: other scholars' published
papers and books are included and used as reference data; conference materials such as
the power points displayed for internal meedngs in the government; the proposals for
applying the digital divide related grant, etc.
3.4.2 Personal Interviews
This subsection provides the reason of conducting interviews, how I recruited my
interviewees, and the number of interviews I have conducted in this research.
3.4.2.1 The Reason for Conducting Interviews
Five reasons are considered for conducting interviews in this research. First of all, to
avoid the opportunistic sample that has been selected in advance in the written text
(Swaffield, 1998: 205), personal interviews may rebuild the comprehensive process of
policy-making. Secondly, for answering the questions raised in Chapter 1 to see how the
concept of the digital divide has been perceived, interpreted, and consequently
appropriated into policy texts and policy implementation, interviews are the most
appropriate method. Thirdly, basing the study on documentary studies via discourse
analysis often attract the critique of analysts' subjectivism. Fourthly, interviews can
provide the researcher the first-hand materials that other researchers do not have. In this
research, interviews give me access to procedural details as well as to controversies and
inside stories that published documents could not reveal. Finally, when conducting
interpretive policy research, it 'cannot be restricted to policy language or ideas only as
understood and intended by their authors. Interpretive policy analysis explores the
contrasts between policy meanings as intended by policy-makers—"authored"
text—and the possibly variant and even incommensurable meanings—"constructed"
text—made of them by other policy-relevant groups' (Yanow, 2000: 9).
3.4.2.2 The Recruitment of Interviewees
I searched the newspapers (aforementioned in section 3.4.1.1) in order to locate
potential interviewees for this research (during the period of the earlier 1990s to 2005).
I identified them as influential political actors who were competing to provide storylines
around the digital divide. The recruitment of interviewees also comes from employing a
snowball method, i.e. from referring to the theoretical literature on actors in
policy-making (see Chapter 2) and from referring to the documents that explicitly
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mention actors/ministries/institutes involved in digital divide policy making in China
and Taiwan. The interviewees have contributed to defining the digital divide as well as to
locating their direct or indirect involvement in the policy-making process. I adopt a
relatively abstract definition of 'contribution' and 'involvement' in this study, for the
discourses pertinent to the digital divide, whether from policy-makers, policy think-tanks,
media text, etc., have to some extent influences on the digital divide policy-making. Thus,
the interviewees in this study included the researchers from academic fields, the survey
institutions, and the administrative officers from Taiwanese and Chinese central
governments. The interviewees were recruited through the snowball method through
which I asked 'people who have already been interviewed to identify other people they
know who fit the selection criteria' (Ritchie, Lewis, and Elam, 2003: 94).
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 display the snowballing process of locating the interviewees in China
and in Taiwan respectively. In order to protect the identity of my interviewees, in these
two figures I merely put the institutions my interviewees are situated in, rather than the
positions they hold. The vertical axis separates my three phases of fieldwork, and the
horizontal axis divides into two fields, academia and policy areas. The direction of the
arrow indicates the next interviewee that the previous one recommended and
introduced to me. Some of the interviewees in China hold dual positions as a researcher
in academia and a policy participant in semi-governmental institutions. Hence, they are
located between the academia and policy fields in the figure. In contrast, in the case of
Taiwan, only the researchers who are delegated to conduct the digital divide surveys
straddle the academic and policy fields because they conduct the surveys for the













3.4.2.3 Limitations of the Interviewee Recruitement Process
The consequences of the process of recruiting my interviewees generate two main
concerns. First of all, particularly in the case of the People's Republic of China, the
interviewees are primarily restricted to individuals within key government ministries and
their specialist advisers. This may create the impression that people with positions in
CCP have been overlooked by the research design. Secondly, people outside the
government seem to be ignored in this research.
In response to the first concern, there is a need to take a comprehensive understanding
of China's national political context into consideration. As indicated by the scholarly
literature, the (CCP) structure always exercises ultimate authority over its government
counterpart (Lieberthal, 2004: 172) even though CCP and the government have roughly
the same hierarchical organi2ation. The CCP, via its Standing Committee of Politburo, is
the ultimate decision-maker (Sun, 2003: 58). The CCP, to a very large extent, holds the
power to decide policy issues and to appoint the leaders to public sector bodies
(Lieberthal, 2004: 234). The State Council, which represents the central government, is
the highest executive office of state power and directs three-dozen ministries and
commissions (Sun, 2003: 58). In the division of labour among ministries, the industrial
ministries play the role of formulating and carrying out specific policies in relation to
informatisation.
An important characteristic of the Chinese political system is the double-relationship of
government officials who are also members of CCP (Lieberthal, 2004). In China, most
officials in government are holding a double position because they are required to be a
member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Thus, the influence of CCP pervades
the responses of government officials. For example, the president of the CCP holds the
position as the president of the state; the minister of Mil also holds the position as the
'secretary of the Party Leadership Group' (dang %u shu ji, SKIMlIrlB)- The CCP
therefore exercises its authority through this interesting double-relationship. The
principle of CCP leadership was thus accomplished through the overlapping of
positions (Kokubun, 1998: 72). This double-relationship of government officials
provides an explanation for why actors from the party are not excluded from the
selection of interviewees, but the influence of the party pervades the government.
Regarding the second concern, there is an emerging debate surrounding the relationship
between state and society in current scholarly literature on Chinese politics. Some
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scholars seek to clarify and redefine the concept 'civil society' (White, et al., 1996) so as
to show that there is civil society existing in China. They emphasise that the economic
reform in 1978 provides a basis for civil society in China (Gold, 1998). White et al.
propose a distinction between political and sociological conceptions of 'civil society'
(1996: 3). In their clarification, a political conception of 'civil society', based on the
principles of citizenship, civil rights, representation, and the rule of law, makes it
distinguishable from the standard conception of a liberal democratic polity (White, et al.,
1996: 4). In this sense, the political conception may undergo difficulties in investigating
the emergence of 'civil society' in China. Thus, they turn to sociological conceptions of
'civil society'. The sociological conception is that of an intermediate associational realm
situated between state and society, populated by social organizations which are separate
and independent to some extent from the state (White, et al., 1996: 3). They argue that
this definition can better investigate the emergence of 'civil society' in China, and may
contribute to an understanding of the transition to a new political order.
Indeed, the scholarly literature on 'civil society' provides a more complete picture of
Chinese politics, and gives me clues concerning potentially wider influences in
policy-making in China. However, in the above-mentioned literature, there are hardly
any empirical findings about the contribution of 'civil society' to policy-making.
Notwithstanding, I sought voices from outside the government and bore the scholarly
literature on 'civil society' in mind when recruiting interviewees. I have tried to expand
the range of potential actors, for example, to include academic researchers and I have
sought to recruit them in the list of interviewees. However, I had to confront practical
difficulties during my fieldwork. The limited number/range of interviews that I was able
to achieve reflects the practical difficulties in recruiting interviewees, especially
under-represented groups, during my fieldwork. This limitation will be discussed again
in the conclusion.
3.4.2.4 The Issue of Accessibility
There are certain methods of accessing my interviews that take into account the
different cultural dimensions of each setting. First of all, as soon as I collected the
policy texts I was going to investigate, I would browse the official website in which
information about officials in charge of the target policy would be displayed. The other
way of getting pertinent information of 'relevant persons' is via reading the archive of
news agency, either stored online or in paperwork. Through the news coverage related
to the policy I was investigating, I could obtain an understanding of who may be my
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target interviewees.
Secondly, locating my target interviewees by means of attending academic seminars or
conferences was another efficient and effective method. In Taiwan's case, I attended a
conference and presented a paper, and the discussant of my paper was one of the target
interviewees I was going to locate. Fortunately, she not only accepted my interview
request but also introduced her acquaintances that are in charge of digital divide policy
for the government to me. This is the approach of snowballing I adopted in this
research.
Thirdly, I developed the interview list via interpersonal relationships, which is the most
workable way to get permission from the target interviewees in China, in particular
those working for the government or semi-official institutes. Additionally, applying for
and taking an official position as a visiting student in Chinese Academy of Sciences
(CAS) and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) also helped a lot in obtaining
interviews with people working in the government. As a visiting student in these two
state-sponsored research institutes, I could secure assistance from their researchers and
utilise their networks of interpersonal relationships to connect my target interviewees
and me. Furthermore, the identity of being a visiting student of these two academic
institutions could also legitimate my position by making me a semi-insider of Chinese
society. In addition, this helped in making appointments with interviewees due to
regular cooperation of CAS and CASS with the government. The second and third
strategies for obtaining interviewees present the practice of 'snow-balling'.
In contrast to the challenges on China, I had less difficulty in accessing my target
interviewees in Taiwan. Four approaches were adopted to locate and make
appointments with my target interviewees. First of all, I utilised my personal contacts
that were built when I was a journalist in Taiwan to locate my interviewees. Secondly, I
looked for the contacts from the official website of the e-Taiwan programme and made
phone calls to arrange interviews. Thirdly, several friends working in academia and
cooperating with the officials I was looking for introduced me to my target interviewees.
Fourthly, attending ICT-related conference also gave me the opportunity to locate my
interviewees. Although some policy-makers involved in the digital divide policy are
retired or have left their previous official positions in charge of digital divide
policy-making and implementation so that I could not conduct face-to-face interviews
with them, I sent them my questions and have kept in touch with them via emails.
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Fourthly, keeping an eye on national/international conferences that happen to take place
in my case country was also a promising way to access my interviewees. I was lucky
enough to be informed that the EU-Cbina Information Society Project A.nnual Conference27
would be taking place in Beijing during my fieldwork, so I decided to arrive earlier to say
hello to the participants, and exchange name cards with them. This helped me a lot in
reaching my target interviewees who hold crucial positions within the government.
Fifthly, in contrast to using snowballing, I used my initiative to find new contacts,
making calls and introducing myself to the secretary of my target interviewees.
Additionally, with the development of Internet and e-government service, I could also
leave my research questions to 'minister's email box', and wait for a reply. As a result, I
did get a reply from 'minister's email box', though not from the Minister him/herself;
instead, I received a reply from the person who was an expert in the issues I was
addressing.
3.4.2.5 Numbers of Interviews
Thirty interviews were conducted with twenty-seven interviewees in this research,
twenty in China and eight in Taiwan respectively. Three of the interviewees were
interviewed two to three times for follow-up questions based on the outcomes of the
first and second phases of fieldwork. In light of the fact that policy research in China is
still a sensitive area, the accounts of the policy-related critique or comments made by
my interviewees cannot be connected with the interviewees' identities. Additionally,
even though policy has become a public topic, and is frequently discussed in the public
sphere, administrative officers still have highly conservative attitudes and are not willing
to show their identities publicly. As a result, all the interviewees in this research will be
anonymously presented.
3.4.2.6 Interview Content
Since the interview is meant to function as a supplementary research tool, the interview
theme and interview guides are designed for the purpose of collecting data that cannot
otherwise be obtained from written documents. The first interview theme aims to
identify the actors involved in specific digital divide policies throughout China and
27 This project is to use innovative ICTs for public and private sector organisations in China. And it is a
four-year initiative between the Chinese Government and the European Union and started on 01/07/
2005. The one I attended in September 2006 was the second annual conference held in Beijing.
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Taiwan; it aims to reveal those potential actors who are not mentioned in written
documents. It also helps to recruit a broad range of interviewees. The second interview
theme seeks to discover more information about the definition of the digital divide,
even though similar information might already be available in the written documents.
The third and fourth interview themes usefully supplement the second theme. They
search for a more comprehensive interpretation of the digital divide in specific case
countries. In addition to the interviews, questions such as 'what is the social meaning of
the Internet?' may also be answered through documents such as policy texts and
through media coverage, publications and public speech, and policy participants, etc. In
this step, I hoped to uncover the social implication of ICTs and combine concepts from
STS (in particular 'interpretive flexibility' from SCOT) and policy research (in particular
'storylines' from interpretive policy research). One the one hand, the presentation of
different storylines reveals the interpretive flexibility of the Internet in this research. On
the other hand, the storylines reveal how the actors make sense of digital divide policy
'by drawing the terms of discourse available to them' (Hajer, 1995: 53). In conducting
an analysis of storylines, certain contexts will be also taken into consideration (see
Chapter 5 and 7). The fifth theme particularly deals with the process of implementation.
The sixth theme aims to discover if digital divide policy-making is influenced by western
countries or by international organations that are designed to investigate the impact of
international contexts on the national digital divide policy making.
Interview Themes Interview Guides
1. Actors in policy-making Who are the participants in policy process? What
are their positions in policy-making and
implementation?
2. Definition of the DD What is the definition of digital divide in your
mind?
3. Ligitimitisation of bridging
the DD
Do you feel it is necessary to bridge the digital
divide? If yes, can you provide a reason?
4. Storylines of DD policy What presumption are digital divide policies based
on?
How did these presumptions express in the policy
making process?
5. Implementation of DD
policy
How is the digital divide implemented?
6. Policy learning Any reference to relevant policies from foreign
countries or global/regional organization while
making national digital divide policy?
Figure 3.3 Personal Interview Content
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3.5 Data Analysis
The interviews and document collection were all conducted in the three phases of my
fieldwork. After the first research trip, I had done a preliminary analysis based on the
transcripts as well as the documents collected. This preliminary analysis helped me
redesign my research questions to focus on central themes for the interviews during the
second research trip, as well as correct the errors made in the first phase of fieldwork.
The steps of analysis below apply to interview transcripts and documents.
Before entering the stage of analysis, I translated all data collected in Chinese to English.
In order not to mistake the meaning in the data, especially the data from China, I have
consulted friends in China to clarify the terms about which I am confused, or asked my
interviewees to go back to the original source, e.g. the term used in English.
Furthermore, although Mandarin Chinese is the official language for these two settings,
the literal usage of key terms in Taiwan and in China is of great difference, e.g. with
China using cshu y/ honggou' (gulf, huge gap) for the term 'digital divide', and Taiwan
using cshu mi luo cha' (difference). There are two strategies for dealing with Chinese data.
One is translating the data into English before conducting analysis. Therefore, the data
for analysis is in English. However, the process of translation might lose or exclude
some possible meanings, because doing translation is also a kind of interpretive activity.
The other one is analysing the data in Chinese, and then writing the result of the
analysis in English. However, if I adopted this method, I would become the only person
involved in this research that would be able to read the raw materials and would lose the
chance to get feedback from a non-Chinese user before starting analysis, in this research,
my first supervisor.
Therefore, in approaching the original implications of the terms used in these two
settings, I chose to elucidate the meaning of terms in Chinese first, and then translate
them sentence-by-sentence into English. Thus, the data analysis is in English.
Details of each step are explained below. The corresponding data and questions are
shown in Figure 3.4.
1. Identifying participant ministries/institutes in policy-making in this research is the
first step for the subsequent procedures. Because digital divide polices in Taiwan and
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China are spread over several administrative institutions in terms of the roles they
play, it is challenging to sketch out all the participants in this study. I adopted two
methods to outline the participants. First of all, I browsed the official websites of
both governments to identify the participant institutions in terms of their division
of labour in making digital divide policies. Secondly, I used the 'snowball' method to
extend the lists of participants, which means I asked every previous interviewee to
find and contact the next one (see above, Figure 3.1 and 3.2). Finally, the sketch of
policy participants was drawn.
As long as the list of participants was being built, the interviews were conducted to
answer the research questions.
In addition to interviews, the questions such as 'what is the social meaning of the
Internet' may also be answered by the documents, such as policy texts, media coverage,
publication and public speech by policy participants, etc. In this step, I hoped to uncover
the social implication of ICTs, which combines concepts from STS (in particular
'interpretive flexibility' from SCOT) and policy research (in particular 'storylines' from
interpretive policy research). One the one hand, the presentation of different storylines
shows that interpretive flexibility of the Internet in this research. On the other hand, the
storylines present how the actors make sense of digital divide policy 'by drawing the
terms of discourse available to them' (Hajer, 1995: 53). In conducting analysis of
storylines, contexts will be also taken into consideration (see Chapter 5 and 7).
2. Following Step 2, and adopting the same procedure, the way in which participants
define the social problem before policy making, in this research 'the digital divide'
was presented and analysed.
Three detailed analytical steps were taken in steps 2 and 3 in order to search for the
storylines. First, after much careful reading and long hours of data analysis, the
discourses, (made available by interviewees and documents), related to the questions in
step 2 and 3, were represented. Then, the main ideas, concepts and frameworks were
transcribed or categorised, and a summary diagram of all participants' views was
developed. Finally, the transcripts and documents were reanalysed to map the social
meaning of the Internet and the definition of the digital divide.
3. The policy process was understood via an analysis of interviews in this step.
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4. In this step, policy texts and implementations are the objects for analysis. The
analysis technique is the same as that in step 2 and 3.
5. In this step, I will analyse the similarities and dissimilarities of digital divide policy. I
borrow Bennett's idea of 'policy convergence' as discussed earlier in Chapter 2 to
investigate the convergence between countries. I also include international and
national contexts to analyse the similarities and dissimilarities of digital divide policy
between China and Taiwan
Step Task Source
1 Identity the participants, and mapping policy network. Document/ Interview
2 Analyse the social implications of ICT. Document/Interview
3 Analyse the definition of the digital divide—the definition of
social problem
Document/Interview
(Survey reports, policy texts)
4 Map policy process—the process from rough ideas, policy
drafting to policy implementation
Interview/literature review
5 Analyse policy discourse Document
6 Following step 5, analyse similarities and differences of digital
divide policy (its models, causes, etc.)
Document/Interview
"Figure 3.4 Steps of Analysis
3.6 Reflections on the Process of Fieldwork
This section reflects my research journey of fieldwork. In the first place, I describe the
feeling of being a junior Taiwanese researcher in China and the difficulties I
encountered. This is followed by the way how I overcame these difficulties.
3.6.1 Entering the Field as a Familiar Stranger
Below is one extract from the interview in the first phase of fieldwork in China with a
journalist who is working in a government-sponsored monthly. I interviewed him
because the other interviewee's suggestion that he might have the contacts I need for
my research; if he was willing to help, it would be easier for me to locate my
interviewees in Beijing. As we met in his office, I introduced myself to him that I am
doing a comparative study of digital divide policy-making in China and Taiwan. After
my introduction, he replied me that:
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If you are keeping on saying that you are doing comparison in two
countries—China and Taiwan, I would terminate this interview right now.
For my understanding, there is only one China. Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Macao are all parts of China. (Personal Interview, CH04. April 2005.
Emphasis by the interviewee)
Chinese has been another mother tongue for me, in addition to Taiwanese, since I
entered kindergarten at the age of six. However, the similar language but different
political contexts between Taiwan and China meant that I began the fieldwork with
considerable trepidation. I was warned by Chinese colleagues that my ambitions of
interviewing central governmental officials in China would prove impossible to fulfill
due to multiple reasons—mainly the conservative personalities of governmental officials
in China, and my identity as a junior Taiwanese researcher. The extract from my
interview transcript presented above completely illustrates my concerns before entering
the field.
The difficulties of doing research in China can be viewed in terms of two levels in this
thesis. In the first place, for the Chinese officials, accepting a request to be interviewed
may be to some extent conflicting with national security. Moreover, policy research in
China is not a popular field and policy-making in China is centralised with little
openness in most cases, whereby citizens are not encouraged to express their opinions
in public.
' Due to the conservative attitudes mentioned above, things became more difficult when I
first tried to access the officials in Beijing on my own. In addition to the reasons stated
above, my Taiwanese identity also meant that I encountered a great deal of difficulty
during the first phase of data collection. China and Taiwan have been political rivals in
the international political world since 1949, although many Taiwanese businessmen and
entrepreneurs travel to China, and the economic connection between these two settings
has been very close during the last two decades. According to my experience in the first
phase of fieldwork, the way in which an interview proceeded was highly dependent on
the wordings I used to introduce myself.
3.6.2 How I Overcame the Difficulties
As I pointed out earlier, to make the fieldwork proceed more smoothly, I sketched the
interview questions several times and revised them repeatedly, then had an in-depth
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discussion with my two supervisors. After the interview questions were settled, I asked
friends in Taiwan working for the government, high-ranking officials, to be my pilot
interviewees. The final version of the interview questions was modified after these
procedures.
Far from going blindly into my second phase of fieldwork, I had searched all the
backgrounds of my target interviewees, including their educational backgrounds, their
publications, their positions in the governments, and the tasks they are in charge of at
present. These tactics were applied both in doing fieldwork in China and Taiwan. Being
a knowledgeable researcher in the course of an interview was very beneficial. During
the period of each in-depth interview which lasted on average forty minutes to one hour,
I was not only playing the role of interviewer, but also an information provider to fulfill
my interviewees inquires.
Additionally, regarding my national identity in the course of interviews, I learned much
from the experiences in the first phase of fieldwork. I brought the experiences back to
my supervisors and other Taiwanese scholars who are well experienced in doing
research in China, and sought their advice. Their suggestions were as follows:
1) Not to actively express my viewpoints about the political relationship between
China and Taiwan in front of the interviewees in China, although some of my
participants were eager to know how Taiwanese people viewed this issue;
2) Not to use the term 'two countries' but 'two settings';
3) Not to mention I am doing a comparison between Taiwan and China, but say I am
doing geographically 'regional research',
4) Never touch any political issues about union (between China and Taiwan) or
Taiwan's independence from China, and so forth;
5) Express my interests in the programme they are running;
6) Use opening sentences such as 'I am no expert in this field; however, I am interested
in this programme. If I have any misunderstandings about this issue, I am happy to
be informed.'
As I mentioned earlier on the issue of accessibility, China presents particular challenges
28 The interviews always began with introducing who I am, where I am from and why I am here (the
field), which attracted my interviewees' interests in how Taiwan/China made their digital divide policies,
and how European countries, such as the UK, consider and take actions of bridging the digital divide.
The interview could go more smoothly than I imagined via the exchange of my knowledge of other
countries' digital divide policy development.
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for the researcher. The Chinese culture highly emphasises personal connections. Thus,
before entering into the second phase of fieldwork, I had built some connections and
contacts in Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and
Tsinghua University via my supervisors. Friends in Taiwan who have connections with
Chinese scholars in mass communication also did me a big favour in arranging
interviews. Therefore, I could get the interviewees' mobile number beforehand. When I
called them, my strategy was using the opening such as 'I am who's friend, and who
introduced you to me. S/he recommended you are the expert in this area...', which
strategy was taught by my Chinese friends and was very helpful in making interview
appointments. Additionally, an official position as a visiting scholar in Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences also helped me a lot in my second phase of fieldwork in China.
After coming back from the second phase of fieldwork and discussing it with my
supervisors, we found that I still needed more interviews to support my preliminary
analysis from my first two phases of fieldwork. Based on previous experiences, I asked
my second supervisor again to help me get a position as a visiting student in Chinese
Academy of Sciences, which is the highest-ranked national research institute in China,
and this strategy also helped me to build my interpersonal contacts with senior officials
in Chinese central government.
I also seized every opportunity to make contacts with Chinese visiting scholars in
Edinburgh, and obtained much help from their contacts in Beijing. As I mentioned
above, conducting interviews in China, especially as a junior researcher from Taiwan
doing PhD in the UK, brought more difficulties for me. I was reminded by my friends
neither to mention that I was doing a PhD in the UK, nor to use English but Chinese to
make appointments via emails. But this reminder did not apply to all interviewees; some
of my interviewees who got degrees abroad were happy to communicate with me in
English.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, I explained how the research design for this study was developed based
on the analytic framework proposed in Chapter 2. First of all, I discussed the
methodological implications of Hajer's discursive approach in this research. Then I
started to describe my experience of conducting fieldwork in China in particular, and I
explained why I needed to do three phases of fieldwork and how I was mapping digital
divide policy in case countries. I discussed the theoretical support for conducting
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comparative studies as well as what is being compared in this thesis. Secondly, I
presented a triangulation of data collection and explain why these methods are suitable
for this study. Thirdly, I discussed the methodological implications of Hajer's discourse
analysis as discussed in Chapter 2 in terms of my analytical framework. For the
empirical analysis, I structured the steps for analysis, each of which is identical to the
research questions raised in Chapter 1. I also explained how to combine two
approaches—STS (interpretive flexibility) and interpretive policy research (esp.
storylines) in data analysis. Furthermore, I attached my question guidelines for personal
interviews. Finally, I addressed the accessibility issue in conducting interviews in China
as well as the reflection on this study, and I then outlined the resolutions to the
difficulties. The methodological reflection on the accessibility to policy makers (the
'black box'), and its implications for this research will be discussed in Chapter 10.
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Chapter 4
International Context for Digital Divide Policy
Chapter 2 demonstrated that, in theory, context can affect policy outcomes via
discursive frameworks. Empirically, research concerning the impacts of the global policy
context on national policy has proliferated (e.g. Hamelink, 1999). However, existing
research mainly focuses on the institutional dimensions, investigating predominately
how the international institutions coordinate national policies. It does not go further to
examine the discourses that originate from the institutions, and it also ignores the fact
that discourses play a significant role in mediating between institutions and actions
during the course of policy-making and implementation. Thus, this chapter will centre
on this ignored dimension to understand the interpretations of digital divide. This
international context may influence the subsequent policy-making and implementation
in my case studies—China and Taiwan.
This chapter begins the substantive body of this thesis. I will selectively present and
analyse the framings of the digital divide and relevant conferences/summits in
international organisations, which will serve as the broader context in which my two
case countries are situated when they are making digital divide policy. The sources for
analysis in this chapter mainly come from documents derived from several international
and Asia-based regional organisations.
Section 4.1 provides a general account of international contexts in which the accounts
of the digital divide and digital divide policy emerge. I investigate the understanding of
the digital divide, tracking back to the influential US National Information
Infrastructures (Nil) programme and other Nil initiatives in the early 1990s. This is
because the orientation of Nil in individual countries is rather similar—particularly its
emphasis on 'national competitiveness'—and it has contributed to the promotion of
digital divide policy-making and implementation from the mid-1990s onwards. Section
4.2 focuses on digital divide related initiatives in international/regional institutions and
related digital divide discourses, which construct the global context that affects national
digital divide policy-making and implementation. Furthermore, it is divided into two
time periods, one prior to the 2003 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS),
and the other after it, because the 2003 WSIS brings an alternative influential
framework—human rights—into the discussion of the digital divide. Section 4.3
provides a general synthesis of the dominant themes in the content of policy
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documents as well as a scholarly discussion on the discourses of the digital divide.
Section 4.4 concludes this chapter.
4.1 A General Account
The historical development that I explore in this section starts with the US National
Information Infrastructure (Nil) initiative in 1992/3. I argue that it plays a crucial role.
It establishes the idea of building a national information infrastructure and provides a
systematic framework for addressing the society-wide adoption (and non-adoption) of
ICTs. More important for this thesis is its role in spreading the idea of building national
information infrastructure to other countries, with the extension of the ideas of the
National Information Infrastructure to those of the Global Information Infrastructure
(Gil), thus profoundly, influencing the subsequent concerns on the digital divide.
Afterwards, three points are raised under this main concern. Firstly, the NII/GII
initiatives focus on the building of a nation's infrastructure and emphasise economic
development. Secondly, following the first point, they may have influences on the
interpretation of the digital divide that takes the provision of hardware as the solution
to bridging the digital divide, and are mainly concerned about the divide between
countries as well as economic development in international fora (G8 and APEC) when
the topic of the digital divide is discussed. Thirdly, when the WSIS was held in 2003, the
nation-centred/economic development framework with which the digital divide had
been discussed began to shift towards one which incorporated an individual/
'people-centred'/human rights perspective.
4.1.1 The Bandwagon of Global Nil Initiatives in the Early 1990s
This global bandwagon of Nil began in the US in 1993 under the then Clinton
Administration. Clinton's Vice-Presidential candidate Gore had proposed the Nil plan
in the presidential campaign in 1992 (Schneider, 1997) and the US Nil became 'a model
for other countries to provide similar plans' (Blanning et al, 1997: 215). Afterwards, the
Nil found its official expression in a variety of policy initiatives29 (Schneider, 1997) and
presented itself as having several roles30. Here, two issues in relation to the concern of
this thesis, the digital divide, are flagged. First of all, the original emphasis is on the
physical infrastructures as demonstrated by the policy text which states that Nil is 'a
29 For more details refer to Kubicek and Dutton (1997) and Schneider (1997).
30 The goal of Nil touched upon a variety of issues, including 'promotmg private investment and
legislative reforms; ensuring network reliability; protecting information privacy and intellectual property
rights; and providing for a more open and efficient government' (McConnaughey, 1997: 221).
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seamless web of communications networks, computers, databases, and consumer
electronics that will put vast amounts of information at users' fingertips' (IITF, 1993;
cited in Kalil, 1997). Secondly, the Nil is conceived as a driver of economic growth: the
then 'US Vice President Gore emphasised that it is critically important to the economic
future of the United States' (McConnaughey, 1997: 221).
This interwoven consideration of infrastructural focus and economic future is
integrated into that of international competition. As observed by West (1996),
'international technological competition among developed nations was both a cause and
effect of industrialisation of Japan' (West, 1996: 251). The technology policy had come
to the fore in western countries seeking to response to the perceived challenge of the
Japanese economy in key sectors, i.e. shipbuilding, vehicles and consumer electronics
(ibid.). Therefore, the 1980s, as West describes it, was an era that was immersed with
anxiety about 'national competitiveness' (West, 1996: 254) permeating advanced
countries, which resulted in the Nil initiatives in the early 1990s.
The goal of national competitiveness further permeated Nil initiatives in East Asia.
Beginning with Singapore's national telecommunication plan in 1992/1993 titled The IT
2000 Report: Vision of an Intelligent Island, the rebuilding of national competitiveness
became one of the most important policy issue in advanced countries. As the first
country to propose a national development plan in 1992, the Singaporean government
was motivated to achieve the goal of the creation of 'new national competitive
advantages and enhance the quality of life of Singapore by the year 2000' (Wong, 1997:
32). It was hoped that the new national competitive advantages for Singapore would be
realised via developing a global hub and boosting the economic engine (IT 2000 Report,
Singapore).
There are many examples which demonstrate that Nil initiatives were driven by
concerns about national competitiveness. According to Singapore's national
telecommunication plan in 1992/1993 titled The IT 2000 Report: Vision of an Intelligent
Island, the Singaporean government was motivated to achieve the goal of the creation of
'new national competitive advantages and enhance the quality of life of Singapore by
the year 2000' (Wong, 1997: 32). It is hoped that the new national competitive
advantages for Singapore will be realised via developing a global hub and boosting the
economic engine (IT 2000 Report, Singapore). Korea saw Nil as 'a part of national
economic policy to provide the tools for competitiveness, and thus economic
development, in a globalised economy' (Jeong and King, 1997: 113). Japan was driven by
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'a "catch up" mentality—the view that Japan is behind in both plans for an information
infrastructure, and key technologies such as networking and software' (West, Dedrik,
and Kraemer, 1997: 67). The EU and many individual European countries recognised
that they needed to steer the movement of the information society because of 'the
awareness that a strategic competitive edge in the world economy increasingly seems to
depend upon the availability, use, and exploitation of information' (Hedblom and
Garrison, Jr, 1997: 490)
China and Taiwan also jumped on this bandwagon 'in order to propel themselves into
the 21st century information age' (Blanning et al., 1997: 218). China began its Nil
generally known as the 'Golden Projects' in 1993, in response to Nil initiatives in the
advanced economies of the US, Japan, and Europe (Muller and Tan, 1997), along with
three other facets: the modernisation of its industrialisation, software development, and
training of information technology personnel (Blanning et al, 1997: 220). Taiwan
created its Nil in 1994 'whose purpose is to transform Taiwan into an "Asian-Pacific
regional operations centre" and to encourage the formation of information service
providers in government and commerce, as well as healthcare, education, and
entertainment' (Blanning et al., 1997: 223).
The core belief of these Nil initiatives follows the logic that 'investments in technology
can play a critical role in stimulating economic growth and productivity' (Kraemer and
Dedrick, 1996: 319) for each individual country. It furthers the belief that technological
change can bring about national competitiveness and this belief occupies policy
concerns for those countries that lost the race in the Industrial Revolution in the 19th
century. Therefore, 'the Nil is seen as a part of national economic policy to provide the
tools for competitiveness, and thus economic development, in a globalised economy'
(Jeong and King, 1997: 113).
4.1.2 1993/4 Information Society (EU) Extending the Focus beyond Economic Growth
Competition between advanced countries concerning ICTs has continued since the early
1990s when the US Nil was activated. Shortly afterwards in 1993, the European Union
(EU) proposed the idea of an 'Information Society' (the White Paper on Growth,
Competitiveness and Employment —Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21s' Century).
Subsequently, in 1994, a group of senior industrialists, coordinated by Commissioner
Martin Bangemann, was established to publish the Bangemann Report (Europe and the
Global Information Society—Recommendations to the European Council). This policy initiative
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addresses similar problems, aiming at similar goals and adopts similar strategies
(Schneider, 1997: 340) to that of the US.31 However, the interesting point is that the US,
with its Nil dominated by private players, emphasised state intervention directed
towards market failure; in contrast, EU with its social democratic tradition and many
post and telecommunications still state-owned national monopolies, emphasised market
solutions. This shows that, as I mentioned in Chapter 1 and 2 about the complex
relationship between context and policy discourses, policy discourses may not be a
direct reflection of the situation of a country.
The approaches of EU and the UK 'are clearly towards the market' (d'Udekem-Gevers
and Lobet-Maris, 1997: 201). It is only later that EU policy developed a much stronger
social focus (d'Udekem-Gevers & Lobet-Maris, 1997). The EU observed that ICTs have
a profound influence on economic interactions and on society as a whole, and ICTs
must be harnessed to serve society rather than merely drive economic development
(Niebel, 1997). Therefore, what the 'Information Society' policy seeks to express is a
comprehensive and integrated view of the new phenomenon (Niebel, 1997: 62) that
ICTs bring to society.
4.1.3 1995 Onwards, from Global Information Infrastructure (Gil) / Global Information
Society (GIS) to the Digital Divide
The U.S. vision of Nil that emphasises infrastructure and economic growth soon
spread to a global level and became a globalised task. It may also have influenced the
globalising digital divide discourses in international organisations (see section 4.2). In
1994, the then American Vice President A1 Gore introduced the U.S. vision for the Gil
at the first World Telecommunication Development Conference. In the preface of The
Global Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Cooperation, Gore called upon every nation to
establish an ambitious agenda to build the Gil, which includes five principles:
encouraging private sector investment; promoting competition; providing open access
to the network for all information providers and users; creating a flexible regulatory
environment that keeps pace with rapid technological and market changes; and ensuring
universal service.3- Thereafter, these features formed a point of reference for the
subsequent international conferences/summits concerning the digital divide, i.e. Group
31 The similarities between NII/IS perhaps stem from mimicry or a shared view of technology. However,
divergence of policy discourses exists between US-NII and EU-IS. That is, the Bangemann Report
emphasises markets, and Clinton focuses on public interests.
32 For more detailed information, please refer to 'The Global Information Infrastructure: Agenda for
Cooperation', http://www.ntia.doc.gov/oiahome/Giiagend.txt
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of Eight (G8), the United Nations (UN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
etc., which I will describe in section 4.2.
Meanwhile, the policy focused very much on the infrastructure construction because it
was argued that the digital divide will hinder expected development and
national/regional competitiveness of Gil if ICTs do not reach everyone in society. With
this issue of the digital divide in mind, the National Telecommnuications and
Information Administration (NTIA) of the U.S., an important constituency
participating in the Nil initiative, embarked on a series of surveys on the digital divide
(see Chapter 1). Individual nations and regional commissions, i.e. the US and EU, lent
weight to the significance of ICTs and the threat to national competitiveness, economic
development and disparity caused by the uneven distribution and usages of ICTs.
Afterwards, the issue of the digital divide began to gain visibility worldwide, and several
international organisations held conferences/summits in relation to bridging the digital
divide.
The concerns of these international organisations centre on the global situation and in
particular the global digital divide. They are concerned about the divides between
nations, instead of divides within nations. This can also be evidenced and traced back as
early as 1997 when the then G7 announced that there was a gap between industrialised
and developing countries. Elowever, actual use of the term 'digital divide' first occurred
in an international organisation when the Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society was
drawn up at the G8 summit in July 2000 (Personal Interview, CH09. January 2006). In
the Charter, the recurrent themes of ICTs and digital divide policy which came to
dominate subsequent international conferences/summits are highlighted, i.e. sustainable
economic growth, public welfare, social cohesion, democracy, the promotion of human
rights, etc. To meet the ends of the Charter, the G8 founded the Digital Opportunity Task
Force in 2001 to clarify the definition of, and solution to the digital divide.
In addition to G8, a regional organisation APEC, consisting of Asian countries, was also
devoted to finding a solution to the digital divide on economic grounds, i.e. to foster the
development of a knowledge-based economy. The concern of APEC is predominantly
to boost the Asian economy, via economic transition to a knowledge-based economy by
taking advantage of the development, penetration and usage of ICTs. The main
concerns are presented in a series of reports drafted by the Economic Committee of
APEC in 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively.
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Thus far, the framework of the digital divide which emerged from the G8 and APEC
was one which focused on the prospects of nadonal economic growth and regional
economic growth, although some peripheral themes were also emerging, e.g. public
welfare, social cohesion, human rights, etc. Around this time, another internadonal
organisation, the UN, was also involved in discussing the digital divide issue. In 2002,
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which once played a vital role in
building an industrial economy (Cogburn, 2003), hosted Plenipotentiary Conferences to
propose the Strategic Plan—bridging the digital divide, and in 2005 proposed Building Digital
Bridges—Approaches and Best Practices to the issue of the digital divide.
Additionally, under the leadership of ITU, the UN General Assembly held a two-staged
WSIS in 2003 and in 2005 respectively. The symbolic importance of WSIS lies in the
involvement of all international organisations in the issue of the digital divide as well as
the integration of ICT for Development related initiatives/programmes into one
summit. Furthermore, the profound breakthrough resides in the embracing of a
wide-range of concerns on bridging the digital divide. These ranged from merely a
nation-centred perspective to a 'people centred, inclusive, development-oriented
information society' (Declaration of Principles, 2003 WSIS).
4.2 International Programmes and Global Digital Divide Discourses
4.2.1 Prior to 2003 World Summit on Information Society
In this subsection I look at the globalisation of digital divide discourse and its migration
through various fora to its authoritative ultimate location in WSIS providing in-depth
details.
4.2.1.1 G8 12000-20011
Prior to 2003, G8 was one of the earlier international organisations that provided an
interpretation of the digital divide (in both 2000 and 2001). Organised by rich countries,
the contribution of G8 to the issue of bridging the digital divide was via holding a
meeting in Okinawa on 22nd of July, 2000. The achievement of the meeting was drafting
the document titled Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society, and then a task force the
lG8 Digital Opportunity Task Force' (DOT Force) was created afterwards in 2001. Though
the task force only existed for two years, it definitely developed some ideas that become
central in building an information society and bridging the digital divide (Chadwick,
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2006: 215).
Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society, Okinawa, July 22, 2000
The Charter has many features common to those of Gil, as I have summarised below
(see Figure 4.1), which reveals that the Charter may be cross-referenced with the goal of
GIL Further evidence which supports this observation is that the US, which proposed
Gil, is also member of G8.
The Charter began with a technological determinist perspective in clause 1, for example:
Information and Communications Technology (IT) is one of the most
potent forces in shaping the twenty-first century. Its revolutionary impact
affects the way people live, learn and work and the way government
interacts with civil society. IT is fast becoming a vital engine of growth for
the world economy. It is also enabling many enterprising individuals, firms
and communities, in all parts of the globe, to address economic and social
challenges with greater efficiency and imagination. Enormous
opportunities are there to be seized and shared by us all. (Okinawa Charter
on Global Information Society, Okinawa, 22/07/2000)
In line with this technological determinist perspective, economic growth is the main
concern of the G8. As shown in the above extract, two phrases—growth of the world
economy and sustainable economic growth—appear in the first two clauses to pinpoint
the significant role of ICTs in economic growth. The positive implications of ICT3 for
economic development recur throughout the Charter. For example, the Charter
emphasises that in order to build a society to fulfill people's potential and realise their
aspirations, it is of great importance to ensure that ICTs are supported to meet the
goals of 'creating sustainable economic growth, enhancing the public welfare, and
fostering social cohesion', and 'work to fully realise its potential to strengthen democracy,
increase transparency and accountability in governance, promote human rights, enhance
cultural diversity, and to foster international peace and stability'. In this Charter it seems
that the ICTs can act as a panacea to solve all the problems caused by modern society. It
is within such logic that the digital divide represents an obstacle to their positive impacts.
However, the Charter does not clarify the real disadvantages of the digital divide, but
turns quickly to repeat the advantages of ICTs in the twelfth paragraph with the
emphasis on their effects as a panacea for all social problems.
33 Although the Charter uses the abbreviation 'IT', the full phrase in the Charter is Information
Communication Technology.
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However, as far as the G8's commitment to bridging the digital divide is concerned, it
provides a wide range of concepts. For example, apart from the economic concern, it
also mentions the concept of 'social inclusion', an idea which was pinpointed in NTIA's
fourth digital divide report (US, 2000) as well as in the Lisbon Summit (EU, 2000) (see
Figure 4.4). This serves as a cross-referenced example in globalising digital divide
discourse.
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GIL Agenda for Cooperation (1994) G8: Okinawa Charter on GIS (2000)
•Encouraging private sector investment (p.l) • The private sector plays a leading role in the
development of information and communications
networks in the information. It is important to
avoid undue regulatory interventions that would
hinder productive private-sector initiatives in
creating an 7T-friendly environment. (Clause 7)
•Promoting Competition (p.l) •Continue to promote competition in and open
markets for the provision of information
technology and telecommunications products and
services, including non-discriminatory and
cost-oriented interconnection for basic
telecommunications. (Clause 7.1)
•Providing open access to the network for a
information providers and users (p.l)
•Ensuring universal access (p.l)
• .. .our commitment to the principle of inclusion:
everyone, everywhere should be enabled to
participate in and no one should be excluded from
the benefits of the global information society. The
resilience of this society depends on democratic
values that foster human development such as the
free flow of information and knowledge, mutual
tolerance and respect for diversity. (Clause3)
•Bridging the digital divide in and among countries
has assumed a critical importance on our respective
national agendas. Everyone should be able to enjoy
access to information and communications
networks. (Clause 9)
•A key component of our strategy must be the
continued drive toward universal and affordable
access. (Clause 10)
•Creating a flexible regulatory environment that
can keep pace with rapid technological and market
changes (p.l)
• We will exercise our leadership in advancing
government efforts to foster an appropriate policy
and regulatory environment to stimulate
competition and innovation, ensure economic and
financial stability advance stakeholder collaboration
to optimise global networks (Clause 5)
Figure 4.1 Comparison of Goals of Gil and G8. Complied by the Authorj
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Digital OpportunitiesforA.U: Meeting the Challenge (Report of the Digital Opportunity Task Tone,
2001)
The contribution of the Charter to bridging the digital divide is its creation of a
follow-up action—the birth of the Digital Opportunity Task Force in 2001. This task
force aims to bridge the digital divide in both national and international levels, and give
a clearer operational definition of the digital divide compared to the previous Charter.
The task force defines the digital divide as 'a reflection of existing broader
socio-economic inequalities and can be characterised by insufficient infrastructure, high
cost of access, inappropriate or weak policy regimes, inefficiencies in the provision of
telecommunication networks and services, lack of locally created content, and uneven
ability to derive economic and social benefits from information-intensive activities'
(Report of the Digital Opportunity Task force, G8, 11/05/2001).
Furthermore, it also proposes the resolution to bridging the digital divide. In the report,
it states that 'a fundamental requirement for reducing the digital divide is for countries
to give priority to the development of their communications infrastructure and to
provide universal and affordable access to individuals and all geographic areas of their
country. A pre-requisite for this is to put in place pro-competitive policies in the
communications sector and a regulatory framework that will support such competition'
(Report of the Digital Opportunity Task force, p.8). The context here is that they fear that a
non-competitive policy will keep prices high, which is part of a laissesgfaire solution.
4.2.1.2 UN
The UN is a significant international organisation dealing with the issue of information
society and the digital divide. The building and development of the information society
is the key objective for the UN. It has been working on the Gil since 1998 onwards. For
example, in 1998, ITU proposed a general Gil standards development and Gil principles and
framework architecture-, in 2000, ITU proposed Gil terminology: terms and definitions, Gil
scenario methodology, and Gil referencepointsfor interconnectionframework (ITU official website).
Thus, Gil to a large extent has impacts on the subsequent digital divide discourse of
UN subsections.
In September 2000, the Member States of the United Nations adopted a Millennium
Declaration, one of the commitments of which is to 'ensure that the benefits of new
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technologies, especially information and communication technologies are available to all'.
Under the structure of the UN, several commissions and institutions are responsible for
the development of the information society. A brief architecture is presented as below:
lnternationalTeleco??jmunication Union (ITU)
Previously launched in 1865 as the International Telegraph Union, the International
Telecommunication Union gained its current name in 1932. In 1947, the International
Telecommunication Union became an official specialised agency under the Economic
and Social Council of the UN. In 2002, ITU's plenipotentiary conference endorsed a
strategic plan for 2004-2007, the priority of which is to bridge the international digital
divide and prepare for the two-staged World Summit of Information Society in 2003
and 2005 (http://www.itu.int/aboutitu/overview/history.html. See the history of ITU).
In the early 1990s, when ICTs were in their emerging stages, ITU played a very
important role for structuring the order of international telecommunications. Launched
in 1865, ITU had already an established presence in the international regulation of
telecommunication, i.e. developing common standards and regulations for the
burgeoning global telegraph networks (Chadwick, 2006: 212). ITU at that time
represented an emerging telecommunications regime. However, now ITU faces a
challenge with the convergence of ICTs that other major players are important in this
new world. As Cogburn (2003) argues, the regime created by ITU is more suitable for an
industrial economy than for an information society. Therefore, with the decline of ITU,
as well as more and more high-level international conferences being held, a new
regime—global information society—is emergent. ITU no longer plays a dominant role
in the information society, but acts as a backup to assist relevant international
conferences and summits, e.g. WSIS (Chadwick, 2006: 221).
In 2002, ITU organised the Third World Telecommunication Development Conference (WTDC).
It established work programmes and guidelines, and defined ICT development
questions and priorities in view of the high-level of recognition of the digital divide
created by the rapid and pervasive expansion of ICTs. It also determined the objectives
and strategies for the balanced worldwide and regional development of
telecommunications, giving particular consideration to the expansion and modernisation
of the networks and services of the developing countries as well as the mobilisation of
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the resources required for this purpose (source from the ITU official website)34.
Following the conclusion of 2002 WTDC, an initiative titled building Digital
Bridges—Approaches and Best Practices was formed in 2004. Hereafter, an action plan for
bridging the digital divide was published in 2005. In the plan, it emphasised that 'access
to ICTs is seen as an essential factor for development and the improvement of the
well-being society' (Building Digital Bridges—Approaches and Best Practices, p.l). It also refers
to the 2003 WSIS which underscored the importance of ICT infrastructure for the
establishment of an inclusive information society (Building Digital Bridges—Approaches and
Best Practices, p.l). In order to meet this goal of the WSIS, the Initiative develops a digital
opportunity index to measure technology access and presented this in the 2005 WSIS.
UnitedNations Information and Communication Technologies (UNICT)
This initiative was launched in November 2001, a creation of the UN's Economic and
Social Council. UNICT serves as a coordinator among other international organisations
for the improvement of the development of the information society. Its ambition is to
engage developing countries in information society policy-making. However, as a
co-ordinator, the coordinating ability of UNICT leaves much to be desired due to the
shortage of budget to exert their power. This situation is also encountered by the
coordinating institutions of digital divide policy in individual developing countries, i.e.
the case countries in this thesis—China and Taiwan. The detailed analysis of their
positions will be presented in the following chapters.
UnitedNations Commission on Science and Technologyfor Development (UNCSTD)
At its second session, in May 1995, the United Nations Commission on Science and
Technology for Development (UNCSTD) chose the topic information technology (IT)
and development as its main theme for the next session in 1997. A Working Group was
established to study the particular problems of access to and use of IT by developing
countries. The main task was to prepare a short report for consideration by the
Commission (Mansell and Wehn, 1998: foreword).
In its Statement on Universal Access to Basic Communication and Information Services of April




The information and technology gap and related inequalities between industrialised and
developing nations are widening: a new type of poverty—information poverty—looms.
Most developing countries, especially the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), are not
sharing in the communications revolution, since they lack:
affordable access to core information resources, cutting-edge technology and to
sophisticated telecommunications systems and infrastructure;
the capacity to build, operate, manage and service the technologies involved;
policies that promote equitable public participation in the information society as
both producers and consumers of information and knowledge; and
a work force trained to develop, maintain and provide the value-added producers
and services required by the information economy (ITU, 1998).
UNCSTD selected ICTs and Development as its main theme for the period 1995-1997.
At that time, 'a Working Group was set up to examine advances in ICTs and their
implications for development, focusing mainly on problems of access to ICTs and the
potential developmental impact of these technologies on developing countries' (Talk by
the Chief, Technology for development Section, UNCATD, 2002)33. The Working
Group proposed many recommendations filed in the source book in 1998, titled
Knowledge Societies: Information Technology for Sustainable Development, which interestingly
couples these two concepts. Their basic objective is sustainable development, a phrase
which was defined by the Brundtland Commission in 1987, as 'Development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs' (Brundtland Commission, 1987).
Thus far, although these sub-organisations of the UN present a broader vision of ICTs
that focuses on 'using its potential to maximise social-welfare and socioeconomic
development' (Cogburn, 2004: 155), they still reveal a narrower version which focuses
on the potential for economic growth and development of ICTs.
4.2.1.3 APEC—Regional Organisation on Bridging the Digital Divide/Asia
In the existing, western-dominated literature on the regional organisations pertinent to
the information society and the digital divide, the Asian-countries-based regional
35 'Briefing the work of the United Nations Commission on Science and Technology for Development in
the area of ICTs for Development', WSIS PrepCom-1, 1-5 July 2002. Document can be accessed on
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/pel/statements general/uncstd.doc.
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organisation APEC, attracts relatively little attention. However, APEC hosted a series of
heated debates and discussions among member states during the period of ministerial
meetings. The aim of APEC focuses on transforming the digital divide into digital
opportunities.
Similar to Gil and G8, the eventual objective of APEC is developing a liberated,
market-let regional environment for the Asian region. This convergence of perspectives
may stem from cross-referencing as well as the overlapping membership between these
international organisations (see Figure 4.2. The countries with membership in both G8
and AEPC are emphasised in Italics by the author). Praising the advantages stemming
from knowledge-based economies, the Economy Committee published a series of three
interrelated reports in 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively. In the 2000 report, the
committee recognised that the economic growth of the knowledge-based countries
appears sustainable; it therefore encouraged APEC countries to take steps towards this
economic approach. In the 2001 report, the committee further examines what
constitutes the 'right policy environment' to build a new economic approach.
G8 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States
APEC Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, japan, Malaysia, Philippine, New Zealand, Singapore,
Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Nations, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Mexico, Papua
New Guinea, Chile, Peru, Russia, Vietnam
figure 4.2 Memberships of G8 andAPEC
Following the efforts made in the previous two year's reports, in 2002, the committee
examined the elements required for a knowledge-based economy, and took a close look
at the issue of the digital divide from the experiences of four countries—Australia,
Canada, Japan, and Taiwan. In this report titled The New Economy in APEC: Innovation,
Digital Divide and Polity by APEC Economic Committee (2002), 'New Economy' replaces
the 'Information Society' used in UN documents. However, they both refer to the same
economic model, with a strong emphasis placed on ICTs for sustainable development.
Also in 2002, Taiwan drafted the plan Transforming the Digital Divide into a Digital
Opportunity, which followed it proposal submitted in the 2000 APEC conference. In
2003, Taiwan submitted a proposal to establish an APEC Digital Opportunity Centre
(ADOC) at an APEC meeting, the goal of which is to help bridging the digital divide in
APEC countries.
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4.2.2 After 2003 WSIS—Birth of a Global Integrator to Bridge the Digital Divide
As described above, concerns about the digital divide have circulated in international
organisations. These concerns are presented in a spectrum from addressing narrow
economic development to a wider socio-economic perspective. All of these perspectives
contributed to the World Summit on Information Society in 2003 and 2005, a two-stage
international summit held by the UN. The summits only lasted for a few days, however
the preparatory and follow-up processes takes several years. Figure 4.3 shows the
processes leading up to the WSIS which was finally held in 2003 and 2005 (Klein, 2004:
4-5).
Year Process
1998 The ITU proposed it within the UN system.
2001 The General Assembly formally authorised the summit
2003 The first phase summit was held in December in Geneva
2005 The second phase summit was held in November in Tunis
Figure 4.3 Process Leading up to the IVSIS
4.2.2.1 Phase One—2003, Geneva
The results of the first stage are the creation of two official documents—Declaration of
Principles and Plan of A.ction.
Declaration of Principles
In the first passage of this document, it claims that an information society, which is
people-centred, inclusive and development-oriented, is the aim of the WSIS. To build
such an information society, ICTs serve as the most important tools. Similar to the
Okinawa Charter of G8, ICTs in this Principle are assigned as an antidote to cure all the
social problems ranging from poverty, gender inequality, illness, human rights abuses
and the like. Under this umbrella of goals, any impediment to an information society
needs to be eradicated; in this case the digital divide.
In this declaration, the digital divide is defined as the way that 'the benefits of the
information technology revolution are today unevenly distributed between the
developed and developing countries and within societies' (passage 10). Furthermore, the
declaration proposes a slogan of 'turning the digital divide into digital opportunities', in
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which opportunities are for all, especially those who are left behind and marginalised
(passage 10).
Plan of Action
To complement this declaration, the Plan of Action was drafted afterwards to translate
the guiding principle into practice, as well as provide 'an evolving platform to promote
the Information Society at the national, regional and international levels' (passage 2) due
to different levels of the information society. In the Plan, the methods to achieve the
aforementioned objectives, aims and goals are methodically listed, to serve as the
references while each country is making national policy to join the international
information society.
4.2.2.2 Phase Two—2005, Tunis
Tunis Commitment and TunisAgendafor the Information Society
Simply put, the second phase of the WSIS was a follow-up to examine the progress of
each part made in the principles and plan during the first phase two years ago. The
Agenda produced by the second phase adopts a much more practical stand to recognise
the situations of developing countries to bridge the digital divide. Two years after the
original declaration and plan were published, participant countries had endeavoured to
make policy to bridge the digital divide. However, they found that in countries with
limited resources, there are plenty of competing objectives to be met other than
overcoming the digital divide. Therefore, in the Tunis Agenda, the WSIS recognised the
reality facing developing countries, and set up financial mechanisms as well as the
Digital Solidarity Fund to finance them.
The two-phased WSIS has produced four main documents, two for each phase
respectively. Declaration of Principle and Plan of Actions are the outcome summaries of the
first phase, and Tunis Commitment and Tunis Agenda for the Information Society were
produced by the second. After the second phase, the WSIS publishes a collection of the
outcomes of the two-phased summits. The material for analysis below is based on the
collection WSIS Outcome Document, published in December 2005.
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4.2.2.3 The Implications of the WSIS
First of all, the WSIS takes the position of a coordinator in coping with the issues
related to the information society and the digital divide internationally. The summits
symbolise a new global cooperation on the information society, including the public and
private sectors and civil societies. The WSIS also takes over the tasks of other
international organisations, and most of them 'have now been brought together under
the umbrella of the WSIS' (Chadwick, 2006: 221). The WSIS also takes over the goal of
ICT for Development from the previously scattered international organisations
concerned with the issue of the digital divide.36
Secondly, generally speaking, the purpose of the WSIS is to build a healthy information
society on the basis of the previously published or upheld UN documents. The scope
of these documents is very broad, ranging from poverty of the developing countries,
gender inequality, children's development, health development, human rights and the like.
Therefore, the outcome of the two summits is all-encompassing, and ambitious enough
to cover all dimensions relevant to unbalanced development.
For example, new motivation for the WSIS to bridge the digital divide is transferring its
concerns from a nation-centred to people-centred, inclusive, development-oriented
information society. This transformation of the discursive and policy goals extends the
policy issue from narrowly addressing economic growth to wider individual/social
development, placing people at the centre of the policy issue.
Thirdly, after the WSIS, an alternative framework of the digital divide has emerged and
has been gradually adopted by policy makers (which will be shown in Chapter 8 on
Taiwan's digital divide policy-making). The rights-based framework stems from
Communications Rights in the Information Society (CRIS), a non-profit organisation.
The UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan also stated the need for the right to communicate
very explicitly in his message on World Telecommunication Day (17/05/2003). He
reminded the international community that there were millions of people in the poorest
countries who were still excluded from the 'right to communication', which was
increasingly seen as a fundamental human right. These warnings later provoked much
discussion about the human rights to communication at WSIS. As mentioned in the
previous section, 'human rights to communication' finally became the prominent policy
36 WSIS Document Annex 2C, Report from the WSIS High Level Panel: 'ICT for Development'.
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issue in WSIS.
To sum up, the two-phased WSIS summit gathered all international organisations to get
involved, and integrate ICT-for-Development related initiatives/programmes into one
summit. The objectives and goals of the UN and other international organisations to
build an information society are methodically listed in the documents produced from
the two-phased summit. The WSIS as a coordinator devoted to the building of an
information society perfectly presents itself as an optimist concerning ICTs. However,
in the Agenda of the second phase, it recognises the financial problems as well as the
reality of competing objectives facing developing countries while implementing the
declaration and plan in joining the information society. Nevertheless, WSIS still displays
an optimistic stance to the role of ICTs for development. This optimism will be also
noticed in the contexts of China and Taiwan in later chapters.
Figure 4.4 provides an overall map of international events related to bridging the digital
divide. The marked areas indicate geography as follows: yellow for US, blue for EU and
green for international organisations.
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When Where Event
1992 US • Clinton-Gore's plan on the national information infrastructure (Nil)
• The lunch of Nil Initiative
1994 EU • The establishment of a High Level Group of Experts on the Global
Information Society (GIS)
• The publication of Bangemann Report on Information Society
1994 US •Gore proposed the Global Information Infrastructure (Gil )to the world
stage in the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
1994 EU •Bangemann took the Information Society to the global stage when it
persuaded G7 group of countries at its summit to set up a GIS Project
1995 EU •Global Information Society (GIS) Project was operationalised through G7
ministerial conference on the GIS
1995-1996 UNESCO
/ITU
•Started a process with culminated with the creation of the 'Africa
Information Society Initiative: An Action Framework to Build Africa's
Information and Communication Infrastructure' in 1996
•Africa was the first continent to undertake such a programme; however the
concept of the digital divide was not been established yet.
1996 G7 •Sponsored a conference on the theme of 'Information Society and
Development' which took in South Africa
•Concluded that there is gap between industrialised and developing
Countries
1995-2002 US •Five Digital Divide Reports
•The original use of the digital divide was referred to fears about the
differential access to IC'l's in different schools in the US
•The term and concept of the digital divide started to be adopted and
spread over elsewheie
• After the publication of the fourth report in 2000 titled Falling through the
Net: Toward Digital Inclusion—a Report on America's Access to Technology Tools, the
concept of social inclusion has permeated discussions of the digital divide.
2000 EU •Lisbon Summit adopted 'social inclusion' in policy making.
2000 G8 •Okinawa, G8 summit, 'Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society'
2002 WB •The Clinton-Gore initiative was taken to the global level. WB's online
magazine Development Outreach report was titled 'From Digital Divide to
Digital Opportunity: Business Leaders Report from Davos'. Clinton and
Gates were present.
2003 UN •WSIS phase I
• 'Human Rights' became a prominent concept to bridge the digital divide
2005 UN •WSIS phase II
Figure 4.4 International Events Related to Bridge the Digital Divide
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4.3 A Synthesis of Dominant Themes and Discussion on the Digital
Divide from the International Programmes
The social implications of ICTs, particularly the Internet, are often discussed in an
over-optimistic way, known as technological utopianism, which is discussed in Chapter 2.
It is under this optimistic framework that the digital divide attracts the attention of
policy-makers because, whatever definition of the digital divide is ascribed, being unable
to utilise the alleged advantages of the Internet would be regarded as a hindrance to
'development'.
In this section, based on the international programmes and global digital divide
discourses I selectively listed and discussed earlier in this chapter, I categorise five
discursive frameworks. These five frameworks represent the existing policy debates on
the digital divide drawing from the international organisations discussed, ranging from
macro to micro dimensions, from national development to individual human rights. I
will discuss them individually with considerations of where the discursive framework is
coming from, when the original usage of the concept arose and if necessary, its
relationship with ICTs, and its policy implications.
4.3.1 National Competitiveness
As discussed above, the emphasis on national competitiveness from NII/IS, GII/GIS
underpins the subsequent digital divide discourses. This reveals that a main motivation
in bridging the digital divide is national competitiveness, which is a common strand in
technology policy in developed countries in the 20th century (West, 1996). The ideology
of national competitiveness is 'the use of a (real or imagined) advantage held by another
nation as a justification for domestic policies', 'used to sell technology policies to
government, industry, and the public at large' (West, 1996: 251).
This perspective regards telecommunications as a key infrastructure that 'promotes
development through combination of three factors; externalities, knowledge creations
and regional development' (Mariscal, 2005: 413-414). That the digital divide has gained
so much attention in comparison to other divides—such as economic, social and
political—reflects the belief that IT37 has the potential to improve the living standards
of disadvantaged groups by helping them upgrade their income (Mariscal, 2005: 413).
37 The two terms 'IT' and 'ICT' are exchangeably used in international documents. 'ICT' takes over from
'IT' as the recognition of new communications media grows.
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This perspective also shows that 'there is a clear need to bridge the digital divide by
subsidising access to telecommunication services because of its contribution to
economic development' (Mariscal, 2005: 413). In this sense, it 'is biased toward the
supply side and gives little attention to demand' (Mariscal, 2005: 415).
4.3.2 ICT for Development
The conceptualisation of development in the 1990s to a large extent presents the
continuity of the Modernisation Theory (Schech, 2002: 13) of the 1950s and 1960s.
Newly developed ICTs are expected to bring about a prosperous global society.
However, the abstract notion of development is gradually split into two perspectives.
One is concerned about the broader development for all populations in the world,
focusing on human development. The other one is narrowly and mechanically
concerned about global and domestic economic growth. The international and regional
organisations to a larger or less extent combine these two perspectives, but sometimes
emphasise one more than the other.
Ideally, 'ICTs for development' presents a shift in the model of development comparing
with that in 1950s and 1960s. For example, it 'points out a shift from a focus on
centralised, state-led development agency, to a more de-centrailised version of
development agent' (Schech, 2002: 13). Thus, the denotation of development in the
phrase of 'ICT for development' embraces a broader development that encompasses
participant development, democracy, respects for human rights, an inclusive information
society and people-centred information society. It presents a similar vision to that
observed by Cogburn (2004). The organisations aiming to develop an equal information
society are concerned about non-material development, such as human rights, human
development and the like, and an endeavor to bridge the digital divide (Cogburn, 2004).
In practice, the narrower development discourse occupies a crucial position in digital
divide polices in developing countries, which will be evidenced in the following chapters
regarding case studies in China and in Taiwan. This narrower development discourse
attracts some scholars' attention and worries. For example, Wade (2002) is worried that
developing countries will be trapped in a new form of dependence on developed
nations in the course of bridging the digital divide. He further proposes an argument to
counter the power of the IT-for-development myth. He suggests that the efficiency of
IT has been overstated, both 'to corporate and public organisations and to stronger
responsiveness of government to citizen-customers' (Wade, 2002: 443). IT cannot solve
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the fundamental problem—poverty and income inequality.
Wade continues that 'the big worry about the ICT-for-development movement is that it
reflects a rationality of acdon that is obstructing radonal decisions about development
investment' (Wade, 2002: 462). Less developed countries 'are disadvantaged in their
access to the global economy not just by their lack of income, skills, infrastructure, and
the like, but also by the very standards and rules that are built into the international
systems. These standards and rules ensure that as developing countries become more
integrated into the international ICT system, Western suppliers benefit
disproportionately' (ibid).
4.3.3 Social Inclusion
The concept 'social inclusion', prevailing mainly in continental Europe, is used to
counter its contrast 'social exclusion', a concept about inequality of process. The
adoption of social inclusion in policy making originated from the Lisbon Summit, 2000
(Hills, Grand and Piachaud, 2002). The European Council set up a new strategic goal
for the Union of advancing a completely developed knowledge-based economy for the
first decade of the 21st century. As a conclusion of the summit, the EU member states
committed to adopting the promotion of social cohesion and inclusion as a strategic
goal. From this point, the concept is embedded in the policy of EU countries; 'social
inclusion and exclusion are prominent concepts in European discourse' (Warschauer,
2003a: 9). Nearly half a year later, in October 2000, the fourth in a series of NTIA
reports titled Vailing through the Net: Toward Digital Inclusion—a Keport on American's Access to
Technology Tools engaged with this concept. Hereafter, since the Lisbon Summit and the
fourth NTIA report took place, the concept of social inclusion has permeated
discussions of the digital divide.
As Selwyn (2002) observes, 'in many ways the digital divide can be seen as a practical
embodiment of the wider theme of "social inclusion" recently prominent in policy
making throughout center-left governments in Western nations' (Selwyn, 2002: 4,
emphasis in original). He continues that 'the notion of "digital exclusion" first emerged
with regard to the technological disparity between developed and developing countries,
within Western advanced capitalist societies the international focus of these debates
quickly gravitated towards the issue of technological inequalities within individual
countries' (ibid, italics and emphasis in original).
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Warschauer (2003a: 211-213) proposes a framework of social inclusion for policymakers
and researchers. First of all, analysis of the problem—the digital divide—'must begin
with examination of social structures, social problems, social organisation, and social
relations rather than with an accounting of computer equipment and Internet lines'.
Secondly, once the problems are identified, programmes for bridging the digital divide
'should be based on a systemic approach that recognises the primacy of social structure
and promotes the capacity of individuals or organisations for ongoing social change
through innovation of those structures using technology'. Thirdly, to ensure the
programmes work well, it is crucial to exploit the catalytic effects of ICT. That is,
understanding the social interactions that surround the technology. Fourthly, the leaders'
visions are of great importance for the success of the programmes. Fifthly, flexible
programmes have more room for modification. Finally, governments need to intervene
properly in promoting higher rates of access, because depending solely on market forces
is insufficient.
4.3.4 Social Capital
A related concern to social inclusion is social capital/technological capital. Simply put,
social capital refers to 'network ties of goodwill, mutual support, shared language,
shared norms, social trust, and a sense of mutual obligation that people can derive value
from' (Huysman and Wulf, 2004: 1). With this definition, social capital is also about 'the
value derived from being a member of a society or community' (Huysman and Wulf,
2004:1).
The current discussion on social capital can be categorised into two traditions—the
Marxist and communitarian traditions. Regarding social capital as one of several capital
forms, the Marxist approach, represented by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, is
interested in the way social capital shapes the social world, 'especially those aspects of a
class struggle and class nature' (Huysman and Wulf, 2004: 2). The Communitarian
approach, contrasting to the conflict perspective of the Marxist tradition, emphasizes
the mutual support and trust within a community, which is seen as 'voluntaristic social
units that promote the harmonic development of organisations and society as a whole'
(Huysman and Wulf, 2004: 3). This approach put an emphasis on unity and collectivism.
There is an obvious distinction between insiders and outsiders in this tradition.
While the analysis of social capital has been grounded so far in the relationship between
individual actors or between an individual actor and a social aggregate, Putnam (1993,
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2000) equates social capital with the level of civic engagement in general. He applies the
concept of social capital to cities, regions, and whole nations, and on this basis,
understands social capital as the set of properties (e.g., norms, levels of trust, or social
networks) associated with a social entity that enables joint activities and conception for
mutual benefit. Putnam's perspective necessitates the questions, which interaction exists
between the level of civic engagement and the use as well as appropriation of
information technology? (Huysman and Wulf, 2004: 4-5).
Selwyn (2002) adopts three forms of capital from Bourdieu—economic, cultural1" and
social—to construct a comprehensive model for investigating the digital divide, which
can 'identify the effect of different forms of capital in all its different forms on
individuals' and groups' ability to make meaningful use of information and
communications technologies' (Selwyn, 2002: 13). Without denying the importance of
economic capital, Selwyn emphasises the key role of cultural and social capital.
Beyond the economic and cultural capital, social capital is a more complicated form of
capital, which 'can be seen as social obligations or connections between an individual
and networks of other significant individuals (Selwyn, 2002: 14). Mariscal has argued
that social capital perspective is important for understanding and overcoming digital
divide. The social capital perspective 'provides a useful analytical lens that identifies the
potential benefits of IT access and in doing so offers useful information for the design
of a policy that integrates the needs and restraints of the users' (Mariscal, 2005: 415).
'New empirical studies provide some evidence as to the importance of IT access not
only as a means for acquiring information but also as a catalyst for cooperation within a
community and thus as an instrument for building social capital. Social capital, as
empirical political science studies show, can have a significant impact on development'
(Mariscal, 2005: 415).
'Fundamentally, a policy that seeks to address the digital divide in a developing country
must face the lack of human knowledge. Accumulated knowledge, learning by doing
over time, represents the most significant factor in the ability to implement new
technologies in the context of a developing country' (Mariscal, 2005: 416). 'Again it is
useful to consider the social capital concept as a mechanism of social interaction, where
community leaders teach others the basic skills to use these new technologies to address
community needs, thus broadening the available pool of social capital' (Mariscal, 2005:
38 Cultural capital in Bourdieu's work (1986) refers to the education, which is equally important while
discussing the digital divide
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416).
When connecting ICTs and social capital, some scholars create a novel
term—technological capital—to denote the fundamental significance of ICTs in society
(Selwyn, 2002; Hesketh & Selwyn, 1999; Howard, 1992). The term 'technological capital'
is a proliferation and an addition to Bourdieu's capital forms—culture, economic and
social—in the information era, but works on the basis of them. Ownership of not
merely technology but also technological capital may facilitate individuals to make
decisions about their own choices in a well-informed environment, which the next
framework 'human rights' elucidates.
4.3.5 Human Rights/ Right to Communicate/ Citizenship
The connection of human rights and the digital divide was popularised in the WSIS.
Although this claim does not provide a definite scheme for practical policy-making,
many scholars have endeavoured to coordinate the concept 'human rights' with that of
the information society. The efforts of such scholars from the standpoint of coupling
human rights and communication involve tracing back to precedent international
documents regarding human rights (e.g. Hamelink, 2003; Mclver et al., 2003). They argue
that human rights exist already in those documents such as the Universal Declaration of
Human lights in 1948 and the Vienna World Conference on Human BJghts in 1993. Moreover,
they analyse and synthesise the interpretation of human rights in these documents in the
hope of mapping a comprehensive and workable definition of human rights to be
applied in the information society, particularly as a method of policy implementation in
bridging the digital divide. They attempt to 'address information rights within a
comprehensive human right framework' (Mclver et al, 2003). Furthermore, they
distinguish an 'information right' from 'the right to communication', with the argument
that 'the right to communication' 'is perceived by its protagonists as more fundamental
than the information rights presently accorded by international law' (Hamelink, 2003:
121).
Hamelink, the proponent in this issue who holds positions as a communication scholar
and policy advisor for several international organisations, such as UNESCO, and
national development in developing countries, bases his core argument regarding human
rights in the information society on 'the right to communication' with the emphasis on
'interactive communication'. He argues that 'communication is a fundamental social
process, a basic human need and the foundation of all social organisations' (Hamelink,
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2003: 121). Complementary to Hamelink's conceptualisation of the right to
communication as interactive communication, Mclver et al. (2003) suggests the right to
communicate is a participatory and positive right, which applies to all groups and
individuals.
Mansell's research (2002) suggests transferring digital divides to digital entitlements,
which places more emphasis on the conceptualisation of a 'right to communicate', and
call for a 'rights-based' policy approach. This approach may be used to remedy the
mainstream discussion on new media policy that over emphasises 'market dynamics,
governance procedures and regulation of the new technologies and services' as well as
presume that 'the relationship between the new media and the citizen is beneficial'
(Mansell, 2002: 409). She argues that the existing policy debate on the digital divide
focuses overwhelmingly on the macro dimension, e.g. technology access and social
exclusion, but that a narrow conception of capabilities gains less attention. Therefore,
she recommends that the digital divide policy should shift its focus from the macro to
the micro level, paying more attention to the individual capability that encompasses
'forms of learning and cognitive development that are necessary for making sense of a
social world of on-line spaces created by the new media' (Mansell, 2002: 408). This is
what she defines as digital entitlement, which corresponds with the call for a human
right to communicate.
Moreover, the call for human rights also includes the concept of 'citizenship'. Loader
(1998) identifies two types of relationship between government and
citizenship—citizens and consumers. Citizens are those that actively participate 'in
planning and decision making' (Loader, 1998: 165), while consumers are 'the users of
these publilc services and regulations, who need information to exercise choice and
control over their personal situations' (Loader, 1998: 165). As mentioned above, the
mainstream discussion on new media policy that emphasises market dynamics takes the
people may use ICTs as producers or consumers. It may be not crucial for all to be
signed up. However, citizenship perspective requires us all to have access to public
service and also to have access to information needed for people to come to informed
choices in democracy.
4.4 Conclusion
As discussed above, many of the perspectives on bridging the digital divide are supply
side driven, such as the 'national competitiveness' and the 'ICT-for-development
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perspective' (Mariscal, 2005), while paying little attention to the need for citizens.
Furthermore, the perspectives presented above to a greater or less extent contain an
implicit assumption—the necessity of digital technology, and its direct contribution to the
information society. The primary assumption behind the issue of bridging the digital divide
is that the Internet is a public good. The main rhetoric on the relationship between ICTs
and societies tends to encourage the use of ICTs to sustain national competitiveness
and steer economic growth. In this case, the discussion on the relationship between
ICTs and societies are inclined to be macro-level, national-competition, and
nation-centred.
Although the international organisations established by the wealthy nations aim to
promote digital divide policy through which to sustain a stable, global economic growth
in their own interests, the emerging varieties of rhetoric on digital divide policy debate
may affect subsequent policy making and implementation. As is shown above, we do
observe that there is an nuance in the trend of the digital divide policy debate—from
macro to micro, from national competitiveness to human rights, from nation-centred to
people centred—recognised by international organisations. The means adopted to solve
the divide may seem similar; however, different motivations may be discriminated.
Namely, focusing on national competitiveness may merely stimulate the construction of
infrastructure, while emphasis on individual welfare may go beyond technology
acquisition to provide individuals with the capabilities they need in using technology.
Currently, we observe a shift in the discursive frameworks on the digital divide policy
debate within international/regional organisations. I also find that there exist
mainstream assumptions on the relationship between technologies and societies, e.g.
technological optimism and utopianism. As mentioned in Chapter 2, contexts may affect
the interpretation of the digital divide as well as subsequent policy making and
implementation. The contexts addressed in this thesis are not only the wider,
international/regional organisations, but also the national contexts of the settings of my
case studies. Thus, Chapter 5 will move on to depict and scrutinise my first case
study—China. I will investigate China's national context in which the digital divide is
interpreted and digital divide policy is made. This analysis of national context and
currently synthesised discursive frameworks will be combined to underpin the empirical
study in China. I will elucidate how international and national contexts are entwined and
appropriated in national digital divide policy.
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Chapter 5
China's National Context for Bridging the Digital Divide
Drawing upon the concept of context from within an interpretive policy research
framework, this chapter deals with Chinese national contexts in which the digital divide
and corresponding policies have emerged. Section 5.1 deals with geo-economic
structural and polidcal contexts, which elucidate the emergence of the digital divide. It
then presents the situation of unbalanced ICTs development within geo-economic
structural and political contexts. Section 5.2 and 5.3, addressing economic policy
concerns and institutional reforms, provide a background understanding of the
fostering of digital divide policy and relevant ongoing debates about solutions to
bridging the digital divide in China. Section 5.4 concludes this chapter.
5.1 Geo-Economic Structure—Regionally Unbalanced Development
If the original motivation of the digital divide in developing countries was about the
prospect of a gap opening up between developed and developing countries, national
digital divide policies have been primarily concerned with uneven economic and
technological development within a country.
Concepts of dual economic structure often refer to the dual structure of developing
economies—the coexistence of modern industry in urban areas with traditional
agricultural practice (Dong, 1992: 1). In China the dual economy is presented by the fact
that the economy of the eastern/coastal/urban regions surpasses the
western/interior/rural ones. Furthermore, the dual economic structure is also reflected
in the demographic distribution and employment structure (Dong, 1992: 2). As my
interviewee, the Director of Internet Development and Research Centre in CASS,
mentioned below, in China, economic division is one of the main reasons for the digital
divide. He states,
The issue of the digital divide reflects China's economic condition in terms
of a dual economy, which represents the divides between rural/urban,
western/eastern areas. Because the economic development in these two
contrasting areas is of significant divergence, the divide of ICT
development is obvious, which is the so-called digital divide in China.
(Personal Interview, CHOI. April 2005)
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This split between regions can be traced back to the structural context and previous
economic development policy preferences of different leaders during the past three
decades. Here I generalise the policy preferences of three-generations of leaders in
China: each of them characterises the features of policy concerns during their ruling
periods.39
The Reform and Open Door Policy in 1978 was the watershed of China's economic
transformation from a socialist economy to a more market-oriented economy. Prior to
the 1978 reform and open-door era, Mao Zedong adopted the strategy of balanced
development, supporting and constructing western China with an economic layout in
proportion. However, Mao's strategy did not allow China to 'leapfrog' in terms of
economic developments. It was only after the 1978 reform was launched that China's
economic growth achieved the goal of 'catch up with' or 'leapfrogging' (discussion of
this term will be provided in Chapter 6) the western countries with gross domestic
product (GDP) growing at an average annual rate more than 9 percent. This may be also
due to the fact that 'Mao's policy explicidy prioritised matters of ideology over
economic pragmatism. Economic development became tangled up with political
movements' (Shen, 1999: 10). Therefore the policies Mao enforced finally 'resulted in
fluctuations in economic development' (Shen, 1999: 10).
Mao's successor Deng Xiaoping, learning lessons from previous experiences and
absorbing China's national realities, applied the strategy of unbalanced development. He
offered the famous proposition of 'Two Important Matters'" [liangge da ju,
which means that the Chinese government would give priority to developing the
eastern/coastal area first. After the eastern area had been developed, then it would help
and drive the development of the western area. However, unsurprisingly, in the course
of achieving this development goal, uneven development inside China resulted, and this
regional disparity has now become a big issue in contemporary China.
The significance of Deng's strategy of national development in China can be located in
the Five-Year National Plans (see Figure 5.3). Throughout the Sixth and Seventh
Five-Year Plans (1981-1985 and 1986-1990 respectively; detailed accounts of Five-Year
39 This observation corresponds to the argument proposed by an influential Chinese economist, Hu
Angang. In his co-authored book with Wang Shaoguang titled The Political Economy of Uneven Development:
the Case of China (1999), they argue that 'economic factors alone are indeterminate in their effects on
regional disparities. Instead, the central government's regional policy preferences and its extractive
capacity are the key factors shaping the regional distribution of investment resources' (Lance L. P. Gore,
2000, Book Review, The China Journal, 44:186-187).
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Plans are presented later on), Deng's 'Two Important Matters' strategy dominated the
policy of national development. However, Deng's expectation was not realised at this
stage; the western/interior regions did not catch up with the first-developed coastal
regions. On the contrary, they lagged far behind.
Mao's and Deng's strategies of national development neither made impressive progress
in raising China's GDP, nor brought about the even development within China. 'The
wrenching collapse of Mao's economic initiatives and Deng's return to greater market
rationality exacerbated regional disparities and the urban-rural split more generally'
(Wilson, 2004: 273). Telecommunications development exemplified the uneven
development between regions. 'Over these years, the urban-rural telephone gap grew
again rather quickly' (Harwit, 2004: 1016).
In the 1990s, Jiang Zemin, the then general secretary of the Party, drew attention to the
unbalanced development between regions. This concern was also represented in the
proposal of the Eighth Five-Year Plan, which 'recommended that the labor be rationally
divided and development coordinated between regions' (Lai, 2002: 435). To modify the
shortcomings of Deng Xiaoping's developmental strategy (Two Important Matters),
Jiang Zemin paid more attention to the reduction of the regional difference. With the
inception of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), Jiang announced that the
unbalanced development would be modified by 2000. Hence, in addition to adopting
Deng's strategy, Jiang also actualised the western development strategy, i.e. 'Go West'.
Thereafter, Premier Zhu Rongji once again emphasised the importance of balanced
development within China. Later on, the proposal of the Ninth Five-Year Plan included
the principle of reducing the developmental gap between regions. With Jiang Zemin's
policy focus turning its attention to rural areas, telecommunications development within
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Figure 5.1 Economic Focuses Shifted over Five-Year Plans (Source: Complied by the authorj
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The development patterns in China, i.e. the dual economy, exacerbate the rural regions'
disadvantages (Nicholas, 2003) in telecommunication penetration. In the course of
almost every interview that I conducted in Beijing, I was consistendy reminded by my
interviewees that 'Beijing is not China'. They alerted me not to be misled by the
blossoming telecommunication development in big tides, such as Beijing. They
furthermore pointed out the fact that poorer regions are also facing the toughest 'Three
Nongs'40 issues—agriculture, farmers, and villages. What concerns my interviewees is
the uneven regional development in general and the digital divide in particular in
modern China.
According to several surveys conducted by Mil, CNNIC, and other institutions (see
Figure 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4), the development in telecommunication, taking penetration rate
as an example, depends on the wealth of citizens to a very large extent. Meanwhile in
China, economic development parallels regional development. The wealthier
eastern/coastal regions have a higher telecommunication penetration rate than the less
wealthy western regions. In terms of the Internet penetration, according to the latest
report by CNNIC in July 2007, the number of Chinese netizens has reached 162 million,
only next to the 211 million of the United States, ranking the second in the world (The
Twentieth Survey Report, CNNIC, 2007). However, the CNNIC report worries that the
divide between urban and rural regions will be wider in the near future.
The regionally uneven development facing China is even worse in the information era,
which is reflected in the divides between telecommunication infrastructures and
implementation. The Chinese government has been keen to reduce an emerging 'fourth
divide', i.e. the digital divide, in addition to the other three divides in China—urban vs.
rural, workers vs. farmers, and intellectuals vs. farmers. Additionally, the Chinese
government is expecting informatisation to drive industrialisation, which is the political
rhetoric in China; 'industrialisation supported by informatisation'. In other words,
although China did not catch up with advanced countries in the first and second phases
of industrialisation, it will now seize the chance to surpass, rather than simply catch up
with, the advanced ones.
40 The three terms 'agriculture, farmers and villages' all begin with the pronunciation 'nong'—nong yie,
nong ming, nong cun—in Chinese. Therefore, the Chinese government takes 'Three Nongs' for short
while addressing this issue.
126
Fixed phones Mobile phones
Total Urban Rural
Eastern China 17651.9 (48.5%) 12680.8 (50.9%) 4971.1 (43.1%) 22134.9 (50.6%)
Central China 11343.5 (31.1%) 7062.1 (28.4%) 4281.4 (37.2%) 12559.2 (28.7%)
Western China 7433.1 (20.4%) 5168.7 (20.7%) 2264.4 (19.7%) 9053.4 (20.7%)
China as a Whole 36428.5 (100%) 24911.6 (100%) 11516.9 (100%) 43747.5 (100%)
Figure 5.2 Inter-Regional Divides in Fixed andMobile Phone Penetrations (as of August 2006)
(Unit: million household) (Source: http:/ /www.mii.gov.en!art/2006/09!211art 27 25044.html:
accessed on 11/12/2007, compiled by the author)
Urban (%) Rural (%) Nation (%)
2005 December 16.9 2.6 8.5
2006 June 18.0 3.0 9.4
+ /- percentage 1.1 0.4 0.9
Figure 5.3 Rural/Urban Divides in Internet Penetration (as of June 2006)
(Source: CNNIC, the 18"' Survey Report (released on 08/08/2006), accessed on 11/12/2007,
http:/ /www.cnnic.net.cn/ download/2006/18threport-en.pdf)
Eastern China (%) Central China (%) Western China (%) Nation (%)
2005 December 13.0 5.7 6.0 8.5
June 2006 14.0 6.5 6.9 9.4
+ /- percentage 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9
Figure 5.4 Inter-RegionalDivides in Internet Penetration Rate (as of June 2006)
Source: CNNIC, the 18"' Survey Report (released on 08/08/2006), accessed on 11/12/2007,
http:/ /www.cnnic.net.cn/download/2006/18threport-en.pdf
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5.2 Adopting National Economic Policy to Bridge the Domestic Gap
China's strategy to achieve even national development and catch-up with advanced
countries is embodied in its 'Twin-Track Strategy', which involves merging
industrialisation and informatisation (Dai, 2002: 141). In this section, I will present
China's national development policy, evolving in a series of Five-Year Plans (see Figure
5.1 and 5.5), tracing back to the First Five-Year plan adopted in the early stages of the
social Republic until now, the Eleventh. By outlining the history of China's development
focus and the way that it was transformed from industrialisation to informatisation, I
provide an outline of how China's national context may impact on its subsequent digital
divide policy-making and implementation.
5.2.1 Economic Development Strategy before the 1978 Reform
The Chinese government has been setting up national economic development plans of
a five-year interval since 1953. The Five Year Plan was an attempt by China to boost her
industry and set her on the path to become a world-class power, and also aimed at
ameliorating national poverty and raising economic growth. When Mao came to power
in 1949, China was many years behind the industrial nations of the world in economic
and technological development. In December 1949, Mao met Stalin in Moscow to sign
the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. This treaty gave China money
and technical assistance to modernise its industry. Though the money received from
Russia was relatively modest (US$ 300 million over five years), Russia did provide 10,000
engineers to boost China's industry and therefore her economy (Heinzig, 2004).
Influenced by the Russian engineers as well as by the success of Stalin's Five Year Plans,
China introduced her own Five Year Plan in 1953. The goal of the First Five-Year Plan
is obvious; 'the Chinese economy was to be transformed through a program of
forced-draft industrialisation' (Volti, 1982: 34). Heavy industry was targeted in the plans
from the outset. The early Five Year Plans attempted to tackle steel, coal and iron
production.
Apart from the aid from the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders chose a leap-forward
strategy that also revolved around the development of heavy industries during this
period of time. However, at that time China was a country which lacked capital but
which had an abundance of labour power. Under the scheme of the leap-forward
strategy, China needed to adopt a centrally planned economy, which meant that the
government controlled every economic component, e.g. prices, raw materials, labour,
128
etc., even the firms' production decisions were decided by the government. As a result,
this economic strategy was deemed to fail due to its problems of central planning and
lack of incentives (Lin et al., 1996). This heavy-industry-oriented development strategy
was regarded as the fundamental reason that China could not achieve sustained
development before the 1978 reform (Lin et al., 1996). Afterwards, with the political
power shift and Mao's successor Deng Xiaoping adopting an open-door development
strategy, the target of the plans has shifted from heavy industries to light industries and
to information industries.
5.2.2 Economic Development Strategy after the 1978 Reform
China's industrialisation and informatisation have developed concurrently and 'both
processes are in turn closely related to the penetration of the Chinese economy by
market forces (Mueller and Tan, 1997:12-13). As far as the development process of
both industrialisation and informatisation are concerned, contemporary patterns of
higher technology industrialisation creates a demand for mobile labour, capital, and
products, whilst informatisation creates more convenient communication to meet the
demand of this industrialisation (Mueller and Tan, 1997:13). This conforms to China's
definitions of informatisation as mentioned in Chapter 1 that in China, 'informatisation'
indicates 'process, progress, and duration of all the way from the industry society to the
information society', as well as 'all the means to accelerate the process from the
information society'41. This may be one of the fundamental reasons why China shifted
its development focus to telecommunications to simultaneously develop industrialisation
and informatisation as well as complete industrialisation via informatisation.
Before the reform era, the telecommunications industry in China was funded solely by
the government and the investment in telecommunications was limited. Taking the
investment in fixed assets as an example, from 1949 to 1978 the total investment of
China in the telecommunications sector was only US $0.65 million (Shen, 1999); and
there was only about 4 phones per 1000 people (ITU, 1986, cited in Shen, 1999) in 1978.
These indicators show that the development of telecommunications technologies in
China, especially the public network services, was impoverished. However, with the start
of economic reform, the demand for business communications within China and with
the world and for interpersonal communications began to rise and the
under-development of telecommunications infrastructure became the bottleneck for
41 See footnote 9.
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economic development. Taking this concern into consideration, the Chinese
government devoted much more investment than before to the telecommunications
sector. During the Sixth and Seventh Five Year Plans, investment rose from US$ 0.65
million in the three decades prior to economic reform to US$ 3.25 billion in one decade
from 1981-1990 (Shen, 1999). With the huge investment in telecommunications, mobile
phone usage also increased, and the Chinese government has now successfully
connected 'information', 'economic growth' and 'high-tech telecommunication
equipment' together in mass media and in public (Shen, 1999).
Thus, we can see that the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) symbolises a transition from
old-fashioned styles to a new one in economic growth; from one directed to extensive
economic growth to one directed to intensive growth, from a centrally-planned
economy to a 'socialist market economy'. The emerging informatisation alongside
industrialisation is the other characteristic emerging from the Sixth Five-Year Plan
onwards. During the period of the Sixth (1981-1985) and Seventh (1986-1990)
Five-Year Plan, China embarked on the development of hardware in
telecommunications technologies, and US$ 3 billion was invested in telecommunications
(Shen, 1999: 17). Since then annual investment has soared; and from 1985, the growth
of telecommunications has outpaced GNP growth (Shen, 1999: 17). From the Ninth
Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) onwards, China extended the development focus in
telecommunications from merely hardware to services, which pinpointed its strategy in
informatisation and the issue of the digital divide started to gained official and public
attention.
As mentioned above, the Chinese government has successfully made connections
between telecommunications and economic growth, which implies that
telecommunications received much attention from the Chinese government because
they are regarded as the driving force for economic development. 'Beginning with Deng
Xiaoping's historic trip to Shenzhen in March 1992, China's reform-minded leadership
recognised the importance of telecommunications infrastructure to the success of
urgent economic growth. In 1992 and 1993, Minister Yang Taifang and subsequently
Minister Wu Jichuan repeatedly emphasised the need to strengthen the administrative
planning and control of telecommunications as the basis for all aspects of China's
reform' (DeWoskin, 2001: 630).
The Chinese government's recognition of the importance of telecommunications can
also been seen in the launch of relevant ministries. For example, 'the key organisation
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for developing and planning the network was the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications (MPT), established in November 1949, just a month after the
founding of the People's Republic' (Harwit, 2007: 315). 'In early 1982, MPT minister
Wen Minsheng announced that expansion of the country's telecommunications system
would be a priority for developing the nation's economy' (Harwit, 2007: 317).
Furthermore, the emphasis upon the role of telecommunications in stimulating
economic growth stems from the attitudes of Chinese leaders. 'The telecommunications
sector had guidance and regulation by ministries that desired to see economic success.
The key factor of market-driven efficiency, however, had been repressed during Mao's
drives against what he saw as "capitalist revisionism". China's reform leaders in the
1980s would actively promote market forces, allowing the sector to make a mighty
contribution to the country's drive towards industrial modernisation' (Harwit, 2007:
316).
From 1995 onwards, the Ninth Five-Year Plan put much emphasis on the
infrastructures of Science and Technology. The programmes on bridging the digital
divide aimed to upgrade national economic growth. Although digital divide policy in
China seems very fragmented, we see how it is enacted and enforced in a nested national
development plan, when it is viewed from this broader perspective. These 'fragmented'
digital divide policies also exhibit features arising from the broader economic and policy
context; they demonstrate digital divide policy concern with 'Chinese characteristics'.42
Holding the belief that ICTs will help China to leapfrog into the information era, the
Chinese central government established the Injormatisation leading Group under the State
Council ' (abbreviated to leading Group in this chapter) in 1996 to advance China's
informatisation. Leading Group is an unprecedented, high-level administration for
handling China's informatisation issues. To demonstrate China's strong determination to
achieve complete informatisation in all domestic regions, the state Vice-Premier takes
the position of chairman of the board; and the board is composed of twenty-two
ministries. With the establishment of the Leading Group, the direction and principles of
national informatisation construction was proposed. The tasks of national
42 The phrase 'Chinese characteristics' was first coined in 1982 by Deng Xiaoping within his programme
of China's political reform, which was famously known as his commitment to 'building socialism with
Chinese characteristics'. After this phrase was created as a political objective for China, it has been
frequently used to highlight China's unique path on reforms in all fields. Adopting this phrase here, this
chapter is focusing on the historical and current development retrospectively to analyse the policy process
of bridging the digital divide.
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informatisation were then addressed.
Since the Leading Group is in charge of the comprehensive informatisation of China,
bridging the digital divide has rather straightforwardly been taken on board as one of its
tasks. Eight ministries have been cooperating and sharing the projects for reducing the
digital divide. Additionally, in 1997, the National Working Meeting of Informatisation
was held in Shen Zhen to deploy the informatisation tasks in local governments. From
then on, the task of informatisation has been rooted locally, trickling down from the
highest central government to the local. Since then, the provincial informatisation
centres have been established.
The Leading Group takes a very significant position in organising and coordinating the
participant ministries in China's informatisation. Its main task is two fold—promoting
China's information construction and maintaining national information security. In
terms of the projects and policies on the digital divide, the participant ministries
includes the Office for West China Development, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of
Agriculture, the Ministry of Culture, the Minister of Commerce, the State Administration of
Radio, Tilm and Television (SARFT). The ministries mentioned above take responsibility
for the division of labour.
5.3 Addressing/Focusing on Telecommunications Development
The assumption that telecommunications have impacts on a nation's economy has
figured strongly both in policy-making and academic research (Wellenius, 1976; Gilling,
1975; Hardy, 1980), in particular within the context of developing countries. The logic
underlying this assumption is that 'with telecommunications, some of the physical
constraints on organisational communication can be removed in all sectors of the
economy, permitting increased productivity through better management and
administration' (Wellenius, 1977; cited in Hardy, 1980: 279). The removal of physical
constraints and the increased ability of managers to communicate are assumed to aid
the interaction between economic enterprises (Hardy, 1980: 279). Eventually, the
impacts of telecommunications on the organisational level will further contribute to a
nation's economic growth. China, seeing itself as a developing country, also hopes to
catch up with advanced countries via the benefits that telecommunications bring to
economic growth.
In practice, the Chinese government values telecommunications highly as a means of
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opening the market via liberalisation and institutional change. And 'institutional
evolution is the essential underpinning for strategies aimed at using advanced ICTs to
simulate economic growth' (Mansell, 2001: 293).
When the open-door policy was first implemented, the Chinese government began to
open the telecommunications equipment market as early as the 1980s, in a
state-controlled manner. However the service market was not open to the outside world
until 1993 when it was required to allow China's accession to the World Trade
Organisation (WTO). Many reasons account for the late opening of the
telecommunications service market. First of all, the provision of telecommunications
networks is costly, and it was presumed to prohibit competitive provision of landline
service. With this consideration, public management perhaps may be the most efficient
and effective method to achieve broader social and economic policy goals, e.g. equal
access (Shen, 1999:15). The second reason may stem from the competition between
ministries for resources and power (Foreword, in Mueller and Tan, 1997: xi). Third is
the political dimension that controlling the means of information distribution is 'critical
to public order and social stability' (Foreword, in Mueller and Tan, 1997: xi).
However, with China's eagerness to improve national economic development,
competition and de-regulation have been at the heart of policy consideration. China is
no exception in adopting liberalisation to catch up with this world trend in her
telecommunications reform. This coincides with Mueller and Tan's (1997) observation
that telecommunications reform may not be merely motivated by the objective of ICTs
convergence, but also by the desire for national economic development, as this thesis
discussed in Chapter 4 about the discourses of national competitiveness and ICTs for
economic development is an example. This further supports the suggestion that the
Chinese government imbue telecommunications with a crucial role in economic
development as the concept 'informatisation' discussed in Chapter 1 on briefing China's
domestic context.
In the promotion of telecommunications development, the Chinese government adopts
a 'pragmatic' and 'utilitarian' manner (Shen and Williams, 2005). With the desire to
stimulate economic growth, China made institutional changes to jump on the
globally-circulated train of telecommunication de-regulation, competition, and
privatisation from the mid-1990s onwards, in order to get connected to the global
telecommunication market and play a role in world trade. This implies the logic that if
China can increase the penetration rate of the telecommunications, then it will have
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higher national economic growth rate. And if national economic growth rate rises, it
also indicates that China wins the international competition.
China's telecommunication reform has attracted many scholars' attention. It is
synthesised in terms of three components of market-orientated reforms, i.e.
liberalisation—deregulation, competition, and privatisation (Laperrouza, 2007), which is
similar to that in the US and UK in the 1990s. Accordingly, Xia and Lu (2005)
summarise a three-phase liberalisation of telecommunications in China. This section
borrows these three components combined with Xia and Lu's three-phase approach to
describe China's institutional telecommunication reform from the mid-1990s onwards.
These institutional changes serve as part of the national context, which has implications
for the analysis of digital divide policy in the next chapter.
5.3.1 Competition and Privatisation (1994—)
Before the 1978 reform, when China was a socialist regime and different state-owned
industries were under the central control of and belonged to specific governmental
institutions. These institutions combined functions of a public operator and a regulator
(Gao and Lyytinen, 2000: 721). After the 1978 reform, the Chinese government was
aiming at transferring management functions from governmental bodies to industrial
organisations (Gao and Lyytinen, 2000). One of the efforts that the Chinese
government made towards telecommunications reform was competition. 'Competition'
in the telecommunication market in China has two meanings. One indicates the
termination of monopoly; and the other is to 'separate government function from
business operation' (Xia and Lu, 2005:3). China's telecommunication reform began with
market competition in 1993. The first step started with opening for competition nine
non-basic telecommunication services, including radio paging, email service and the like
(Liang and Zhang, 2000). The second step began in 1994 when a new company, China
Unicom, was formally established. To present the government's determination to open
the telecommunication market, also in 1994, what had been the Directorate General of
Telecommunications (DGT) of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT)
was registered as a company under the name of China Telecom. DGT was changed
from a functional department of MPT to an enterprise responsible for operating and
managing MPT's fixed and mobile networks (MPT. 1996; cited in Gao and Lyytinen,
2000). This change denoted the termination of monopoly and the move forward to
duopoly. Since then, the Chinese telecommunication market has not been solely
occupied by China Telecom, but by competition between at least two companies.
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After the re-organisation of telecommunication operators, there were six operators
providing telephony services in the market, including China Telecom, China Netcom,
China Mobile, China Unicom, China Satellite and China Railcom. The status of these
six operators are 'state-owned private operators', which means that they are listed
companies, but the state is the biggest shareholder (see Chapter 6) and they were
assigned by Ministry of Information Industry (Mil) to be responsible for bridging the
digital divide via realising the policy goal of universal service. This will be further
discussed in Chapter 6.
5.3.2 Deregulation—Birth of an Independent Regulator: Mil (1998—)
In line with 'competition' as mentioned in the previous subsection, the Chinese
government deregulated the telecommunications sector in the course of
telecommunications reform. A significant event that took place in China's
telecommunication regulatory reform was the birth of Mil in 1998. Section 5.6.1
mentioned that DGT was registered as a company and committed to head-to-head
competition with China Unicom. However, China Telecom was still just an
administrative agency without providing real telecommunication services. The national
long-distance network was actually operated by provincial and municipal Posts and
Telecommunications Administrations (PTAs) that reported directly to MPT. In this case,
the real competitor to China Unicom was not China Telecom, but MPT, which enjoyed
dual status as a regulator and a player in the telecommunications market (Liang and
Zhang, 2000; Gao, Lyytinen, 2000). The launch of Mil also ended this unfair
competition situation, and furthered the transition process (Yan and Pitt, 2002) in
telecommunications.
The building of Mil was also part of the national institutional re-organisation plan. The
Chinese government underwent five institutional re-organisations after the reform era
from 1978 to 2003 to improve its efficiency. The project of reorganisations aimed at
making the government work more efficiently. It is under the third re-structuring
scheme that Mil was founded, in 1998. Meanwhile, the former ministries—Ministry of
Posts & Telecommunications (MPT)43 and Ministry of Electronic Industry (MEI)
formed and were incorporated into MIL This incorporation presents the Chinese
government's desire to promote convergence of prior fragmented administration (Gao,
43
For detailed accounts on MPT refer to Mueller and Tan, 1997.
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Lyytinen, 2000: 722). With this reorganisation, the new Mil is a unit directly under the
State Council, and it is primarily in charge of the national electronics and information
products manufacturing, telecommunications and software industries, and information
promotion of the national economy and social services.
The birth of Mil was highly significant for several reasons. First of all, it displays the
Chinese government's determination to create a transparent environment for
competition via separating players from regulators in the Chinese telecommunication
market. After the establishment of Mil, the corporate function of building and
managing the state telecommunication trunk line network has been transferred to Mil
and the function of managing industrial, materials and building enterprises has been
delegated to enterprises as well.
Secondly, the positioning of Mil also indicates a significant change in China's
telecommunication market and brought about privatization. When the former MPT and
MEI merged into Mil, Mil took the initiative to split China Telecom into two
companies, the 'South' and the 'North', based on a geographical division. The 'North'
was eventually merged with the then Netcom and Jitong and renamed China Netcom,
while the 'South' inherited the original brand name China Telecom.
Thirdly, in addition to building an open market, Mil also plays an important role in
promoting national economic development by increasing the spread of
telecommunications. This can be seen in Mil's taking over the administrative function
of the former State Leading Group of Information Industry and its General Office,
which was charged with studying and drafting the information economy development
plans.
Fourthly, one of the functions of Mil's establishment is making and implementing
policy to bridge the digital divide. Beyond each single, short term digital divide policy
controlled by each of the individual ministries, Mil takes responsibility for sorting out
physical digital divides inside China, which means that Mil is charged with bridging
physical access only; the urgent issue at present being getting all remote villagers
connected at least to telephones.
5.3.3 Universal Service
Deregulation does not mean that the economic role of government will be lessened, but
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the government operates differently (Mosco, 1990: 38-40) from that in the regulatory
era. Take the European Commission for example, 'in spite of its commitment to a
reduction in regulation, the Commission has introduced a considerable number of
directives, decisions, regulations, recommendations and resolutions in pursuit of its
goals' (Mansell, 1993: 220). Therefore, learning from the lessons from western countries,
deregulation of the telecommunication industry in China requires several related
initiatives. In addition to competition and establishment of a cross-section antitrust
regulatory agency (e.g. Mil), implementing universal service is also necessary (Yu et al.,
2004) in order to make all citizens connect to basic telecommunications with an
affordable cost.
The universal service policy is the most relevant to the interest of this thesis in
investigating digital divide policy in China. Let us first go back to the history of
universal service in the US. In 1878, Alexander Graham Bell proposed getting the
telephone into every home, which was taken as the emergence of the concept of
universal service (Compaine & Weinraub, 2001: 152). After that, the term 'universal
service' gained a more concrete interpretation in the US, which meant incorporating the
'national telephone system into a geographically ubiquitous monopoly' (Muller &
Schement, 2001: 121). In 1907, universal service was taken 'for telephone dialtone when
AT&T first articulated its theme for the Bell system (Compaine & Weinraub, 2001: 148).
In 1909, AT&T's annual report first included the statement 'One System, One Policy,
Universal Service' (Compaine & Weinraub, 2001: 152). Theode Vail, the head of AT&T,
coined this term and later submitted to government regulation to achieve this goal.
Therefore, the tern 'universal service' originated not as a public policy goal, but as an
industrial strategy (Hudson, 2006: 307).
It was not until the early 1930s that the concept of universal service connected with
telecommunications policy in the US. While suffering from the trauma of the Great
Depression in the 1930s, the US government recognised that a universal telephone
service as the next needed ubiquity (Compaine & Weinraub, 2001: 171). Consequently,
in 1934, the concept of universal service was incorporated into the Communications
Act (Compaine & Weinraub, 2001: 148). In the 1970s, the concept of universal service
connected with household telephone penetration (Muller & Schement, 2001: 121) was
officially noticed in policy.
With information and information communication technologies gaining more and more
attention in the government and in the public, NTIA conducted a series of hearings on
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universal access; a detailed account is provided in the following section. In 1995, the US
vice President A1 Gore made speeches about universal service at the G7 Information
Summit and ITU World Telecommunication Development Conference respectively.
During the G7 Information Summit, Gore said that the Clinton Administration
proposed to make every classroom, every library, every hospital, and every clinic
connect to the national and global information infrastructures. At the conference of
ITU, Gore called for all nations of the world to cooperate in building Gil founded on
the principles of universal access, the right to communicate and diversity of expression
(Compaine & Weinraub, 2001: 161-162).
Historically, it is clear that the concept of universal service was intended to apply to
telephone access. It was in 1996 that the concept was extended in the
Telecommunications Act to online services, including the Internet, and was no longer
confined to the basic dial tone. The Federal Communications Commission,
governmental regulatory agencies, and industry players organised the universal service
fund for the universal service policy, however the notion of what is to be covered by
this fund is open to question (Compaine & Weinraub, 2001: 147-148). Meanwhile, the
Telecommunications Act specified institutions—schools, libraries and rural health
centers—rather than households as the means through which the services should be
made accessible (Hudson, 2006: 308).
With the scope of universal service extended, the categories that the policy covered
have been enlarged from the universal service of the telephone from the outset, and
then to education, electric power, and information and telecommunications services
eventually (Muller & Schement, 2001). The main literature that has just been discussed
on universal service focused on two aspects. First of all, it was based on the assumption
that telephone penetration levels are determined primarily by the price of a basic
monthly subscription. Secondly, it was preoccupied with the issue of how large the
subsidies to local access are and how to finance them in a competitive environment
(Muller & Schement, 2001: 123)
The digital divide concern in China builds upon the established debate—universal
service—related to telecommunications and uneven development. In China, one
strategy for providing universal service involves first narrowing regional divides in
penetration level (Yu et al., 2004:729). The Chinese government has been taking a series
of actions in building a seemingly well-prepared environment for telecommunication
reform, and the legal dimensions are no exception. In September 2000 the government
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issued the 'Telecommunication Act', which for the first time encompassed all
telecommunication-related issues as well as providing guidelines for implementing
universal service policy.
According to the experiences of advanced countries, the policy goal of universal service
on telephony has to be implemented before telecommunication liberalisation can be
achieved. Universal service to a large extent implies social welfare, which would require
the intervention of the government. In the time that telephony infrastructure and
service was controlled by the government, the government could adopt indirect
intervention to implement the policy goal. Accordingly, in the time that telephony
infrastructure and service was controlled by monopoly, the government could indirectly
ask the operator to assure universal service.
However, China is now standing at a watershed between new and old
telecommunication markets, facing the termination of an old-style monopoly or
duopoly and opening up a new competitive environment. It is regulated competition
that we see in the West. Meanwhile, the Chinese government is also confronted with the
tough task of realising the policy goal of universal service via raising telephony
penetration as its first step in bridging the digital divide. In practice, upgrading
competitiveness and meanwhile providing universal service produce conflicting goals
for existing telecommunication operators. In Chapter 6, I will present the policy that
Mil has adopted to solve this difficulty.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the national contexts within which the case study of China
will be analysed in the next chapter. I presented the Chinese national contexts from
many different angles, i.e. geographically uneven development, economic development
divides between regions, and policy inclination to the eastern coastal region, to show an
apparent regional divide inside China. I also described how the existing unbalanced
development has been exacerbated in the era of informatisation.
The action taken to ameliorate this development outcome in China predominately stems
from the deep belief that technology will eventually resolve this uneven development.
In the era of industrialisation, first the heavy and the light industries represented China's
dream of speeding development. From the mid-1990s on, ICTs have replaced heavy and
light industries as the cure-all for development. The innovation and development of
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ICTs, as well as informatisation, are all promoted in order to catch up with advanced
countries and to join the list of world powers. From this narrow development
perspective, any hindrance to development must be removed. It is within this narrow
'development driven' framework that the relevant digital divide policies are gradually
made and implemented within individual ministries based on their own areas of
responsibility.
With the determination to develop telecommunications, especially the
telecommunications service market, the Chinese government has made much effort
towards liberalisation via competition, deregulation, and privatisation. However, at the
current stage of telecommunication development in China, universal telephone service
is still the main policy concern in order to bridge the digital divide. However, concerning
the institutional context, the Chinese government is in a predicament—between on the
one hand realization of universal service to bridge the digital divide between regions and
on the other securing new investments and cheapening access via a competitive and
privatized telecommunications market. Therefore, how the Chinese government
implements the policy of universal service to bridge the digital divide and upgrade its
(economic) development on the one hand, and on the other encourages and sustains fair
competition and privatization represents a great challenge.
The following chapter will be devoted to empirical data analysis in the case study of
China. The discursive framework of the digital divide will be elucidated first. I will then
scrutinize a representative case Cun Cun Tong Dianhua to investigate how this policy was
made and has been implemented by means of a political approach. From this case study,
I will analyse how the discursive framework shaped in the international (Chapter 4) as
well as national contexts (Chapter 5) delimits and demarcates the institution(s) involved
in Cun Cun Tong Dianhua policy. Moreover, a detailed analysis of the predicaments this
policy has encountered during implementation will be provided.
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Chapter 6
Digital Divide Policy-Making in China
This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the discursive framework of the digital
divide and the consequent policy which was made in response to the issue of the divide
in China, within the national context presented in Chapter 5. Section 6.1 adopts the
concept of domestication developed in Chapter 2 to analyse the discursive framing of
digital divide policy in China's national context. Section 6.2 outlines the landscape of
China's digital divide related policy and participant ministries. It suggests that, one way
of understanding the Chinese government's decision to involve a wide range of
ministries in the policy-making process is that this enabled them to display their
commitment to addressing this policy issue. However, at the same time, by revealing the
complexity of the policy landscape, I avoid suggesting that it was determined in an
entirely harmonious or straightforward manner. This point is addressed in section 6.3,
which highlights the tensions which existed between the participating ministries
concerning the interpretation of the policy issues at stake.
In section 6.3, I take an ongoing policy—Cun Cun Tong Dianhua —as my
case study to deal with the main concern of this thesis—how the interpretation of the
digital divide contributes to policy-making and implementation as well as which ministry
is assigned to be in charge of the policy implementation. In the first place, this case
shows how the narrow conceptualisation of national development, i.e. in terms of
economic development and national competition, is embodied in the policy
implementation under the political means fenpian bao gan' by which it takes
place. Literally,^#pian baogan means dividing up the work (fenpiati) and assigning a part
to each individual or group {bao gan). Additionally, this case shows the debate between
actors. Thirdly, it draws attention to China's difficulties as it tries to catch up with
advanced countries in industrialisation and prevail in the international competition
concerning informatisation. Section 6.4 concludes this chapter.
6.1 Domestication of the Digital Divide
In Chapter 2, the idea of domestication was suggested as a means of analysing how a
concept is appropriated and embedded within a national context. Furthermore, in
Chapter 4, the history of the term 'digital divide' from the US and EU was discussed. In
this section, I utilise the concept of 'domestication' to analyse how the term 'digital
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divide' was appropriated from the international level to China. In applying
'domestication' in this thesis, I develop it into three levels—1) the linguistic
appropriation; 2) fit to national policy discourse; and 3) fit to national setting—national
economic/social context (see Figure 6.1).
Although the term 'digital divide' has existed for one decade since its inception in the
US in the mid-1990s, the ideas behind this term are still of tremendous diversity. In
Chapter 4, I discussed the different ideas behind this term and revealed four categories
of discourses on the digital divide, ranging from national development to human rights,
from nation-centred to citizen-centred, from technology equipment to users' skills,
within the international context. Undoubtedly, the interpretation of the digital divide in
China is also intertwined with national and international contexts. In this section, I will
present and discuss how this term is named, and investigate the discursive frameworks
employed in defining the digital divide in China. The data analysed in this subsection are
collected from personal interviews, newspapers, and policy documents. Because of
research ethics, as I have discussed in Chapter 3, the data collected and used from
personal interviews will not show the interviewee's personal information, except
something about their positions within the government (see Appendix).
Types Practices
Level One Linguistic Appropriation The Chinese government selected a
Chinese term 'shu y/ hong goit to refer to
the English term 'digital divide'
Level Two Fit to National Policy Discourse Promoting national competitiveness and
ICT for Development discourses within
China's national contexts
Level Three Fit to the National Setting—Material
Economic/Social Context
Figure 6.1 Three Levels of Domestication
6.1.1 Domestication of the Term 'Digital Divide'
In this subsection, I deal with the first level of domestication. The idea of
'domestication' here is applied in the analysis of how the digital divide is linguistically
translated by the Chinese government to make it belong to China as well as matching it
to China's values. Additionally, the process of selecting a Chinese term for the digital
divide also shows that a group of high-ranked policy-makers defined the policy
problem.
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According to the interviews I conducted in China, Chinese policymakers identified three
reasons for the Chinese government to cultivate a Chinese term to define the
phenomenon of the digital divide between countries and within China. First of all,
when the fieldwork of this research was conducted in 2005-2006 in China, the concept
of the digital divide had only appeared for one decade in the US; therefore, it is too
novel to be described by existing Chinese terms. Additionally, the term 'digital divide'
was coined in western countries, e.g. the US, in English, and then spread internationally
and eventually to less developed countries, which means that, in Chinese the concept of
the digital divide was a foreign concept and had to be translated to match the domestic
phenomenon.44
Thirdly, the ability to determinine a formal term and impose it on policy making and on
media reporting is an important aspect of power (Schoenhals, 1992). Manipulating and
formalising political language is one of the tools the CCP uses to exert its power
(Schoenhals, 1992). Drawing on Schoenhals' work (1992), he states that the
formalization of language usually has a fixed form, and is applied by successors as they
are making political speech or as they are creating new policy. Formalizing political
language has its tradition tracing back to premodern China. The first role that
formalized policy language plays is to make people know what to do and how to do it.
In the Analects Confucius argued that when names are not correct, the affairs of state
will not culminate in policy making and that the common people will not know how to
do what is right.
Schoenhals (1992) continues, in contemporary China, by formalizing policy language,
the party/state seizes the sole legitimate medium of political expression. Fie explains
that how the party/state rulers prescribe formulations that are circulated to Party
propaganda offices and are intended to dominate public thinking about particular issues.
He points out that the restricted language perpetuated by Chinese authorities may
prevent the development of creative thinking and actions upon which social power
depends. These observations may inspire my analysis of how the Chinese government
chose a formalised Chinese term for the digital divide.
Having clarified the reasons why Chinese policymakers worked out a Chinese term to
44 This observation emerged from my experiences in the course of arranging my interviews and
communicating with my friends in academia. Their first response to the key phrase 'the digital divide' in
my research was to ask me what the digital divide is and if I mean 'information gap'. The digital divide for
them was still not a term or concept in their daily lives when I was conducting my interviews in 2005 and
2006.
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refer to the phenomenon, I will now describe the process by which they decided upon a
proper Chinese term for the digital divide. Ever since the term was created in the US in
1995, and in particular after the US and others projected the global significance of this
concept through, for example the WSIS, the Chinese government and mass media have
been inspired to reflect on this phenomenon and started to become concerned about
giving a name to the 'digital divide' in Chinese. It was in 1998 that the concept of
'information poor' was first used in a speech by a member of the State Council
Development and Research Centre (DARC), and the phenomenon subsequently gained
in popularity. A member of DARC said:
[...] This unavoidable trend is both a challenge and opportunity for each
region and sector in China. If we do not get a better position in the world in
the information era, we will be categorised into the 'information poor' area.
In so doing, China will be labeled as an 'information-poor' country. (Science
and Technology Daily, 10/11/1998)
This warning by this member of DARC expressed Chinese government officers'
overwhelming anxiety about China lagging far behind advanced countries. In the late
1990s, the Chinese government started to devote time to developing a proper Chinese
term to encompass the emerging phenomenon they perceived inside China, which
showed their serious attitude towards this issue. This process also shows how China's
domestic developmental context is drawn into their considerations. One of my
interviewees described a scenario, vividly presenting how seriously the leader of the
Chinese government treated the informatisation in China. This is also clear from the
high rank of the officials who attended this meeting:
While the government was recruiting suggestions and proposals for the Tenth
Five Year Plan, I contributed my ideas to the top governmental leaders. Other
officials in high positions were at the planning committee as well, such as the
members of The State Development Planning Commission (SDPC), Minister of
Ministry of Information Industry (Mil), Minister of Ministry of Science and
Technology (MOST), and so forth. After the meeting, we did a joint
presentation and reported the conclusion of the meeting to President Jiang
Zemin. (Personal Interview, CH09. January 2006)
The identities of the participants in this meeting have two implications. First of all, all
of them have important positions. Secondly, they are responsible for China's
development, in particular industrial and technological development. This implies that
the Chinese government took the issue of the digital divide as a developmental and
technological issue.
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Then, the interviewee continued to recall that the purpose of meeting was as follows:
During the planning stage, we proposed the plan of informatisation via the
development of technology. In addition, reducing the digital divide was the
focus of the Tenth Five-Year Plan. I recalled that it was half past twelve at
night that we were still working on drafting the Plan as well as working out a
proper term to name 'the digital divide'. (Personal Interview, CH09. January
2006)
In the process of brainstorming, several Chinese phrases were considered:
[...] the term 'digital divide' in English could be translated into Chinese as shu
%ifen ge shu f chaji and shu sf honggou (l&Ml^lfi)-
Eventually we chose the term cshu hong god in order to
emphasise the huge gap. The word 'god (gap, iff) illustrated the problem of
the gap more correcdy than the other candidate terms, highlighting the
seriousness and significance of the digital divide (ibid.).
I would like to explain here the differences between these three Chinese terms literally.
In Chinese, the English word 'divide' can be interpreted mainly either as several sections
fen ge, ffWi), big differences (cha ji, MM) or a huge gap (hong gou, $§lff). The
explanation for fen ge' (5J"!t!l) means the division of a whole, which emphasises the
destruction of the entirety, 'chayi' (MM) further points out the differences between
groups. Moreover, the term 'chayt (MM) in most cases is used for simply describing
difference, but not the degrees of difference. It also implies that the difference can be
effectively and easily bridged if the proper policy is made. The reason why these two
terms were not chosen is because they do not precisely reflect China's situation of the
digital divide; they do not pinpoint how huge the difference is, but merely present the
relative difference.
In contrast, the explanation of 'honggou' ($S§|ff) not only represents the differences, but
also denotes the degree of difference between groups, presenting the absolute
differences. The literal meaning of the Chinese word 'honf (iff) is 'a huge bird', which
has been used as an adjective for describing that something is too big to be imagined.
The Chinese word 'god (iff) means the valley between two mountains or the split part
of one mountain. The metaphor of the combination of 'hong god (fl-flff) vividly
represents the challenging task of bridging the huge differences between regions and
countries, and compels the attention of the state and the public. It is 'just like there is an
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incredible gap lying between western and eastern China as well as between China and
other countries' (Personal Interview, CH09. January 2006).
Therefore, to correcdy reflect the situation of China's informatisation, the participants
of the planning committee finally made the decision to adopt the term 'shu honggou'
(S£-F-$§HI) in their draft of the Tenth Five-Year Plan. Since then, the phenomenon of
the digital divide in China has been properly named, and is taken to represent the
specific phenomenon facing China both within China and between China and other
countries.
After the Chinese government created the term ''shu honggou' (ll^T-$!IP!), it became a
heated topic of discussion in the mass media. In the beginning of 2001, a newspaper
article titled How can we bridge the digital divide—-from the penetration rates of computers and the
Internet opened up a series of discussions on this issue amongst specialised media,
government, and sections of academia.
However, it is interesting to consider why the Chinese officials spent so much time
discussing the translation of 'divide' in Chinese when there were very few debates over
the term 'digital'. There may certainly be some explanations for this. The extensive
debate over the term 'divide', for instance, may have occurred only because there is no
formalized term for it in Chinese. Correspondingly, one reason that no debates
addressed the term 'digital' in Chinese may be because the term 'digital' has already been
formalized in Chinese - 'shu sf and is thus unproblematic. However, another
possible explanation for this is that, when the 'divide' is characterised as 'digital',
technology becomes the sole and simple cause of the divide; 'addressing a "divide" that
is "digital" might appear to require a digital sort of effort' (Ribbon and Courtright, 2002:
5) to bridge the divide. This explanation points to a technology-centred perspective
which, over-estimates the power that technology has and directs policy-makers to simply
bridge the technological gap and to guard against the uneven development between
regions at this stage.
The latter possibility is supported by a statement made by the deputy minister of the
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Ma Songde in a newspaper article, in
which the definition of the digital divide and the key concern of this divide mainly
focus on the technical dimension of technology distribution and usage.
[...] ICTs brought developed countries huge economic benefits and
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social improvement; meanwhile the divide of technology usage
between developed and developing countries is increasingly widening.
This so-called 'digital divide' is even wider than the economic divide.
(Science and Technology Daily, 08/01/2002)
6.1.2 Dominant Discourses on the Digital Divide—National Competitiveness and ICT for
Development
Having discussed the first level of 'domestication', here I move to the second and third
ones—the domestication of the concept of the digital divide to policy discourse within
the national context. In this subsection, I show how international organisations'
framings of the digital divide and China's national context are interwoven to influence
the domestication of the concept of the digital divide in China. In Section 6.1.1, the
process of selecting a Chinese phase was used to show the Chinese government's
determination to address the digital divide; this section will go further to investigate the
reasons for this determination.
In Chapter 4, I have categorised five discursive frameworks of interpreting the digital
divide. In the course of data collection and data analysis, I explored that 'ICT for
development' has been appropriated highlighting the framing of the digital divide when
the interviewees and participants were explaining why China needs a digital divide policy.
And this seems tightly attached to the logic that the digital divide is a barrier to national
development, thus digital divide policy is needed to remove this barrier. This triangular
relationship between ICT, development and the digital divide mirrors the national
context in which the digital divide is embedded. I will now present the storylines from
both interviews and documentary sources to illustrate this argument.
China's domestic 'context', described in Chapter 5, explored the context of the
domestication of the concept of the digital divide. This is also related to the Chinese
government's attitude to and hope for 'development'. First of all, China clearly sees
itself as a developing country and is determined to catch up with advanced countries.
Secondly, the Chinese government has a strong fear that the lack of information
technologies will widen the gap with the industrialised countries. Thirdly,
informatisation is regarded as a means to leapfrog. This reveals that for China, internal
divide is secondary to international divides.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, 'informatisation' indicates 'process, progress, and duration
all the way from the industry society to the information society', as well as 'all the means
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to accelerate the process from the information society'. This interpretation of
informatisation implies that the Chinese government takes a linear logic on ICTs for (of)
development and it contains the uncritical assumption that more investment in ICT
infrastructures will result in more 'development'.
The strong emphasis that China puts on development is not surprising at all. Two of
Deng Xiaoping's slogans 'science and technology are productive forces' (ke xueji shu shi
sheng chan and 'science and technology are the first productive
forces' (ke xueji shu shi diji sheng chan li, manifest the relation
between science/technology and development and the expectation of China's
leapfrogging with technological development. Later on, in 1995, the State Council
proposed 'The Strategy of National Rejuvenation through Science and Technology' (ke
jiao xingguo, in the National Technology Conference to affirm the Chinese
government's determination to pursue this strategy.
Moreover, nearly two decades on from when domestic economic reform first began,
economic development still dominates Chinese leaders' attempts to confront the
increasingly uneven development within China. Therefore, the discursive linkage of ICT
and development, that is, prioritising the development and promotion of ICT, provides
rationalisation of policy (Nassje, 2002) to create policy legitimacy. Through the
resonance of these two concepts, the ambition of the government to improve
development is legitimately recognised and ICT for development gains in reputation as
well. The discourses on 'ICT for development' in China can be documented via the
storylines presented below.
Storyline 1: Leapfrogging
The belief in the revolutionary potential of ICTs amongst the Chinese leadership is
likely to be influenced by the heritage of China's past (Dai, 2003: 8). In China, the idea
of leapfrogging can be traced back and set in historical context, e.g the Great Leap
Forward. The Great Leap Forward was a mass movement under the leadership of Mao
ZeDong in 1958, during the period of the Second Five Year Plan. It attempted to break
through the limitations of backwardness and to improve the living standards for
Chinese people. The fundamental idea behind the Great Leap Forward was that China
could leap over the normal stages of economic development in a very short period.
This idea rested upon the notion that the masses possessed tremendous productivity,
and that they could readily transform labour into capital (Lieberthal, 2004: 103). A major
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policy was the promotion of small-scale industry as a concerted programme for rural
industrialization (Saich, 2004: 13). This came with a hope that China could catch up with
industiralised countries.
In the era of informatisation for the Chinese government, leapfrogging is the idea that
countries and societies can jump over one or more generations of technology and that
the poor nations can thus move more rapidly to the modern Information Age (Sunden
and Wicander, 2002). Leapfrogging also implies that 'progress can be attained in
discontinuous leaps rather than incrementally' (Jasanoff, 2002: 269). As mentioned
earlier, after being intimidated by western firearms and gunboats during the Opium War
at the end of the 19* century, China became eager to learn western technologies, now
treating ICTs as the panacea for national development. Therefore, 'leapfrogging' is
occupying Chinese leaders and Chinese policy-makers' minds. As one of my
interviewees reveals,
The current digital revolution overwhelming the world is a good
opportunity for developing countries, including China, to realise
leapfrogging development. We lost opportunities in the era of
industrialisation; now we are facing new opportunities in the era of
the Internet. We cannot, and must not miss this opportunity again.
(Personal Interview, CHI3. September 2006)
As discussed in Chapter 2, a storyline plays the role of attributing the urgency and
responsible behaviour (Hajer, 1995: 65). A storyline also has the functional role of
facilitating the reduction of the discursive complexity of a problem and creating
possibilities for problem closure (Hajer, 1995: 65). In this extract, the interviewee makes
a claim about the urgency that China 'cannot, and must not miss this opportunity again',
so the responsible behaviour is to take this opportunity in current digital revolution.
Moreover, the 'leapfrogging' storyline mainly encompasses two related
concepts—technological determinism and technological optimism (for definitions of
these terms refer to the discussion in Chapter 2). It assumes that ICTs will bring a digital
revolution, and with the myth that digital revolution will be a good opportunity for
developing countries to 'realise leapfrogging development'. Additionally, leapfrogging
storyline ignores the context surrounding development and continuities in the process
of technology innovation and development (Jasanoff, 2002).
'Leapfrogging' storyline is usually connected to China's national context emphasing
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economic growth. Therefore, the national economy becomes the recurrent topic
pertinent to the discourse of the digital divide. A simple, linear logic directs that if
society as a whole can utilise telecommunication technology, development will be
achieved more rapidly. The relationship between technology and development was
manifested in a public speech by Jiang Zemin, in late 1996, when he attended an OECD
conference, that 'integration of technology and economics is the key point for
economic development' (Science and Technology Daily, page 1, 1996). 'In China itself, a
"leapfrogging discourse" has emerged which stresses the economic benefits for
development' (Damm and Thomas, 2006: 2).
Storyline 2: National Competitiveness
The storyline of 'national competition' is a repeated motivation for developing countries
to foster informatisation, and reduce the digital divide. The two interview extracts
shown below may serve as exemplars. These two extracts reveal the importance of
informatisation for national competition for China.
Informatisation is the best opportunity for China to win in the current and
future national competition race. In the future national competition, whenever
one country, one province, one area, even one business is eager to defeat
others, informatisation will play a decisive role. (Personal Interview, CHI2.
September 2006)
China needs to seize the opportunity to speed development in information
communication technologies, and utilize them in all fields, such as economics,
society, technology, national defense, education, culture, and laws. (Personal
Interview, CHOI. April 2005)
Storyline 3: Catching- up via Industrialisation supported by Informatisation
China takes a stage view in its economic development and regards itself still in the early
stage of industrialisation in terms of the nation as a whole. Therefore, China adopts a
twin-track strategy of development, which means developing the economy through the
parallel processes of industrialisation and informatisation, in the early 1990s, heralded
by the launch of 'Informatisation of the National Economy Programme' (INEP). This
marked a shift away from economic reform and 'open door' policies developed since
Deng Xiaoping came to power in the late 1970s, which were primarily concerned with
catching up on the 'missed opportunity' of industrialisation. The emphasis in the future
was to be as much on efforts to enable China to become a key player in development of
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the global information economy, and 'informatisation has since become a central feature
of economic development policy in the post-Deng Xiaoping era' (Dai, 2002:145).
In reality, while competing with other countries in various industries or products, China
will lose the chance to win the race without support from information technology. It is
because of this concern that Jiang Zemin gave a speech on the National Strategies on
the Fifteenth Conference of the Representatives of Communist Party of China (CPC):43
[...] utilizing information technologies to upgrade the industrialised level in
the course of industrialisation; utilising information technologies to improve
traditional industries in the course of informatisation. The informatisation
strategy is to fuel industrialisation with informatisation. We, as a late-comer
country in technology development and innovation, will benefit from
technological leader countries. We will look forward to taking great leaps
forward in development. (Science and Technology Daily, 1997/09/13)
That is, informatisation and industrialisation are intertwined tightly; one can
not work out without the other. Informatisation pushes industrialisation
forward; industrialisation provides a market for information. (Science and
Technology Daily, 1997/09/13)
For some reason, we have missed industrialisation. Now we are chasing the
train of the informatisation revolution. We have to adopt advanced
technology and equipment, develop national information industry, and
combine industrialisation and informatisation. Only grasping this opportunity
can we catch up with developed countries. (Science and Technology Daily,
1997/09/13)
In China, informatisation is emerging while industrialisation has not been
completely realised; that is, informatisation surfaces when industrialisation is
still ongoing. Therefore, China does not necessarily follow developed
countries' path, which means industrialisation comes first, and then
informatisation follows. We in China better develop industrialisation and
informatisation at the same time, and develop industrialisation supported by
informatisation. {Science and Technology Daily, 1998/02/22)
The above extracts implicitly treat informatisation as an uncompleted process of
industrialisation. This also provides evidence I mentioned earlier that China takes a stage
view to its development that it attempts to clearly demarcate industrialisation from
informatisation. When the Chinese officers make the statement that 'catching-up via
Industrialisation supported by Informatisation' it indicates China still regards itself as
45
National Technology and Information Section, Science and Technology Daily, 1997/09/13.
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occupying the developmental stage identical to that of the so-called 'industrial
revolution' in western countries. The Chinese government sees informatisation as a
mechanism which would help the country leapfrog and catch up with advanced
countries.
Since China regards informatisation as an opportunity for economic catch up and even
leapfrogging, and hopes that informatisation can bring about industrialisation, it is
reasonable to argue that the digital divide obstructs its development. In this sub-section,
I argue that the concern with the digital divide is nation-centred, not people-centred;
and that the digital divide is interpreted as an obstacle to (national) development.
Storyline 4: Necessary to Bridge the 'International' Digital Divide
From the perspective of national development, it was the digital divides between nations
that first attracted the Chinese government's attention. When the Chinese government
first raised the issue of the digital divide in drafting the Tenth Five Year Plan, they were
concerned with the digital divides between China and other advanced countries, instead
of the divides within China. The Chinese government was worried that China would fall
further behind developed countries and would be prevented from winning the race of
national competition. Therefore, in the initial stages of the digital divide, the
government was concerned with the nation as a whole, rather than each individual
citizen. As one of my interviewees said:
When the issue of the digital divide attracted our attention, we were
concerned about the divides between developed and developing countries.
That is, the gap between the United States and China. (Personal Interview,
CH09. January 2006)
Another extract also supports this observation:
China has been known as a strong country in the world in terms of its big
population, but it is not known as a powerful country in terms of the
technological literacy its people are equipped with. Thus, if we are expecting
to leapfrog from a big country to a powerful country, bridging the domestic
digital divide becomes the most crucial challenge facing us. (Hu Angang,
Science and Technology Daily, 04/07/2002, p.5)
This extract implies the logic of the relationship between bridging the international
digital divide and the national digital divide. The international gap between China and
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other countries is its people lack technological literacy. In order to overcome this and
make China a power country, 'bridging the domestic digital divide becomes the most
crucial challenge' facing China (above extract). Following this logic, the ultimate goal of
bridging the national digital divide is to make China a powerful country in the world,
and to further to bridge the international gap between China and other countries.
As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, the term 'digital divide' was given an official
Chinese term by the Chinese government in the end of 2000. Since then, Chinese mass
media, particularly the print media, has started to publicise nationwide stories about the
digital divide in China. The first appearance of the term 'digital divide' in the mass
media was in early 2001, when the Chinese President Jiang Zemin gave a speech at the
UN Millennium Summit. As he stated at the Summit, 'the increasingly broadening digital
divides between developed and less developed countries represent the huge gap of their
technological developments, which would further widen the divides between the south
and the north countries'.
It seems that the Chinese political leaders are concerned about the global digital divide
more than the domestic one. It is common for them to mention the global digital
divides between countries. When Harwit was trying to find a definition of the digital
divide for China, he pointed out that 'developing countries' leaders tend to think of the
term as an international division of network access' (2004: 1012). Their concerns focus
on how China can catch up with the developed countries in the third industrial
revolution, since it has already been a loser in the first and the second industrial
revolutions. ICTs give China a good chance not only to catch up with but also surpass
the developed countries. Obviously, in using this line of argument, they put the
international digital divide before the domestic digital divide.
Storyline 5: The Digital Divide as a Barrier to Development
This storyline suggests that the digital divide is a barrier to China's national development.
It also implies that the most serious digital divide in China is the regional divide. The
deputy minister of MOST wrote a newspaper article in 2002 that was concerned with the
domestic digital divide in China. He presented quite a few worrisome statistics to show
the uneven development especially between regions inside China, and concluded that
'this huge divide extremely harms China's modernisation of agriculture'.46 He continued,
46 Science and Technology Daily, 01/08/2002.
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'economic poverty only accounts for tragedy at present; however, digital divides may
account for the future development in the next decade, as well as being important for
sustainable development of the society as whole'.
Another interviewee also mentioned this point. S/he stated:
In China, the digital divide is not the most serious social problem,
but the poverty of farmers in the western, rural area is. However,
the digital divide may exacerbate the situation of framers' lives,
and will further have negative impacts on the economic
development. Therefore even the digital divide is not the most
serious social problem for China, the Chinese government is still
taking action to bridge the digital divide. (Personal Interview,
CHOI. April 2005)
Recognising that the digital divide is a barrier to development, the policy-makers further
point out that bridging the national digital divide between more and less developed
regions is the prerequisite to bridging the digital divide between China and other
advanced countries.
We need to bridge both the international and national digital
divides. The strategy is to bridge the national digital divide first,
and then the international digital divide will be subsequendy
bridged. If the government takes the other way round, which is
bridging the international digital divide prior to bridging the
national one, the domestic digital divide will never be bridged.
(Personal Interview, CH09. January 2006)
This interviewee points out the linkage between bridging the international digital divide
and the national digital divide in China. His words also account for the reason why the
Chinese government aims to bridge the digital divide between China and other countries,
but it currently takes action in bridging the national digital divide.
The storylines shown in the previous section present a technological determinist and
optimist perspective on technology and development. These storylines take for granted
ICTs for national development/economic development, without mentioning any
negative effects from adopting the ICTs, e.g. Internet crime, pornography and so forth
which became frequently-researched topics in the late 1990s when the Internet was
entering the commercial field and everyday life. Moreover, these storylines are very
similar to the globalising digital divide discourse that the definition of development is
confined to national development, i.e. economic development, ignoring other aspects of
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development, i.e. social development, individual development, etc. Additionally, there is
an unclear logic embedded within the frame 'ICTs for national/economic development';
it is not being clearly articulated why informatisation can help China achieve the above
goals. Also the attention to overcoming regional inequalities is at the expense of
considering divides within a community — the marginalized groups within a community
are either ignored or assumed to benefit by a 'trickle down' process.
Thus far, I have presented the Chinese government's attempts to find a proper term to
name the phenomenon of 'the digital divide'. I also revealed how China is concerned
about the relationship between ICTs and development. I found that ICT for national
development is the main concern of the Chinese government, and that alternative
discursive frameworks for the digital divide were not considered. I did not encounter
other storylines of the necessity of bridging the digital divide summarised in the
previous chapter. As a result, the objective of bridging the digital divide is constructed as
advancing China in industrialisation, and realising informatisation to support the
unfinished industrialisation.
6.2 China's Determination to Bridging the Digital Divide
6.2.1 Mil Plays the Key Role in Bridging the Digital Divide
So far, we have seen the Chinese government's interpretation of the digital divide, which
is the top-level view of the digital divide within the government. Following the
discussion in Chapter 5 and section 6.1, Mil's role in bridging the digital divide has huge
implications in this research. First of all, it reflects the international and national context
in which the digital divide is understood and the relevant policy is developed, i.e. one in
which the issue of the digital divide is taken primarily as a matter of access to physical
infrastructure; at this point, the technology-driven ministry (Mil) is delegated to be the
key policy-maker. Secondly, under the charge of Mil, the digital divide policy is inclined
to the provision of technology, e.g. the Cun Cun Tong Dianhua policy that
I will discuss later in this chapter.
6.2.1.1 Mil Chairing the State Council Informatisation Office (SCIQ)
China's bureaucratic structure of authority is characterised by fragmentation which
means that the leadership consists of tiers ranging from the core group of top leaders
to line ministries which implement policy (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988: 22). This
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fragmentation has its disadvantages in that it requires more negotiation between
fragmented authorities. However it has advantages in that it brings together the various
parties participating in policy making. These positives and negatives also exist in digital
divide policy-making.
The State Council Informatisation Office (SCIO) is a cross-ministry liaison and
coordination body, chaired by the minister of MIL It is regarded as the
supra-organisational coordinator, being responsible for negotiation and resource
allocation. As I was informed by an interviewee who is working in the Beijing
Informatisation Office, SCIO is an important task-force, in charge of national
informatisation planning. SCIO holds special meetings for special issues, such as Village
informatisation'. SCIO is also involved in setting policy goals for national
informatisation, without being in charge of detailed policy-making and implementation.
The Office, as a task force, is under the administrative power of the State Council
officially, but the director of the Office is assigned to the Minister of Mil, rather than
another independent organisation. This arrangement shows that Mil, as a technological
development driven ministry, plays an important role in bridging the digital divide.
Additionally, this also shows that the Chinese government takes the digital divide as an
issue of physical communication, since this policy is the charge of Mil, a ministry
responsible for China's informatisation, in particular the infrastructures.
6.2.1.2 Cun Cun Tong Dianbua1 Project 11999 onwards)
Prior to the introduction of Cun Cun TongDianhua project, a background understanding
of the Cun Cun Tong policy is provided first. As mentioned in Chapter 2, policy-makers
may make similar policy to solve their domestic problem via social learning. One of the
ways of social learning is mimicking other countries' policy. Cun Cun Tong is such an
example. Cun Cun Tong as a set of policies was inspired by the neighbouring country,
South Korea, which took the initiative to launch a 'New Village Movement' to develop
the rural regions via providing basic infrastructures and telecommunications by means
47 The literal translations of this term word by word are as follows: cun for village, double cun for every
village, tong for connection and dianhua for telephones. The targeted villages mentioned in the policy refer
to 'administration villages' (pang ^heng cun, fr®Tf), which are the local administrative units in rural China.
In contrast to administration villages are 'natural villages' (gi ran cun, One administrative village
is usually composed of 4-5 natural villages. Natural village is the lowest and most basic level of
administration units. Each of the villages has one representative, and all of these representatives are
members of the natural-village commission. The chairman of the commission automatically becomes a
member of the higher-lever unit—administrative villages.
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of state intervention from the 1970s onwards. Learning from South Korea, the Cun Cun
Tong project is a series of policies on improving daily life in rural villages and western
China. The goal of this policy package is step by step to fulfill the demands of villagers
in transportation infrastructures, televisions, radio, telephones and finally the Internet
(Personal Interview, CH13. September 2006).
This project was drafted in early 1998. Now it is integrated into the plan The Construction
of Socialist New Village, which is prioritised in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. According to
the statistics when embarking on this project, there were 723,000 administrative villages
and 5358,000 natural villages. Among them, there were still 117,000 administrative
villages and 563,000 natural villages not covered by radio and TV wireless, which meant
that 14.8 million Chinese people could not connect to radio and TV.48
The first part of the policy implementation began in 1999, with the construction of
roads to every village, and provision of electricity for every village. Almost at the same
time, SARFT started to implement the policy of getting broadcasting and TV to every
village.49 The intention of this project is to provide people in remote areas with the
ability to watch TV and listen to radio.
By the end of 2005, 117,000 administrative villages and 86,000 natural villages
composed of at least 50,000 households were connected to broadcasting radio and TV.
That is, 9.7 million farmers in remote areas were now connected. Between 1998 and
2002, the central government spent US $5,625 million (US $4 million from the National
Development and Reform Commission, and US $1,625 million SARFT) in getting
administrative villages connected to broadcasting and TV. Between 2004 and 2005, the
central government spent US $9,375 million. After the efforts made by the government,
the increase in coverage of broadcasting and TV was from 86.02% and 87.68%
respectively in 1997 to 94.48% and 95.81% respectively in 2005.
To sum up, since the project started in 1998, the central government has spent US $15.5
million to get 117 thousand administrative villages and 86 thousand natural villages
covered by radio and TV. Moreover, this echoes what I discussed in section 6.1.1 that
when the Chinese government defined the term digital divide, it took the physical access
for granted, i.e. the first technology of inclusion in Cun Cun Tong project is wireless TV,
48 Source from hrtp:/ /politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/1027/4826701.html, accessed on 09/07/2007.
49 Wired broadcasting was installed much earlier and in China it is a mass medium with a distinctive local
flavour. Taking loudspeakers for example, in 1980, loudspeakers were penetrating half of all rural
households (Lee, 1994).
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then telephone, and then the Internet.
From the policy chain of Cun Cun Tong comes the policy of providing every village with
telephone(s)—Cun Cun Tong Dianhua is relevant to my research because it suits the
criteria discussed in Chapter 1 concerning the case selection. Therefore my research will
single out this policy for analysis. Generally speaking, this project will provide physical
communications for 900 million farmers who are not connected to telephones or the
Internet. The project is an ongoing process, which aims to get farmers connected to the
telephone as the first-stage task, and further to help farmers go online, bridging their
digital separation from the rest of Chinese people. A detailed account will be presented
in section 6.3.
6.2.1.3 Publication of Internet Reports—China Internet Network Information Centre
Although the China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC) does not directly
get involved in the policy-making process, or take responsibility for policy
implementation, it still plays a key role in providing an outline of the Internet use
statistics for the policy-makers mentioned above. CNNIC as an official organisation
conducts surveys regarding Internet use of netizens in China twice a year. The results
of surveys provided act as significant references for policy making. As soon as the
results are finished, CNNIC 'submits the full report to the Ministry of Information
Industry for their data to publish "Chinese Information Statistics Annual Report",
which is the authoritative data cited by academics and international organisations'
(Personal Interview, CH03. April 2005). CNNIC also provides The State Statistics Bureau
with informatisation data, including Internet-related indicators. The reports CNNIC
submitted 'are not only used for policy-making, but also for complementing what is
missing in state informatisation indicators-making' (Personal Interview, CH03. April
2005).
As mentioned in Chapter 2, boundary-drawing is one of the ways for policy-makers to
define the policy problem. CNNIC is playing this role in framing policy via conducting
Internet surveys. Although these surveys conducted by CNNIC do not aim to give a
definition of what the digital divide is, they do perform the function of drawing
boundaries around what should be included in the concerns of the digital divide as well
as what should not. Boundary setting via survey materials is one way in which CNNIC
is looking at the digital divide in China. The choice of variables addressed makes it
obvious which elements are to be taken into account for further policy consideration
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when making digital divide policies. The contribution of CNNIC to policy making is
through the procedure as stated by my interviewee from CNNIC who is responsible for
these surveys:
We submitted the completed reports to the Ministry of Information
Industry (Mil). Mil publishes Chinese Information Statistics A.nnual Report
every year in terms of governmental data. We also provide The State
Statistics Bureau with some informatisation data, including the
Internet-related indicators. Therefore, the report we submitted is not only
used for policymaking, but also for complementing what is missing in state
informatisation indicators-making. You can also find the indicators of
China we made in ITU's or other UN sub-organisations' reports. (Personal
Interview, CH03. April 2005)
The variables of the surveys conducted by CNNIC draw our attention to the uneven
adoption of the Internet in terms of sociological categories, i.e. gender, age, education,
geography, occupation, and so forth. These variables on the one hand draw our
attention to the phenomenon they present; on the other hand, they narrow down other
possible ways of understanding the digital divide. Deciding variables is itself a way of
seeing the world. The boundary resides between those variables that have been
constructed and those that have not yet been created. Once a new variable has been
built, the boundary is broadened.
Additionally, the variables of these surveys are likely to be the kind of categories found
in the digital divide discussion in the west and in other international organisations. This
is because these researchers are doing social learning, the concept I discussed in Chapter
2, when they decide the variables. As the interviewee who conducted these surveys told
me, he regularly attended international and regional conferences to share his experiences
in conducting the Internet surveys with researchers in other countries, and now they
have built an international network of conducting Internet surveys.
6.2.2 Other Relevant Policies and Participant Ministries
This section introduces other relevant policies and participant ministries to show the
Chinese government's determination to bridge the digital divide. Figure 6.2 presents the
complete architecture of digital divide policy in China. As I mentioned in Chapter 1,
China at present has no policy direcdy tided with 'bridging the digital divide', and the
policy pertinent to meeting the goal of bridging the digital divide is scattered in a
broader policy framework. Thus, the initial effort for the researcher in the course of
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data collection was to locate the relevant policy, in which the issue of bridging the digital
divide is mentioned and set up as the goal to be achieved. The final version of the
policy landscape exhibited in this section has been modified many times based on a
literature review between 2003 and 2004, and three research trips between 2005 and
2006. Below I will provide detailed accounts of three relevant policies on bridging the
digital divide.
6.2.2.1 E-School (year 2000 onwardsl
The Ministry of Education (MOE) is responsible for education about information
technology in primary and middle schools. In order to realise the strategy proposed by
Deng Xiaoping, i.e. 'education should be engaged with modernisation, the world and
the future', MOE decided to spend five to ten years to promote computer education in
schools. The other significant task for MOE is to implement the policy of E-School.
However, before MOE officially embarked on 'E-School' policy, China had already
pursued the expansion of digital access on the various fronts. For example, one of the
leading forces in spreading data services to China's schools is China Education and
Research Network of MOE, or CERNET. The network was founded in 1993, and has
as its goal the provision of Internet connections to universities as well as secondary and
primary schools. CERNET did not build its own data network, but leases lines from the
major telecommunications operating companies, such as China Telecom and China
Netcom (Harwit, 2004: 1027).
In order to realise the goal of the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), in 2000, the
Working Conference on the Education of Information Technology of National Primary
and Middle Schools set up the target to advance a thorough distribution and application
of the Internet. Later, the E-School project was launched to equip ninety percent of all
independent primary and middle schools with the ability to access the Internet within
five to ten years. The detailed tasks are as follows:
a. To construct Internet infrastructures in primary and middle schools in
middle-range cities;
b. To build distance-education centers in primary and middle schools in small cities
in middle and west regions, equipping them with television sets, DVD players,
computers, etc.;
c. To develop a series of programmes and resources for tutoring, and build a
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shared database for primary and middle schools in teaching;
d. Engage the teachers of the primary and middle schools in this project, and
provide them with training courses to familiarize themselves with the
information technologies.
6.2.2.2 Go 1Vest® (year 2000 onwards!
The projects Go West and The Construction of Socialist New Villages also reflect China's
regionally uneven development as well as China's determination to solve this problem.
The Committee for Western China Development of the State Council has been in
charge of the Go West project since 2000. The Committee was founded in 2000 to
realise the goal of advanced development of Western China. It gained top level support
from the central government. The president of the State Council is the director of this
committee, and the vice president of the State Council is the vice director. The
members of the committee were composed of nineteen central ministers, later
expanded to twenty-seven. According to the structure, under the committee is the
'Office for Western China Development', which is taking responsibility for policy
implementation.
The main task of the Office is drafting strategies for the development of Western China,
including economic development of rural villages, technology infrastructure, etc. The
ultimate goal of this Office is to alleviate uneven development between eastern and
western China.
Development of the western part of China has been a big concern for Chinese
authorities since the Maoist era after the foundation of the People's Republic of China.
However, the strategies of economic development that have been adopted by Chinese
leaders since this time diverge considerably, though their common goal is to narrow
down the regional divide between the coastal/eastern part and the western.
The project Go West is mainly implemented by three ministries—the State Council
Informatisation Office, the Office of the West Regional Development Leading Group
50 The literal translation of this policy title from Chinese into English is 'explore and develop the western
China' (HnliAillSit, xi hu da kaifa). Interestingly, its official website in English version uses 'Go West' as
the English title of this policy. 'Go West' is a paronomasia, which on one hand means going to and
exploring the western China, and the other, learning the developmental experience from the western
countries and catching-up with the western countries eventually.
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of the State Council, and MIL This project is part of efforts to help China bridge the
digital divide, from the perspectives of development, research, promotion and
application. With regard to the detailed objectives of this project, it encompasses the
following:51
a. Based on the environment of the west region, making best use of the information
technology and products to underpin the informatisation in this region;
b. To promote the implementation of information technology step by step through
building up model centres;
c. To drive industrialisation through informatisation; help the west region to improve
the industry structure, and develop information industry; upgrade increasingly the
informatisation level in the west region;
d. Within three to five years, the model centres can fulfill the expected requirements;
e. Within ten years, the digital divide can be largely bridged.
To fulfill the objectives, the project focused on the building of the infrastructures,
Internet education, computerised agriculture, and the informatisation of manufacturing.
The basic principle of enforcing this project is 'spend less, work more, and do real work'.
The fact that the government spent US $25 million in this project demonstrates its
determination to develop the west region and to bridge the digital divide between the
eastern and western regions within the nation.
Later on, in April 2003, the Ministry of Science and Technology launched a US $24
million project called 'Narrow the Digital Divide—the Western Action'. Under this
project, the western region has made great progress in Internet-related infrastructure.
Taking the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region for example, multimedia online
classrooms and rural information websites have been set up in more than 100 primary
and middle schools. The other example is the Tibet Autonomous Region in July 2004,
where a full-scale information platform was established to provide online technology
for Tibetans (China Daily, 25103/ 2005).
6.2.2.3 The Construction of SocialistNew Villages (year 2006 onwards)
Since people in rural and poor regions in China are mainly earning their livings by
51 htrp:/166.102.9.104/search?q-cache:0QUSDvLi BoT:gxc.gzst.P'ov.cn/2x/030227.doc+%E7%BC%A9
%E5%B0%8F%E6%95%B0%E5%AD%97%E9%B8%BF%E6%B2%9F%EF%BC%8D%E8%A5%BF
%E9%83%A8%E8%Al%8C%E5%8A%A8&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=7&P-l=uk. accessed on 12/12/2007.
163
agriculture, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA for short) takes part of the responsibility
for reducing the digital divide. The policy 'Construction of a socialist new village' is the
responsibility of MOA.
This programme is part of the eleventh five-year plan from 2006 to 2010, including
currendy working schemes, such as Go West and Cun Cun long, furthering the goals of
these incumbent plans. The Chinese government has decided to spend at least US$ 37.5
million on infrastructure deployment in rural areas during the period of the Eleventh
Five-Year Plan.
Constructing socialist new villages is the top priority of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan,
which shows the determination of the Chinese to bridge the gaps in all areas of life
between rural and urban eras, and the west and east regions. Expanding and continuing
the Project of Extending Radio and TV Coverage to Everj Village, to get all villages connected
to broadcasting and television and developing distance education are listed as the top
projects that the Chinese government is eager to finish.
As mentioned earlier, before 2003, there was no definite digital divide policy in China. It
is not until the drafting period of the Tenth Five-Year Plan that the digital divide gained
attention from the media as well as from policy-makers. Furthermore, digital divide
policy has been inspired by foreign countries, regional and international organisations.
With more and more frequent foreign visits of governmental officials as well as speedy
flow of information via attending international conferences, the Chinese government
has been learning lessons from other countries.
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6.3 Case Study: Cun Cun Tong DianHua Policy Realised
through Fen Pian Bao Gan
Previously I argued how the Chinese government's selection of a Chinese term in its
domestication of the concept 'the digital divide' and the policy and ministries involved
in digital divide policy making both reflect the serious atdtude of the Chinese
government to the digital divide. In this section, I provide a case study to provide more
evidence to show how the dominant storylines of the digital divide (leapfrogging,
national competition, etc.) have had an impact on the policy outcomes. This case also
shows China's determination to bridge the digital divide in order to help the nation's
economy. I also discuss the ongoing debates between ministries in this section. The
reasons for selecting this case for illustration were already provided in Chapter 1.
In the following analysis, I first present the definition of this policy and the
measurement of policy implementation. Then, I examine the debate which occurred
prior to this policy, which shows two perspectives on how rural development should be
carried out. I will next present the construction of digital divide discourse in this policy,
which is embedded within a broader national development discourse, and demonstrate
how this discourse influenced both policy making and implementation. Subsequently, I
reveal how this policy has been made and implemented in a market-driven
telecommunication market via a centralised political approach. Regarding the
implications pertinent to the digital divide and implementation of this policy, I will
provide comprehensive and comparative accounts in Chapter 9 when comparing China
with the case of Taiwan.
6.3.1 Background of the Case—Cun Cun Tong Dianhua
Cun Cun Tong Dianhua is included in a packaged policy aiming to develop the rural areas
in China, which is expected to realise the balanced development within China via
technology provision, building a basic telecommunications network in rural China (see
Figure 6.3). With the definition of the title in Cun Cun Tong Dianhua
policy, Cun means a village, Tong (connection/access to) is the current policy goal,
Dianhua means landline. The village is operationally defined as connected as long as it is
equipped with a single telephone set (Personal Interview, CH13. September 2006). This
implies that the present focus of this policy is on infrastructure, and physical access.
Getting all villages connected to the basic telecommunication infrastructure is one
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dimension of this packaged policy and is within the popular scheme of universal service
implemented in advanced countries already. However, it is a rather different view from
that of the advanced countries. For example, in the US, universal service seeks to get
every household connected to the basic telecommunicadon infrastructure; in China, the
target unit for universal service is village. Under the principle of 'development' within
the context of China, the Chinese government is eager to draw 900 million farmers
(nearly two-thirds of China's population at the end of 2005) into the informatisation era.
Taking into account the existing living standards in remote villages, especially in western
China, the Chinese government adopted a step-by-step policy to implement universal
service policy, providing the villages with telephones in the first instance, and then the
Internet. Mil is in charge of this policy, which was initiated in July 2003 and is still
underway.
One official of Mil made the complaint that 'this is the most influential, wide-ranging,
and difficult project that Mil has even been in charge of since its foundation for the
past seven years' (Personal Interview, CH13. September, 2006). Mentioning this as the
most difficult project during the past seven years ironically implies that Mil has suffered
the greatest hardship during the setting up of this policy mechanism. The difficulty of
this project mainly stems from financial shortages. First of all, there is no effective
channel for securing funding. Secondly, a huge amount of money must be invested in
telecommunication facilities in small villages during the initial stage, whereas it takes a
very long time to generate profit for investors. This is the reason why private companies
are not very interested in joining this project. Thirdly, the villages left unconnected are
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6.3.2 Debates over the Mechanism to Bridge the Digital Divide
6.3.2.1 Universal Service Endeavouring in China
In order to implement the Cun Cun Tong Dianhua policy, the idea of universal service was
proposed by Mil and gained publicity in mass media and academic research. According
to the experiences from advanced countries where the goal of universal service"
(telephony) has been nearly realised, universal service policy had been starting to be
implemented before telecommunications markets were deregulated, liberalised and
opened to competidon. However, no sooner had China started to open its
telecommunications market than it began this policy. Therefore, the main challenge of
this project is that, as Preston and Flynn (2000) argue, 'this is unlikely to occur under a
largely market-led system for obvious reasons—there's no profit in offering services for
free' (Preston and Flynn, 2000:97) from the standpoints of telecommunications
operators. In China, universal service is particularly regarded as a non-profit business
because of the huge geographical distances mentioned in Chapter 5. Moreover, the
suggestion, that the government does not need to take actions to steer
telecommunications in rural areas, also challenges the enforcement of universal service.
As a result, Mil was proposing a financial mechanism—Universal Service Fund
(USF)—to achieve the goal of universal service, connecting all villages to telephony.
6.3.2.2 Debates over the Mechanism of Universal Service (Universal Service Fund.
USF)
The Idea of USF
In order to implement Cun Cun Tong Dianhua, Mil came up with the idea of a 'Universal
Service Fund' (USF) in 1998. 'In May 2000, the State Development and Planning
Commission suggested the establishment of a USF in accordance with international
standards' (Harwit, 2004:1027). In November 17, 2001, the State Council for the first
time announced in its formal public document that China would set up a USF to bridge
the digital divide in western/rural areas. In June 2002, Mil finished a research trip to
other countries, and submitted an official report entitled 'A Research Report on
Universal Service Fund and Its Application in China' to the Ministry of Finance (MOF).
53 Universal service policy applied with nationalised administration; however these often had high charges
and low connection rate (about 60% in the UK). Privatisation increased penetration and also stimulated
more formal US regulatory requirements.
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In this report, Mil suggested that all private telecommunication companies are eligible
for affording universal service, and had a responsibility to contribute to the fund.
'In the second half of 2002, the two ministries planned to discuss the details of how to
raise and manage the fund. The recommended size of the proposed fund was US$ 1.2
billion. Finally, in early 2003, Mil announced that all of China's major fixed-line and
wireless telephone companies would have to pay an annual fee of US$ 0.03 for every
phone number they owned (even ones not currendy in use), in order to spread phones
to rural regions. The total projected revenue would be about US$ 48 million per year,
considerably short of the necessary total fund size projected in the previous year'
(Harwit, 2004: 1027). In 2004, Mil proposed that for a better future, the foundation of
USF is the best solution to universal service at the National Information Industry
Working Conference.
The Difficulty in Setting-Dp USF
However, USF has not solved Mil's problems in implementing Cun Cun Tong Dianhua.
The USF still had not been set up when I began writing this thesis. Mil is still having
trouble in setting up USF, and this has generated a debate between Mil and MOF. The
basis for this debate stems from the division of labour between bureaucratic ministries,
not from the USF per se. As an actor in charge of bridging the regional divide, Mil does
not have the financial resource to implement the policy, but MOF does (Personal
Interview, CH13. September 2006).
The creation of a universal service fund has undergone several difficulties. An analyst
working for one telecom operator summarizes four reasons to explain the barriers to the
launch of a universal service fund/4
1. Universal service is under the regulation of the telecommunication service, and
there exist some difficulties in cost-benefit calculation;
2. Six telecommunication operators remain skeptical about the launch of a
universal service fund. They are not really wilting to donate to the fund;
3. The foundation of a universal service fund will have tremendous impacts on the
interests of ministries and interest groups. This creates much difficulty in
coordinating, and creating a universal service fund;
54 China Management News, 14/05/2005, http://telecom.chinabyte.com/78/2005078.shtml. accessed on
26/12/07.
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4. The Chinese government lacks experience in managing a universal service fund.
The MOF thought that there is no sufficient reason to set up such a fund, and
furthermore, that there is no proper mechanism for running this fund at this moment in
China. Without the approval of MOF, the proposal was left aside, even though
proponents have never given up promoting this idea for China.
Although the fund is still at the preparation stage, three ministries—Mil, MOF, and
NDRC (National Development and Research Commission, NDRC) jointly issued a
document at the end of 2004 to charge telecommunication resources for the foundation
of USF since April 1st, 2005 onwards.
6.3.3 A Compromised Policy Outcome—Fen Pian Bao Gan (alternative method of policy
implementation)
Since the USF has not yet been launched, Mil adopted a complementary strategy to
realise the policy goal of raising the penetration rate of telephones in rural areas. This
complementary policy is unique under Chinese political circumstances. Mil decided to
use administrative/political means to designate six existing telecommunication
companies to share the responsibility for implementation of 'telephones to every village'.
They gave this complementary strategy a brief term fenpian bao gan\ which is similar to
China's famous farm reform in the 1980s, carried out to modify inefficient systems in
agriculture during the Cultural Revolution (Email Interview, CH20. October 2006).
In order to run fen pian bao gan fairly, Mil created a complicated mathematical model to
assign six telecommunication operators to take responsibility for getting remote villages
online, which is based on the revenue and profit each operator gains. According to the
model designed by Mil, the six operators ideally take the same responsibility for getting
all villages online. After the rules of game were set up, Mil would evaluate the
implementation of the six operators, tracing the progress quarterly. After each
evaluation, Mil could regularly report the progress and implementation of these six
operators to the State Council, and Provincial Governments, as well as announcing the
results to the telecommunication industry.
Although the policy mechanism Fen Pian Bao Gan has attracted some criticisms from
private operators (see section 6.3.4.1), Cun Cun Tong Dianbua has made great progress in
terms of telephone penetration. The project underwent two pilot stages called 'act after
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trials' (Yu et al., 2004: 719) (shi dian, before it was formally initiated. The first
stage took place in the beginning of 2004 in five provinces and the second stage in
mid-2004. During the pilot period, each operator was assigned either one province or
autonomous region for its own experimental spot. After successful trials announced by
Mil, the policy was formally initiated in 2004 in all villages in need of telephone access.
Figure 6.4 shows the assigned pilot province of each operator. Under the initiative of
Mil, this policy has recruited US$ 250 million from six operators. According to Mil's
reviews every month, these six operators have made great progress in policy
implementation (see Figure 6.5).
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Operator Pilot province The target amount of villages
China Telecom Shaanxi Province 3,457
China Mobile Sichuan Province 6,112
China Satcom Sichuan Province 132
China Netcom Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 1,557
China Unicom Guangxi Autonomous Region 1,680
China Tietong Henan Province 193
Total 13,131
Figure 6.4 Pilot Province and Target Amount of Villages of each Operator (Source:
httpf/wwiv.mii.gov.cn/art/2005/12/29/art_992_4083.html)
Phase (s):Year (month) Connected/expected Progress (connected /expected Connected/whole
villages villages)% villages (%)
Phase I: 2004 (1 —12) 9,357/37,741 24.8 90.9
Phase 11:2005 (1-3) 16,135/37,741 42.6 92
Phase III: 2005 (5)
Phase IV: 2005 (6-7) 19,609/37,741 52.0 ...
Phase V: 2005 (8) 25473/37,741 67.5 93
Phase VI: 2005 (9) 32,165/37,741 85.2 94
Phase VII: 2005 (10-11) 52,304/37,741 138.6 (achieved the goal before
due)
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Phase VIII: 2005 (12)
Phase Villi: 2006 (1-3) —/10.600 97.6 97.6
Phase X: 2006 (4-6)
Phase XI: 2006 (7-8) -/10.600 98% 98
Figure 6.5 Progress of 'Cun Cun Tong Dianhua' (Source: Mil Website; Ccompiled bj the Author)
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6.3.4 A Harmonised or Discordant Complementary Strategy?
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the six telecommunications operators are listed companies,
and as I described earlier in this chapter, investment in rural area may not be a profitable
business. As one governmental official admitted, 'undoubtedly, this has been questioned
by telecommunication companies.' Then, the question follows: why do operators
consent to implement fan pian bao gan? And how has the Chinese government
managed/achieved it since this policy conflicts with the rules of running in a
supposedly open, free market?
6.3.4.1 The Problems with Fan Pian Bao Gan
Prior to providing possible answers to this question, I will detail the problems with fan
pian bao gan. The first problem originates from the uneven workload between operators,
even thoughMil has carefully set up a mathematical formula to distribute the workload.
Before the opening-up of China's telecommunication market, China Telecom had been
playing the monopolist role in providing universal service. One of the most important
tasks is to get every village connected to telephones, which is regulated under China's
'Telecommunication Regulations'. However, even after the market gradually turned out
to be competitive, and China Telecom no longer monopolised China's
telecommunication market, China Telecom was still burdened with the implementation
of Cun Cun Tong Dianhua policy. For China Telecom, it seemed very unfair, because
performance is of great significance for a listed company. Therefore, China Telecom
was not pleased that it alone was given the obligation to implement this policy, although
now this responsibility is shared with other telecommunications operators.
The other problem comes from the high cost of spreading the cable over the rural areas,
and the low rate of return. For example, China Telecom spent US$ 1 billion annually in
providing universal service in rural areas. Additionally, with the cancellation of set-up
fees as well as the competition of long-distance telephone costs with other operators,
China Telecom is now slowing down its pace in investing in telecom infrastructure.
6.3.4.2 Why Do Operators Consent to Implementing Fan Pian Bao Can}
Thus far, it has shown that there is disagreement about Fan Pian Bao Gan strategy in
implementing Cun Cun Pong Dianhua. The question comes out to be: then, why do
operators consent to implementingfanpian bao gan} The answer could be quite simple, as
174
stated by one of my interviewees from Mil:
To be honest, investing in the telecommunication facilities in rural areas
has no profit at all. For example, I have been visiting to a small, remote
village in Zhejiang province. The mere cost of making a telephone work
is 30 thousand RMB yuan (equal to USD $3,750). Mil does not provide
any incentives to these six telecommunication companies. These
companies are affiliated with Mil, and the CEOs are assigned by MIL
Therefore, those companies regard the implementation of this policy as
their political responsibility. Although these companies are listed
companies, they are owned by the state. (Personal Interview, CHI3.
September 2006)
But, the answer may be not that simple, and it is related to the unique characteristics of
China's opening up her telecommunication market in 1998, as well as the transferring of
the ownership. 'In terms of privatisation, the government has maintained a majority
ownership in the largest operators. Competition remains limited in basic services and the
independence of the regulator is far from being achieved' (Laperrouza, 2006:28).
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the year 1998 was a crucial turning point in China's reform
of the telecommunications industry. Soon after the establishment of Mil, the
telecommunications industry underwent a considerable re-organisation. In 1999, China's
telecommunication service experienced the first re-organisation. The monopolist China
Telecom has divided into four operators—New China Telecom, China Mobile, China
Satellite and China Unicom. China's telecommunication monopoly ended with this split.
In 2001, the second reorganisation took place, and the new China Telecom further split
into two: new China Telecom and China Net Netcom. After two phases of
reorganisation of China's telecommunication service, there exist six operators at
present.
Before the reorganisation of the telecommunication market, the Chinese government
could easily assign the monopolist China Telecom to take responsibility for universal
service. In principle, after the two stages of reorganisations were carried out, the
Chinese government could not exert political power over assigning operators to take on
the burden of universal service. However in reality, the state still remains the biggest
shareholder of most of the operators. Even China Netcom, the least state-owned
company, still has forty percent shares owned by the state. Of the six operators, two are
completely owned by the state (see Figure 6.6). It is under such a political and financial
environment that these six operators are taking the responsibility for implementing the
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policy, even though they are reluctant to. Therefore, the state holds the majority of
shares and is the biggest shareholder in these six operators who provide basic
infrastructure to remote villages to solve the problem of 'the last mile' (pui houyigong li,
S).55
Additionally, it is not just that the state has high shares in the private operators; it is also
administration power of the state which could refuse licenses, e.g. operators wanting 3
G licenses, etc.
Operator Date Amount Comment
(billion)
China Mobile 1997/10 USD 4.20 Listing on HKSE and NYSE of Guangdong and Zhejiang network. 24.3° o publicly held.
China Unicom 2000/06 USD 4.92 Listing on HKSE and NYSE. 22.53° o publicly held.
China Unicom 2002/09 RJVIB 11.5 Listing on SSE. 39.5° o stake in China Unicom (HK).
China Telecom 2002/11 USD 1.43 Listing on HKSE and NYSE of 4 provincial networks (Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu and
Zhejiang). 20% publicly held.
China Netcom 2004/11 USD 1.13 Listing on HKSE and NYSE of Shanghai, Guangdong, Beijing, Tainjin, Hebei, Shangdong,
Henan and Liaoning. 27.7% publicly held.
China Railcom 2005 RMB 2.00 Listing on SSE (A shares)^osmoned^^^
Figure 6.6 IPOs by China's Telecommunication Operators, 1997-2004 (Source: Eaperroupa,
2006:101)
Note: SSE=Shanghai Stock Exchange; HKSE—Hong Kong Stock Exchange; NYSE=New York
Stock Exchange.
Due to the complaints from operators, although fan pian bao gan' policy seems to be
working well, and the progress has surpassed anticipation, this policy is a pragmatic
solution but also a second choice, rather than the best one for Mil if the proposal of a
universal service fund could be successfully implemented. As one Chinese official said
in a public forum, 'in order to get every village connected to telephones last year, we
gathered the six telecom operators to have an administrative negotiation. Although the
six operators remain skeptical of this replacement, we have no other choices but this
55 The 'last mile' indicates the final leg of delivering connectivity from a communications provider to a
customer. It is usually referred to by the telecommunications industries, which is typically seen as an
expensive challenge because "fanning out" wires and cables is a considerable physical undertaking.
56 Chen, Jinqio. The Second Private Business Forum.
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6.4 Conclusion
This chapter shows a rather complex pattern of bridging the digital divide in China. It is
shown that the digital divide is first about China's national standing in global
competition. Then it becomes welded to the issue of the national regional digital divide.
This shift stems from the belief that bringing the national digital divide will then bridge
the divide between China and other countries. Currently in China, the regional divide is
the big concern for Chinese policy-makers; therefore a pragmatically feasible goal of
one landline in every village is carried out to bridge the regional digital divide. In policy
implementation, a pragmatic administration pressure is used to fulfill the same policy
goal because the USF is delayed.
Overall, despite the competing forces that were involved in the policy-making process,
this chapter shows that the Chinese government attempted to impose a top-down
definition of the digital divide. This is demonstrated by the process of selecting a
Chinese phrase to name the digital divide which was carried out by high-ranked officials
who reported the result to the President Jiang Zemin. This centralised approach is also
reflected in the frames of the digital divide, e.g. nation-centred, not people-centred, as
well as the implementation of Cun Cun Tong Dianhua via the fan pian bao gan mechanism.
In Chapter 9, I will contrast this centralised model with the less centralised model
adopted by Taiwan at the national level.
Regarding the frames used to state the importance of bridging the digital divide, I have
in this chapter presented and elicited the main discursive frameworks of ICTs for
development and national competition. I found that the relationship between the four
elements—development, ICT, digital divide, and digital divide policy—is explained in
the economic concern of ICT for development. Development is undoubtedly an
important issue for developing countries. In the informatisation era, ICTs have come to
be regarded as an efficient tool for (national) development and competition, with the
hope of activating 'industrialisation supported by informatisation' in China. China
believes that through this developmental process, it gains a great opportunity to surpass
developed countries.
However, as I discussed in chapter 4, 'development' is by no means a single-dimension
concept. Development discourse has its historical and theoretical roots in both western
and third world countries. When 'development' emerged in the development studies
field, it referred to material improvement, especially economic growth. In the 1990s, the
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concept of development extended to focus on 'human development', citizenship and
other related terms. The discussion of the digital divide also extended to combine a
group of terms such as human rights, citizenship, and human development in the global
level. However, the discourses pertinent to TCT for development' and the digital divide
in China present a very simplified and one-dimensional image, in which national
development predominates.
The one-dimensional frame which is employed in tackling the digital divide represents
the challenge facing China, a developing country, and the national context of ICTs
development. In China, the uneven dual economies seem to be an obstacle to national
development. People in western China still live in poverty. They cannot even afford a
telephone. Therefore, the issue facing the Chinese government first of all is to get
villages connected to telephones, and the Internet would be next. It is within this
national context that China implemented the Cun Cun Tong Dianhua policy.
The investigation of Cun Cun Tong Dianhhua shows the following findings. First of all,
Mil, as the ministry responsible for this project, seems merely to care about the
penetration rate of telephone connections. The second point, which relates to the first
one, is that Mil cares about infrastructures rather than content, although it could be
argued that Mil is merely responsible for the infrastructure given the division of labour
among the government, and at this stage the infrastructure is the first step to bridge the
digital divide. However, it could also be argued that the fact that Mil is delegated to
implement this policy to a large extent reveals the Chinese government's expectation of
bridging the digital divide by providing technological/physical access as a developing
country. Physical access is a prerequisite to bridge the digital divide, but it should not be
the only barrier.
However, China's attempt to bridge the digital divide by means of the Cun Cun Tong
Dianhua faces the difficulty of lacking the related supporting mechanisms, for example,
the USF. In order to realise the policy objective of universal service in a narrow sense
and 'industrialisation supported by informatisatiori in a wide sense, Mil adopts a centralised
strategy Jen pian bao gan to set up the tasks for six telecommunications operators, which
distorts the telecommunication market in the environment of deregulation, competition,
and liberalisation. This also provides further evidence that the Chinese government's
determination to bridge the regional digital divide. In the next two Chapters, I will
examine the case of Taiwan; its national context is presented in Chapter 7 and the
empirical study in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 7
Taiwan's National Context for Bridging the Digital Divide
This chapter deals with the Taiwanese national contexts in which the digital divide and
corresponding policy are emerging. These domestic contexts discussed in the following
four sub-sections also provide the reasons behind the Taiwanese government's domestic
digital divide policy-making as well as its promotion of and participation in the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Digital Opportunity Centre (DOC) project.
Section 7.1 describes Taiwan's geo-economic structure in terms of regionally
unbalanced development, which serves as the initial reason for making digital divide
policy. Section 7.2 outlines the trajectory of economic development in terms of the
transition of economic structures, which represents another reason. Section 7.3
describes the power transition from the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) to
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which ascribes DPP the responsibility to improve
Taiwan's development status. Section 7.4 provides the history of how Taiwan's
international standing changes and its current situation, which provides the background
of Taiwan's promotion and participation in APEC DOC (ADOC). Section 7.5
concludes this chapter.
7.1 Geo-Economic Structure—Regionally Unbalanced Development
Taiwan is formally known as the Republic of China (ROC). Established in 1912, the
ROC was Asia's first constitutional republic. The ROC government, led by the
Kuomintang (KMT), relocated to Taiwan in 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) established the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland (GIO37, 2006).
With 22.8 million people living in an area of about 36,000 sq. km, Taiwan has a
population density of 631 persons per sq. km, making it one of the most densely
populated countries in the world. The population is concentrated on the western coast
around the metropolitan areas of Taipei in the north, Taichung in the centre, and
Kaohsiung in the south (GIO, 2006). The concentration of population in big cities
brings about the uneven regional development (MOEA, 2006),38 which is also reflected
in the penetration of ICTs. According to the 2005 Digital Divide Report, 'there were
57 The full title of GIO is 'Government Information Office', see page VII, List of Abbreviations..
58 http://investintaiwan.nat.gov.tw/zh-t\v/news/200611/2006110301.html. accessed on 17/07/07.
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significant differences in the opportunities for access to computers amongst individuals
in different counties and cities' (2005: 5). The Report shows the evidence that 'more
than 70% of people in Taichung City, Taipei City and Hsinchu City had access to the
Internet', 'while less than 55% and 50% of people in Chiayi County, Penghu County and
Yunlin County had access to computer and the Internet respectively' (2005: 5). Figure
7.1 shows the regionally unbalanced ICTs penetration in Taiwan.
Figure 7.1 Taiwan's Regionally Unbalanced ICT Fenetration (Source: Digital Divide Report 2005,
RDEC, Taiwanj
7.2 Economic Transformation and the Government's Emphasis on
'Informatisation'
This subsection presents the economic history of Taiwan, focusing in particular on two
significant economic transitions: the 1960s' industrialisation and the 1990s'
'informatisation'. The second economic transition is still ongoing and the difficulties of
economic transition are forcing the new ruling party DPP to look for ways to overcome
them. It is within this political-economic context that the Taiwanese government was
determined to make the digital divide policy.
7.2.1 1895-1945: the Colonial Period
Taiwan had been colonised by many countries, including Spain, Holland, and Japan,
before 1945 when Taiwan was governed by the ruling party KMT. During the period
1895-1945, Taiwan was a colony under Japanese authority, which made a crucial
contribution to Taiwan's early development and to agriculture in particular. As a result
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of 'the Japanese occupation from 1895 to 1945, Taiwan had a relatively modern
infrastructure in the form of roads, railways, harbors, and the like to build on' (Lau,
1986: 3).
7.2.2 1951-1965: US Aid
While the Japanese colonial era provided the foundation of Taiwan's development in
terms of the transportation infrastructure and agricultural economic structure, the US
helped Taiwan develop a rapidly industrialising economy in 1965 (Jacoby, 1966: 238).
When the Nationalist government moved to Taipei in 1949, the economy of Taiwan
was still recovering from heavy Allied bombing during World War II. Only some
industrial facilities remained intact. The US aid helped stabilise the situation and laid the
foundation for a future economic takeoff. From 1951 to 1965, large amounts of
economic and military aid came from the United States. Much of the aid was used to
improve Taiwan's infrastructure and the agricultural sector, which accounted for the
31.1% of all investment (Howe, 2001: 50). With domestic resources, the private sector
contribution was only marginally larger than the public one. This structure of
investment by resource was pardy a reflection of the Japanese period and its aftermath,
but also congruent with KMT philosophy which, following Sun Yet-sen, the founding
father of National China, had the preference of many socialist-oriented KMT
ideologues (Cheng, 2001: 28; Howe, 2001: 50). Therefore, during this period, the Taiwan
economy can be thought of as a transforming, semi-socialist economy supported by
American guidance and resources (Howe, 2001: 50).
The American influence in this period was exercised partly through institutions and US
advisors stationed in Taiwan, and partly through the role of American-educated
administrators and economists (Lau, 1986; Howe, 2001:49). The key institution founded
for the US aid included the Council for United States Aid (1948), the Economic
Stabilization Board (1951), later the International Council for Economic Co-operation
and Development, and the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction, later
transformed into a de facto ministry—the Council for Agriculture (Howe, 2001: 49).
Therefore, 'even after direct U.S. aid ceased in 1965, the United States continued to
contribute to the Taiwanese economy through trade, direct investment, technology
transfer, and the education and training of advanced students' (Lau, 1986: 3).
So far, it has been shown that the economic relationship between Taiwan and the US
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has been strong since the 1950s. In recent years, in terms of trading volume, in the first
half of 2004, Taiwan was the United States' eighth largest trading partner (behind
Canada, Mexico, China, Japan, Germany, Britain, and South Korea); its ninth largest
export market, and its eighth largest source of imports (GIO, 2004).59
7.2.3 1965-1981: First Economic Transition—Industrialisation
Land reform policies, in combination with economic assistance, facilitated Taiwan's
economic development. A further series of policies in the 1950s and 1960s then led to a
remarkable takeoff in the 1970s. The first was an import-substitution policy aimed at
making Taiwan self-sufficient by producing inexpensive consumer goods, processing
imported raw materials, and restricting other imports. Considering the relatively small
scale of Taiwan's domestic economy, the government adopted a second policy of export
promotion in the late 1950s that continued throughout the 1960s. Using Japan as a
model and following US advice, the resource-poor and labour-rich island began to
expand its light industries. Export-processing zones free of bureaucratic red tape were
set up with special tax incentives to attract overseas investment. Within a short time,
Taiwan had become known internationally as an exporter of products of which it was
the original equipment manufacturer.
Between 1962 and 1985, Taiwan's economy experienced its most rapid growth in history:
an average annual growth rate of nearly 10 percent, or more than twice the average
economic growth rate of industrialised countries during this period. Equitable
distribution of income was a major objective in the government's economic planning. In
1953, the average income of the top 20 percent of the population was estimated at 20
times that of the bottom 20 percent. In the 1980s, this 1:20 ratio was reduced to
between 1:5 and 1:4 (GIO, 2006).
A key element in Taiwan's steady economic growth was the implementation of universal
education throughout the island. After 1949, the government expanded education to
raise literacy rates. In 1951, 34.6 percent of the population of six years and older were
illiterate. This figure had dropped to 15.3 percent by 1969 (and to 2.84 percent of the
population over 15 years of age in 2004). In 1968, six years of compulsory education, a
right stipulated in the Constitution, was extended to nine years. Additional technology
and vocational colleges also met the needs of the industrial sector during the economic
takeoff (GIO, 2006).
59 http://www.taiwanembassy.orp7ct.asp?xItem=1 ]793&ctNode—2237. accessed on 08/11/07
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7.2.41980 onwards: A Second Economic Transition 'Informatisation'
Since the 1980s onwards, Taiwan has been facing a significant economic transition. In
1986, the Taiwanese government proposed a Plan for Economic Transition. During this
period, the developmental policy of Taiwan focused on the 'information industry', and
the government hoped that 'information industries' would lead to 'informatisation' and
then build 'an information society' or 'a knowledge-based society'. I am using quotations
when mentioning these terms because academically, they have attracted heated
discussion on the definition and implementation since the 1960s, and there is a need to
consider how they were being employed by the Taiwanese government. I will present
this observation in the below section. This also provides a background for
understanding the analysis of digital divide policy conducted in Chapter 8 in terms of
how it is employed in interpreting the digital divide in Taiwan.
7.2.4.1 1980-1989: Shaping a Shared Understanding of 'Information'. 'Informatisation'.
and 'Information Society' Accompanied by the Government and the Civil
Society
The public understanding of 'information', 'informatisation', and 'information society'
was initially shaped by the government. During the 1970s, Taiwan was facing many
difficulties, e.g. global energy crisis, global economic recession, Taiwan's leaving the UN,
and China's open-door policy, etc. This series of events forced Taiwan's officials to look
for a way forward for Taiwan, and during this period, the technological elite chose to
develop the electronic and semiconductor industries to boost Taiwan's economy. This
decision was taken at an inter-ministerial conference in 1976, whose topic was the
transformation of scientific and technological development in Taiwan. During the
conference, 'information industry' was being equated with the electronic and
semiconductor industry. Within this context, 'information' for the then Taiwanese
government was mainly denoted to hardware, instead of the content. Moreover,
'informatisation' under these circumstances was used to refer to the transition of the
economic structure from light and heavy industries to information industries; and
'information society' referred to 'a society where the adoption of computers is
spreading over everyday life' (Personal Interview, TW 07. November 2005).
The Institute of Information Industry (III) played an important role when framing the
image behind 'information', 'informatisation', and 'information society' in the 1980s.
The Institute was launched as a non-government institution in 1979, and according to
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the introduction on its official website, acts as 'a non-governmental organisation, jointly
sponsored by the Taiwan government and prominent private enterprises', and the
purpose of its establishment is to strengthen 'the developments of information industry
in Taiwan'. It further indicates that 'since its inception, III has been a source of vision,
innovation, technological excellence and a major contributor to Taiwan's development
as a significant player in the global ICT area. Whilst dedicated to reinforce industrial
development, III has also helped promote full utilisation of ICT technologies hence
advancing the establishment of modern information society development in Taiwan'.
From this introduction, the position and role of III in Taiwan's development in
'information' and 'information society' is revealed.
Furthermore, III took an important role in fostering Taiwan's informatisation in terms
of promoting the use of computers. In the publications celebrating its twenty-fifth
birthday, III evidenced its achievements in promoting Taiwan's informatisation. These
publications reveal that 'computer' was not an established noun in Taiwanese society
until 1979 (the year of the birth of III) and that III gave a uniform definition to it,
which has been widely recognised in media coverage and everyday life (Hung, 2004). As
argued in this book, before 1979, Taiwanese people had no definite ideas about
'computers'. It was in 1980 that, III for the first time hosted the event called
'Information Month' (jSflH^l), in which most internationally popular computer
companies gathered together in order to promote and sell their products. This event has
a long history and still takes place every year until now. According to Ill's statistics, there
were 19.81 million visit counts between 1980 and 2001 (UDN News, 24/08/2001),
which is only slightly less than Taiwan's population of 22.4 millions of 2001. Through
this event and its tide, computer and information has been connected in the minds of
the public. This reveals that for III, information is taken as 'hardware', and III highly
emphasises computers' role in 'informatisation'.
From the naming and interpretation, it also reveals Ill's highlighting computers' role. In
Chinese, the term 'computer' had two popular translations; one is based on the
understanding of a calculator in the industrial era, taking the computer as an advanced
calculator and therefore calling it 'electronic calculator' [dian yiji suan ji, III'jpH'PJffll)
literally. With more understanding about the functions of computers, it seems to people
that computers are like human beings' brains, but much more efficient and developed.
Nowadays, computers in both Taiwan and China, are translated as 'electronic brains'
{dian nao, fjtjj§j) in order to symbolise their many functions; the metaphor of a brain
will not die as long as it is plugged into a source of electricity. This interpretation
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represents Ill's exaggeration of a computer's functions. And this interpretation is clear
in the way that policy-makers develop digital divide policy as will be discussed in the
next chapter.
7.2.4.2 Policy Development for Promoting 'Information'. 'Informatisation' and
'Information Society'
Meanwhile, Taiwan's first science-based industrial park, the Hsinchu Science Park, was
also established to upgrade industries. Labour-intensive industries, once the mainstay of
Taiwan's economy, gave way to technology- and capital-intensive industries. In the 1990s,
the electronics and information-technology sectors expanded rapidly to become
Taiwan's main industries, accounting for more output and exports than any other sector
in the manufacturing industry. The service sector's performance during this stage was
outstanding, averaging an annual growth rate of 9 percent. All of these signs indicate
that a knowledge-based economy has taken root in Taiwan (GIO, 2006).
Immediately before this period, the Taiwanese government had initiated the 'Ten-Year
Plan for Economic Development' in the 1980s, which can be labeled as the period of
the First Ten-Year Plan. During this ten-year period, the production of information
technology achieved great performance in quantity and in reputation around the world
(Wang, 1995-1996: 558). In the subsequent decade of the Second Tenth-Year Plan, the
policy focus transferred from 'production' to 'application'.
The First Ten-Year Plan (10YP1, 1980-1989) specifies important implications for
Taiwan's development, and was 'the formative stage for Taiwan's information industry'
(Wang, 1995-1996: 558). It symbolised that the developmental focus of Taiwan was to
be transformed from traditional industries to information industries. During these ten
years, the Taiwanese government focused on hardware development in information
industries, and promoted the information and computer industries as 'strategic
industries' by means of special government assistance, e.g. granting preferential loan
services to computer-related strategic products (Wang, 1995-1996: 557). These efforts
made by the government eventually yielded positive outcomes in terms of the
quantitative improvement in productivity, as well as the increased value of Taiwanese
information products in the world market (Wang, 1995-1996: 558).
However, the development mode during these days mainly rested on overseas OEM
(original equipment manufacturer; manufacturer to specifications by purchasers). Many
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Taiwanese firms have become meshed in the global sourcing and subcontracting of
American multinational firms, serving as critical suppliers of key components and final
products (Simon, 1996:121). This means that Taiwan's manufacturers lacked the
innovation capacity to become a technological leader in the world during this period.
Taiwan's information technology development needed a boost and reorientation to
overcome this bottleneck. Under these circumstances, the Taiwanese government
transferred its development focus from hardware production and exportation to actively
promoting software and the national market to create an 'information society'60 (Wang,
1995-1996: 558). This was the motivation for the next ten-year plan—10YP2.
Meanwhile, during this period, Taiwan's economic performance was not as successful as
that during 1965-1981. Several reasons accounted for the ending of the successful phase
(1965-1981) during the late 1980s (Howe, 2001: 53-54; Cheng, 2001: 34). One was the
opening of China in 1988 that it enacted its Regulations for the Encouragement of
Investment by Taiwanese Compatriots (tong bao, |W|jJfg) (Howe, 2001: 52), which created
dilemmas of a new kind for Taiwanese industries (Howe, 2001: 53-54). This dilemma
stems from the positive and negative results of China's opening market to Taiwanese.
The positive perspective on this policy suggests that China's opening would help speed
trade, investment and technology transfer activities between Taiwan and China. The
negative perspective worries that much investment has been by small firms that have
restricted intangible assets and they need to migrate with and develop local networks. In
this case the hollowing out effects in Taiwan might be serious (Howe, 2001: 56).
A second reason for the reduced economic success in the later 1980s was that China's
opening occurred in tandem with regionalised production networks, which were driven
by demand in markets in Europe, the US and Japan (Howe, 2001: 54). Thirdly, in
1987-1988, the unprecedented 35% appreciation of Taiwan's currency, a result of
post-Plaza Accord currency alignment, forced the government to face the pressures of
liberalisation (Cheng, 2001:34). Fourthly, the US, a leading economic partner running
chronic trade deficits with Taiwan, asked for import liberalisation.
With the achievements made in 10YP1, as well as the difficulties that arose during it, the
Taiwanese government looked for solutions to these obstacles, and this served as part
of the reason for bringing about the Second Ten-Year Plan (10YP2, 1990-2000). The
most distinctive features of 10YP2 were presented in three dimensions. Firstiy, 10YP2
60 The quotation marks placed around this term have been inserted.
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did not only view the information industry as an important export leader, but
furthermore, charged this industry with the task of dissemination of information and
improvement of the quality of citizens' lives. Secondly, as already mentioned, the
development focus transferred from hardware to software. Thirdly, recognising that its
access to manpower gave Taiwan a unique advantage, the government targeted research
and development so as to fully utilise this resource.
Apart from the development of information industries, another crucial project in
Taiwan's informatisation was the development of Taiwan's National Information
Infrastructure (Nil). As soon as the US government proposed its Nil project in 1994,
many countries followed. Taiwan was no exception. Because Taiwan has been close to
the US in the recent history of its economic development, and because the US has
influenced Taiwan's economic and technological policy via the mechanisms built in the
period of US aid, Taiwan has adopted the idea of III from the US and mimicked it very
quickly. This can be seen from the time series of events. In 1994, soon after the US
proposed its Nil, the Executive Yuan asked economic- and developmental- related
ministries to collaborate to form a task force 'Nil Promotion Group', which included
the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), Ministry of
Transportation and Communications (MOTC), Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA),
Ministry of Education (MOE) and Research, Development, and Evaluation
Commission (RDEC). The KMT, then Taiwan's ruling party, proposed a similar national
plan tided 'National Infrastructure Initiative' in 1995 to make Taiwan one of the most
informatisatised countries in the world.
Later in 1997, a project addressed by the Executive Yuan entitled 'National Information
Infrastructure Initiative' was released. In 1999, Nil set the policy target of getting three
million households online in three years, and this policy predominately focused on
infrastructure provision. Afterwards, the government continued their promotion of a
'knowledge-based society', and the relevant training programmes for farmers. Although
the policy in relation to bridging the digital divide had been made clearer than before, a
comprehensive investigation of the digital divide was still lacking at that time.
7.3 New Power, New Task—Power Transition in 2000
From 2000 onwards, in a context of globalisation and trade liberalisation, as well as the
rise of neighbouring China as a new economic power, the Taiwanese government is
facing new challenges in terms of economic development. In response to this challenge,
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the government has taken concrete measures to upgrade Taiwan's industries, conducted
financial reforms to foster a more attractive investment environment, and promoted
environmental protection to achieve sustainable development. Development plans have
been formulated to transform Taiwan into a 'green silicon island' (GIO, 2006). Several
major construction projects are also under way.
The difficulties of the economic transition from industrialisation to informatisation
forced the government to work out a scheme of national development. Apart from the
economic transition, political power also underwent unprecedented transformation. In
2000 the ruling party DPP, for the first time, took over power from KMT which had
ruled Taiwan for half a century. Following its triumph at the presidential election, the
DPP leader was keen on proposing a national plan to upgrade Taiwan's informatisation.
Therefore, in 2000, the government proposed a national plan entitled Challenge 2008,
which set out the developmental objective for the period 2000-2008, aiming to build
Taiwan as the most advanced 'e-country'61 in Asia. Digital divide policy was later
included under the e-Tahvan project in this national plan.
The DPP government showed its determination to implement this national plan in
terms of setting up a new task force National Information and Communications
Initiative (NICI) in April 2001. NICI was designated to accomplish the following
missions: to accelerate the development of the IT industry, e-commerce and related
business; to improve the efficiency of government services; to promote Internet usage
and related applications; and to uplift the competitiveness of the Taiwanese IT
Industry.62 With the birth of NICI, the Nil steering committee was merged into NICI.
Figure 7.2 provides the comparison of Nil and NICI.
It was in 2001, when the Executive Yuan hosted a 'National Conference on Economic
Development', that the issue of the digital divide was first addressed explicitly; however
at this time the spotlight was still simply on the construction of infrastructures (Digital
Divide Report 2004:10).
61 In this term, 'e' is pronounced in English, which sounds the same as 'first/number one' in Chinese.
62 Source from NICI official website, http://www.etaiwan.nat.gov.tw/index.php. access on 12/12/2007.
Nil NICI
Year of foundation 1994 2001
Ruling Party KMT DPP
Chairman Executive Yuan Executive Yuan
Committee Members Council for Economic Planning Ministry of Interior
and Development Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of National Defense
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Ministry of Economic Affairs Ministry of Education
Ministry of Education Ministry of Justice
Research, Development, and Ministry of Economic Affairs
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• Directorate-General of Budget,
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National Youth Commission
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Research, Development and Evaluation
Commission
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Committee of Law and Regulations
City of Taipei
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Industrial Technology Research Institute
• Institute for Information Industry
NICI Civil Advisory Committee
Objectives The construction of Government with high efficiency
Information Superhighway Industries with high competitiveness
Upgrade national competition Information society with high quality
Upgrade living standards Universal applications of IT and






Provide a life-long learning
environment for citizens
Create a more participatory and
open democracy
Figure 7.2 Comparison between Nil andNICI (Source: Complied by the Author)
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7.4 Taiwan's International Standing63
The above sections provide a background to facilitate understanding of Taiwan's
domestic digital divide policy making. This section goes on to examine Taiwan's
motivation in cooperating with international organisations to help less developed
countries bridge their domestic digital divide and how this was influenced by Taiwan's
particular defacto international standing—no longer recognised legally internationally but
with substantial links with some international organisations and some states. The
detailed description and discussion of Taiwan's participation in international projects in
relation to bridging the digital divide will be provided in Chapter 8.
Although Taiwan has been frequently mentioned alongside three other Asian
settings—Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong—as 'four little tigers' for her
astonishing economic performance, Taiwan's political status in international
organisations has been hindered by China,64 e.g. Beijing has sought to exclude Taiwan
from membership of international organisations (Yahuda, 1996: 1328) after Taiwan's
leaving the United Nations in the 1970s. As Taiwan's former President, Lee Teng-hui
(1999) stated in a published paper, the people of Taiwan have long endured diplomatic
isolation, which essentially began with its expulsion from the United Nations in 1971.
Lee (1999) further explained that under pressure from Beijing, many countries were
forced to switch official recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Eventually, Taiwan was
gradually excluded from most international governmental organisations. Dropping from
37 in 1966 (Yahuda, 1996), Taiwan was holding full membership in 18 international
governmental organisations in 2003, most of which deal with regional agriculture,
economics, science and technology, (including the World Trade Organisation, Asian
Developmental Bank, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and Asian Productivity
Organisation). Additionally Taiwan has observer status in 10 world groups (Fanchiang,
2003).
Thus, in order to have presence at an international level, the Taiwanese government has
seized every opportunity to participate in international conferences to join projects that
63 The usage of this term refers to that used by Yahuda (1996). Is his paper, he states that using this
concept of 'international standing will be easier to examine issues that may take a legal form but are in
substance political, such as diplomatic recognition, membership of international organisations, base of
participation in international society and so on' (1996:1325). Because this section describes Taiwan's
difficulties in gaining membership into international organisations, the concept of 'international standing'
is suitable.
64 For detailed events, please refer to the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
http: //www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/lp.asp?ctNode=1174&CtUnit=:53&BaseDSD=7&mp=l. accessed on
08.07/2007
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assist other underdeveloped countries in tackling poverty. This strategy was proposed in
1973 when the then Premier Chiang Ching-kuo outlined a policy of 'total diplomacy',
calling for the mobilisation of all available resources including political, economic,
scientific, technological, cultural and sporting to develop substantial links with states
that had transferred diplomatic recognition to Beijing (Yahuda, 1996: 1330). The goal of
this strategy was not only to escape isolation, but also to use Taiwan's international
standing to gain political advantage (Yahuda, 1996:1330).
Since scientific and technological progress has long been represented as a central
condition for its standing and for its ability to compete internationally, Taiwan has
provided an extensive range of technical aid especially to countries in Africa and Latin
America (Yahuda, 1996:1332). In the agrarian and industrial eras, the Taiwanese
government actively sent agricultural advisory teams to developing countries, to equip
them with agricultural knowledge and help them develop agriculture to feed their people.
In the era of so-called informatisation, the Taiwanese government actively participates
in projects to help build a global information society. Figure 7.3 presents Taiwan's active
participation in APEC. Through the presentation of technological development and
through presence at international occasions, Taiwan is thus promoting her national
identity in front of other countries. The Taiwanese government has been investing
considerable resources in initiatives of global benefit, such as humanitarian aid and
measures to counter terrorism and international crime. Technology has been an
extremely important means by which Taiwan has sought to gain in status. This context
is reflected in Taiwan's proposal of ADOC and its enthusiasm to participate in building
ADOC in less developed countries, which will be discussed in Chapter 8.
Time Events
1989 The birth of APEC
1991 Taiwan joined APEC as a member
2000 New Economic Plan—Building a Digital Society
Taiwan proposed the 'Transforming the Digital Divide to Digital Opportunity'
project2001 E-APEC
2003 Taiwan proposed 'ADOC' project and implemented this project
Figure 7.3 Taiwan's Participation in APEC (Source: Complied by the Author)
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7.5 Conclusion
This chapter explored the national contexts within which the case study of Taiwan will
be analysed in the next chapter. I presented Taiwanese national contexts from many
different angles, i.e. geographical, political, and economic contexts and combined this
with a discussion of Taiwan's international standing in order to provide a background to
the discussion in the next chapter of how and why the policy-makers in Taiwan
interpret the digital divide and make digital divide policy.
With the presentation of the structural contexts, I described and synthesised the
geo-economic dimension in terms of Taiwan's developmental trajectory and pointed out
reasons why the Taiwanese government is keen on bridging the regional digital divide.
The geographical context provides an explanation for the phenomenon of the digital
divide between rural and urban areas, which is the most prominent digital divide in
Taiwan, when compared to other dimensions, i.e. gender, age, etc.
In Section 7.2, the discussion of the economic context divides Taiwan's development
stages into three main periods—agrarian, industrial and informatisation. I first revealed
how the Taiwanese government and the civil society organisation worked together to set
up a shared understanding of 'information', 'informatisation' and 'informatisation
society'. These interpretations reveal one of the main concerns of the Taiwanese
government in promoting 'informatisation', i.e. economic transition to upgrade Taiwan's
industries. Moreover, concerns about upgrading industries and overcoming economic
transition in turn enhance Taiwan's 'informatisation' along with the provision of policy,
infrastructures, education, etc. Therefore, the image of Taiwan's 'informatisation'
emerged as a means of achieving the economic transition from industrialisation to
'informatisation'.
Although the previous ruling party KMT had completed the main infrastructure for
informatisation, e.g. the Nil programme, the problems caused by unbalanced
development within the country have been emerging, creating the so-called 'digital
divide' (the definition of this term is to be discussed in the next chapter). This provides
the political context in which the digital divide policy is emerging. Therefore, the new
ruling party DPP has on the one hand been keen to look for a novel way to lead Taiwan
to survive the economic transition, and on the other, to tackle the deficits left from the
uneven development between areas.
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Apart from the national contexts, e.g. economic and political aspects, digital divide
policy for Taiwan also serves as a symbol that Taiwan has taken this global issue
seriously and Taiwan has the ability to solve this problem within Taiwan and to help less
developed countries. Coupling of national and international contexts, digital divide
policy is taken to be a political strategy to promote Taiwan's international standing. This
observation reveals that the digital divide is not merely a social phenomenon to be dealt
with, but also an opportunity for Taiwan to gain its international presence. Having
undergone certain historical events, e.g. losing membership of the UN, the Taiwanese
government is now seeking to improve its international standing via every possible
channel. Proposing and participating in ADOC is seized as a chance for Taiwan to gain
international recognition for its potential contribution to assisting less developed
countries in ameliorating their digital divides.
Thus, within the contexts summarised above, as well as the international contexts
mentioned in Chapter 4, the Taiwanese government made the e-Taiwan Programme to
promote advanced 'informatization', and the 'digital divide policy' was named and
implemented. However, what is worthy of note is that, within the aforementioned
national contexts, the participant ministries/institutes involved are more concerned with
the technological dimensions of the digital divide, and their main goal is to achieve a
painless, successful economic transition, making Taiwan an advanced country in the
information era. With the advancement of technological development, the Taiwanese
government further utilises its advatange in order to promote its international standing
in the world. This background understanding will underpin the analysis of the data
discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 8
Digital Divide Policy-Making in Taiwan
In contrast to China, the Taiwanese situation provides a less centralised model of digital
divide policy-making. This subsequently influences the order of this chapter. It shows
that the activities of bridging the digital divide were initiated by a non-government
institute, and that they came about before official digital divide discourses emerged. In
section 8.1,1 present the actions taken to bridge the digital divide before 2003. This year
is chosen as a watershed because the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS)
Phase One was held in this year and the Taiwanese government embarked on a
systematic digital divide policy immediately after the Taiwanese delegation came back
from WSIS. In this section I include the actions taken by the Institute for Information
Industry (III) to bridge the digital divide since the 1990s, the telecentres built by the
Research Development Economic Commission (RDEC) and the publications of digital
divide reports conducted by academic researchers. This indicates that the Taiwanese
government and Taiwan's civil society were aware of the issue of the digital divide
before the WSIS. Section 8.2 presents official digital divide policy commencing from
2003. Section 8.3 deals with the current project geared towards bridging the digital
divide—and especially the Digital Opportunity Centre (DOC), looking at the
implementation of policy, the actors participating in the policy implementation, and the
debates between actors. Section 8.4 draws attention to an Asian regional
project—APEC Digital Opportunity Centre (ADOC), scrutinising how the Taiwanese
government utilises this chance to promote its international standing. Section 8.5
concludes this chapter.
8.1 Actions Taken to Bridge the Digital Divide before 2003
This section firstiy looks at a less centralised model (comparing to China) in addressing
the digital divide by III since the 1990s onwards. Secondly, it analyses the Telecentre
project held by RDEC in 1999. Then, it investigates the digital divide reports conducted
from 2001. All of them took place before 2003 when the Taiwanese government
officially made the digital divide policy.
8.1.1 A Less Centralised Model in Addressing the Digital Divide by III (1990s)
As mentioned in Chapter 7, with the domestic contexts of economic transition and the
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government's emphasis on 'informatisation' in the 1980s and the consequent
responsibilities for developing information industry, III has been playing a major role in
promoting the use of computers for the public and trying to create an 'information
society' (the definition of this term was mentioned in section 7.2.4) for Taiwan. From
the 1990s on, as Ill's publication mentions, III has explicitly paid attention to the
phenomenon of 'the digital divide'. As what III understood at this time, the 'digital
divide' was caused by 'uneven development of ICTs' between areas, and the way of
reducing this gap was to take actions in terms of providing technology access (Hung,
2004: 7).
In Taiwan, lshu wei luo cha' is used as the translation of the digital divide in order to
indicate a 'difference' between groups in adoption of the ICTs. This difference is not
unbridgeable, but marks a figurative difference between groups. Another possible
translation of 'divide' has been discussed in Chapter 6: the Chinese government selected
'honggou' for 'divide'.
A natural disaster in the late 1990s increased Ill's determination to promote the use of
ICTs. The fatal earthquake on 21st of September, 1999 ('921 earthquake'65 for short)
provided further impetus for III to equip people in remote areas with information
technology. This group of people depends mainly on agriculture and thus lost both
their properties and their means of generating income through the earthquake. Ill was
fully aware of the despair caused in the wake of the earthquake and therefore began to
recruit volunteers from universities to build computer centres to help rural residents use
computers and the Internet. Ill hoped that the farmers could utilise the Internet to sell
their products online and also rebuild the local economy. Thus, the digital divide issue
was closely interwoven with the reconstruction of the remote counties that had suffered
from tremendous destruction during the earthquake.
Another motivation to bridge the digital divide in remote areas came from Taiwan's
entrance into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. After entering the WTO,
Taiwan's farmers struggled in the force of competition from low-price imported fruit
and other agricultural products from other countries. As noted in Chapter 7, there exists
regional disparity within Taiwan. People living in remote areas of Taiwan earn their
65 The earthquake occurred on the 21st of September, 1999, which was referred as 921 by Taiwanese
people. The quake's major impact was in the mountain region in the centre of the island. According to the
BBC news report on the 28th of September, 1999, the official death toll stands at 2,105, with 8,713 people
injured, 141 missing or trapped and 100 stranded in remote areas after one week since the event took
place, http://news,bbc.co.uk/I /hi/world/asia-pacific/460170. stm. accessed on 17/07/07
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living from agriculture. Suffering from the '921 earthquake' as well as from competition
following Taiwan's entrance to WTO, the farmers in remote areas are concerned for
their future. The combination of these two important historical events has made III
much more concerns about how to connect ICTs to farmers' daily lives, and to make
ICTs helpful in their daily life.
From the above discussion, it is clear that the actions to bridge the 'digital divide' were
taken a long time before the government developed official digital divide policy.
Additionally, this reveals that before the US started to publish its five digital divide
reports, the idea of a 'digital divide' had emerged from a non-government organization
even though the term 'digital divide' was not cultivated at that time. Finally, the
definition of the digital divide during this period overwhelmingly focused on access to
technology, and this definition was influenced by Ill's goal of promoting computer use.
This definition is now used in digital divide policy-making but has attracted much
criticism from within academia, which will be shown later in this chapter.
8.1.2 Telecentres by RDEC (1999)
A short while after III began actions to bridge the digital divide, RDEC began to build
telecentres in remote areas in 1999. This is the earliest initiative that I have identified as
geared to inclusion taken by the government. Telecentres were the form of initiative
embraced in the general expectation of 'ICT for Development' at its height around
2000 (Personal Interview, TW08. November 2005), which were also built under the
names of multipurpose community telecentres, public Internet access points, or
information kiosks (Bailur, 2007).66 This initiative was at its height before Taiwan's
explicit digital divide policy was developed. This also coincides with the observation in
section 8.1.1 that Taiwan was taking actions to bridge the digital divide before this term
'digital divide' was imported from the US and used in policy-making.
The launch of telecentres was included in the e-government programme, which was the
responsibility of RDEC from the late 1990s onwards. In tandem with the e-government
programme, telecentres provided venues for people without computers and the Internet
to go online and have one-way or two-way communications with the government. The
telecentre programme has undergone two stages. The first stage was initiated in 1999
with the project budget US$ 1.1 million under the Nil Promotion Programme. RDEC
66 More history of telecentres development can be found in Bailur, 2007.
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finished the development of 141 telecentres in remote areas67 in 2001. The second
stage began in 2002, under the scheme of Challenge 2008: National Development Plan, and
RDEC continued to develop 71 telecentres in 2003. The telecentres exhibit two models:
one was called the 'PC-model', providing personal computers, printers and web-cameras
for the residents; the other one was called the 'I<losk-model', equipped with a
wall-mounted Internet computer similar to a public telephone. RDEC in the first stage
adopted centralized management but only 30 out of 141 telecentres survived by the end
of 2002 due to the difficulties facing this project, such as costly maintenance fees,
improper operation and lack of collaboration with local communities. In order to solve
these difficulties, RDEC decided to transfer the responsibility for implementation to
local government bodies. Additionally, private businesses participated in this project to
provide personal computers and other equipment (Lin, 2005).
8.1.3 Digital Divide Reports (since 2001 onwards)
Since RDEC became aware of the issue of the digital divide, it started to delegate to
academics to conduct national surveys on the digital divide in Taiwan from 2001
onwards. These digital divide reports symbolise the perception of the digital divide as a
problem worth noticing and in need of resolution by the government. The first survey
was conducted in 2001 and the first report published in 2002. Up until 2006, five
national digital divide reports have been published.68 During the course of the surveys,
the internationally changing definitions of the digital divide have been employed, and
the results of these surveys serve as references for digital divide policy-making (Personal
Interview, TW02. November 2005).
Other countries' methods of measuring the digital divide were drawn upon when
researchers embarked on conducting these surveys (Personal Interview, TW01. March
2005; Personal Interview, TW05. November 2005). In the very early stage of conducting
surveys, researchers reviewed a wide range of literatures from Asian countries (e.g.
Japan, Korea, and Singapore), EU, and the UK. In particular, they gained a very
comprehensive understanding of the US's measurement (Personal Interview, TW01.
March 2005). This shows that Taiwan not only aligns with external definitions of the
digital divide, but also with ideas about how it might be assessed. Such a move may
67 The definition of remote areas in this initiative is 'the total number of remote villages is 702. Each
village or borough owns a small territory normally with population under 1000 in rural areas' (Lin, 2005:
4).
68 The five reports can be accessed on the official website of RDEC,
htrp://www.rdec.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=19790&CtNode=:8706. the latest access on 11 /09/07
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mean bringing in ideas about the dimension of the digital divide. Taiwan also takes on
board that there is a gender divide in this period, which figured highdy in the US and
EU discussion. This is also an indicator of the influence of international discourses, as
well as a shift from concern with physical access to focus on use of ICTs. This shows
that the researchers learnt from other countries that I mentioned in Chapter 2 as 'social
learning'.
However, these researchers were not sadsfied with what they had learned from the
measurements of the US. The researcher continued,
We found that the measurement the US took then was not sufdcient to
comprehensively represent the problems. Concern about access does not
fully sketch out the problem of the digital divide. We found that it was
necessary to add something to the measurement based on Taiwan's
context, e.g. high penetration rate of Internet use. (Personal Interview,
TW01. March 2005)
This view implies that the applicability of one concept exported from other countries
needs to be taken into more consideration if it is to tit into the national context. The
idea of domestication described in Chapter 2 is applicable in understanding this change
in measurement of the digital divide. In this case, the researchers who conducted digital
divide reports have referred to a generic measurement of the digital divide adopted by
the US, which represents the first element involved in the idea of
domestication—selective uptake of generic prescription (Brosveet and Sorensen, 2000;
Williams, 1999). Moreover, the other element of the idea of domestication, which is
adapting the generic prescription to local circumstances, is also embodied here since the
researchers noticed that 'it was necessary to add something to the measurement'. Once
recognising this need, the researchers started to make what, in their opinion, was a
suitable measurement for Taiwan. As another interviewee stated,
We found the emphasis should be put on 'application', i.e. the
'behaviour' aspect. The fundamental infrastructures are well-built in
Taiwan; therefore we now should pay attention to 'e-impacfi, a concept
that was appropriated from EU. EU emphasises e-medicine, and Taiwan
should also pay attention to this aspect. As far as Taiwan is concerned,
its uniqueness is its development of e-government, a field which has
gained great progress, and good performance in public engagement.
(Personal Interview, TW06. November 2005)
The changing views in Taiwan also mirror the critiques discussed in Chapter 4 of early
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concepts of the digital divide, e.g. too much emphasis being placed on access to
technology. When the first survey was published in 2002, the digital divide had complex
definitions. The researchers who conducted this first survey stated in the report that:
The definition of the digital divide was not comprehensive. Therefore,
we expanded the dimension of access to two sub-concepts—access to
the Internet, and Internet users' behaviour. Then we brought in the idea
of 'information literacy' to include three sub-ideas—general literacy,
information technology literacy, and Internet literacy. However, these
two ideas—information access and information literacy—are not
confined to the resources one holds. On the contrary, we will develop
these two concepts to analyse how individuals apply information
technology in his/her daily life and workplace (2002 Digital Divide Report,
p. 5).
Here, the researcher separated the idea of information from the technology, which for
III has been used in the 1980s and 1990s. The dimensions of measurement have more
or less changed from the first report in 2002 to the latest one in 2006, corresponding to
what the researcher told me during the interview that 'the meaning of the digital divide
is not only diversified, but changing' (Personal Interview, TW06. November 2005). As
mentioned earlier, the researchers took a two-dimensional measurement of the digital
divide in the first report—information access and information literacy, which
highlighted the concern extending from 'access' to 'literacy' (2002 Digital Divide Report).
This pioneer report concluded by suggesting that there was a close connection between
ICTs skills and traditional literacy and media literacy,69 which were further developed by
the following surveys.
Drawing on suggestions from the 2002 report, the 2003 report was published, and
adopted a broadening and delicate four-dimensional measurement. The
four-dimensional measurement spanned two sections—'information possession' and
'information application'. Under the section of 'information possession' are
'information access' and 'information literacy'. Work application and learning' and
'daily-life application' are put under the section of 'information application'. The
expanding of the dimensions of the measurement indicates that the definition of the
digital divide was proliferating and changing. After the second report was published, the
dimensions of measurement have remained fixed.
69 Traditional literary in this report encompasses the abilities of language competency in listening,
speaking, reading and writing as well as numerical skills. And media literacy refers to the ability to employ,
interpret, evaluate, analyse and produce media contents.
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8.2 Systemic Policy to Bridge the Digital Divide since 2003 onwards
Digital divide policy is included in the e-Taiwan programme in terms of the subsection
of e-opportunities in 2003. This e-Taiwan programme puts ce' in front of each
subsection, and particularly emphasises the technology itself. This 'e-everything'
(Dutton, 2005: 16) programme seems to hold the very hope that the answer to the
problems of development can be found (Heeks, 2002: 1) with the adoption of ICTs.
Prior to investigating digital divide policy in section 8.3, there is a need to look overall at
the e-Taiwan programme.
8.2.1 e-Taiwan Programme
In May 2002, NICI and a group of ministries, e.g. Ministry of Education, Ministry of
Economics, worked together to launch the e-Taiwan programme under the Challenge 2008
Plan and it immediately became a major component in this national development plan,
which is revealed by the integration of a wide range of resources from multiple
government agencies. Figure 8.1 presents the budget for bridging the digital divide in
2005-2008, which shows an increasing trend. The policy titled with an English 'e' has
double meanings. One indicates that the goal of this policy is to develop a digitalised
Taiwan, and the other lies in the fact that the sound 'e' (in English) means 'number
one'/'first'/'best' (in Chinese), thus indicating that Taiwan attempts to become the best
country in the information era.
In 2003, after hearing the report by the Taiwanese delegation that had attended WSIS,
the Executive Yuan Premier instructed all governmental agencies to work actively to
eliminate the digital divide in Taiwan. Figure 8.2 presents the executive sequences for
bridging the digital divide. One of the participants who attended WSIS in 2003 recalled,
It was after 2003 that the officials who attended WSIS were impressed [...].
They thought that WSIS was such a crucial summit as more than sixty
national leaders attended, and more than two hundred and fifty ministries
coming from so many countries. Therefore, they immediately drafted a
proposal to the then Premier. (Personal Interview, TW02. March 2005)
As a result, it was in 2003 that a policy with the name of bridging the digital divide was
formally developed and put under the scheme of the e-Taiwan programme. This is the
first time the Taiwanese government made a policy clearly announcing that it aims to
bridge the digital divide. Thereafter, in March 2004, the Bridging the Digital Divide Initiative
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was put into practice. In order to show its determination, the government listed this
Initiative under the scheme of the e-Taiwan programme (the hierarchy of Challenge 2008
Plan, e-Taiwan, and Bridging the Digital Divide Initiative is presented in Figure 8.3). The
central project in bridging the digital divide was carried out via the launch of DOC, of
which I provide a detailed analysis in section 8.3.
As its official website shows,"1 the e-Taiwan programme is focusing on designing and
planning programs for the development of the nation's information and
communications infrastructures and applications. According to the policy text of the
e-Taiwan programme, it is directed to an infrastructure-based national development, as
shown in the extract below:
It includes infrastructure, industrial development, application, and
demand. The most important aspect of infrastructure development is
to establish an information and communication environment for
installing broadband Internet in every household. It is expected that
six million households in Taiwan will enjoy the convenience of
broadband Internet by 2008. The major effort in application and
demand will promote the use of the Internet in government, business,
and society to expand local market demand and upgrade relevant
industries. This plan will transform Taiwan into to a high-tech service
island. (The website of e-Taiwan Programme, English version)71
The original framework of the program was constructed around five major pillars:
Infrastructure, e-Society, e-Industry, e-Government and e-Transportation. The e-Taiwan
programme has been regularly submitted to progress reviews and has been revised
according to changing requirements and conditions. Since June 2004 when Premier Yu
Shy-kun recommended that e-Taiwan programme bring greater benefit and convenience
to the public, several key applications including tele-working, healthcare and
e-governance have been planned which adopt a more user-oriented approach in
expanding the content of e-society initiatives. In addition, e-Transportation was
included under the e-Society pillar.
Furthermore, cultural perspectives and universal access to technology have been
incorporated into a new component of the e-Taiwan Program, the e-Opportunity plan. The
e-Opportunity plan is part of the changing focus of the e-Taiwan programme, which is
intended to contribute to bridging the digital divide. The subsection of e-Opportunity
70 http://www.etaiwanexpo.nat.gov.tw/english/l-origin/ori-l.asp
71 http://www.etaiwanexpo.nat.gov.tw/english/1 -origin/ori-l.asp. accessed on 12/12/2007.
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forms the core initiatives of the e-Taiwan program, with the aim of swiftly bringing the
benefits of ICTs to everyone in Taiwan.
In regard to the aim of e-opportunity, it is further composed of three
sub-sections—bridging the digital divide between rural and urban areas; bridging the
digital divide between industries; helping other countries to bridge the digital divide.
Since 2005 onwards, the government provided a total budget of US$ 0.22 billion for the
following four years to complement this Initiative via economic, educational and social
dimensions. It is hoped that under the e-Taman programme, the government will build
three hundred DOCs in the four years 2005-2008 throughout Taiwan.
Year Amount Note
2005 2.97 The budget was cut by the Legislature Yuan to US$ 1.9 million
2006 5.60
2007 6.252008 (h25
Figure 8.1 Budget of National Expenditure on Bridging the Digital Divide hj Year (unit: US$




The establishment of a single planning and regulatory unit
The measurement of the digital divide and the evaluation of
effects of related plans




E-government service and promotion




ICT application in small and medium
enterprises
"Figure 8.2 Fin's Executive Sequences for Bridging the Digital Divide (Source: Fin, 2003: 50;
translated by Hung, 2004: 19)
Figure 8.3 e-Taiwan Programme Structure (Source: e-Taiwanprogramme website)72
72 http://www.etaiwan.nat.gov.tw/content/application/etaiwan/egenerala/guest-cnt-browse.php?cnt id—
779. accessed on 12/12/2007.
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8.2.2 Dominant Discourses in the e-Taiwan Programme
In Chapter 2, I discussed that policy-makers will make claims to frame the problem.
This section, I synthesise three types of discourses the Taiwanese government used to
emphasise the necessity of ICTs, the first two of which present the myth of
technological determinism discussed in Chapter 2 as well as in China's case study in
Chapter 6. The third one corresponds to Taiwan's current international standing as
mentioned in Chapter 7.
8.2.2.1 National Competitiveness
'National competitiveness' is a repeated concern in the policy text of e-TaiwanP In the
first place, the policy text Challenge 2008: National Development Plan emphasises the
important role played by electronics, information, and telecommunications
infrastructures in human society. It states that 'the technological revolution steered by
ICTs has revolutionary influences on economics, society, and culture' (Challenge 2008:
National Development Plan, p. 155). It then further states that 'Taiwan now is facing the
challenges stemming from the global economic recession and industry transferring
abroad, therefore how to best utilise ICTs to enhance innovation and application to
upgrade industrial competitiveness and build a high-quality "e-Taiwan" turns out to be a
crucial and urgent issue' ('Challenge 2008: National Development Plan, p. 155). Thus, 'the
objective of e-Paiwan is to advance Taiwan as a country with a knowledge economy, to
promote the competitiveness of industries, and to build an efficient government, which
will eventually make Taiwan the most advanced country in Asia'{Challenge 2008: National
Development Plan, p. 15 5).
Regarding the strategies this programme outlined, it is clear that infrastructure is the
tool which the state expected to use to build Taiwan as a digital island, helping it to
become the most advanced country in Asia. This expectation can be seen in the
statement that 'this programme hopes to build an e-Taiwan via a comprehensive
economic developmental plan, achieve the goal of Taiwan as a high-technology service
provision island, and promote Taiwan as the most digitalised country in Asia' (p. 155).
In this programme, the Internet was taken as the main driving force to further Taiwan's
entrance into the global economy, 'directly challenging the traditional economy
supported by capital and labour'. It further suggested that in such a global economy, a
73 For example, Challenging 2008: NationalDevelopment Plan, 2003: 155, 158, 164.
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knowledge economy supported by knowledge, ICTs and speed will become the
determinant factor driving national development.
When previous policy texts are considered, it is clear that the goal of building Taiwan as
a digital technology centre under the e-Taiwan programme, i.e. High-Tech Service Island,
is not novel. The ongoing, but suspended national programme 'Asia-Pacific Regional
Operation Centre' (APROC)74 serves as the best example that the Taiwanese
government has persistently made efforts to survive in the ever more challenging
economic environment facing Taiwan in the era of globalisation. APROC was first
initiated in 1995 when KMT was then the ruling party. However, the progress was
judged to have been unsatisfactory, therefore when DPP gained power, APROC was
suspended.
The aforementioned 'centres' the Taiwanese government has been eager to build (either
APROC or the current High-Tech Service Island under the e-Taiwan programme) have
several things in common. First of all, these plans place a great deal of emphasis on
infrastructures. Secondly, they are concerned more with national competition than social
development or the development of individual citizens. This observation echoes the
evidence from the introduction to APROC which states that 'the six centres will stand
upon solid foundations laid over many decades of successful economic development
that have seen Taiwan transformed from an agricultural backwater to a modern
industrial society and a significant player in global trade'.73 Therefore, it seems that the
high-ranking digital divide policy-makers care about the digital divide because they
define it in a particular way, i.e. in terms of economic growth, and that they focus on
how to develop advanced infrastructure in order to bring about economic development.
8.2.2.2 Social Development
In addition to concern about national development in policy texts, the implementation
of digital-divide policy draws attention to the social level, concerning regional equality.
This concern is based on an understanding that the digital divide is rooted in
socio-economic status. As the official of RDEC stated, 'the bridging is to reduce the
74 APROC aims to develop Taiwan into an Island of Science and Technology that is also a gateway to the
Asia-Pacific region, the market of markets of the 21st century. It consists of six centres—the
Manufacturing Center, the Sea and Air, transportation Centers, the Financial Center, the
Telecommunications Center, the Media Center. More details please refer to official website of APROC,
http://www.cedi.cepd.pov.tw/aproc/html/links el/2.html, accessed on 17/07/07.
75
http://www.cedi.cepd.gov.tw/aproc/html/links el/2.html. accessed on 17/07/07.
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original divide' (Personal Interview, TW08. November 2005). The original divide he
mentioned is the regional divide, as he described, 'the people living in remote areas can
hardly have the same opportunity as those staying in urban areas'. Therefore, in his
mind, 'the government should connect the digital divide policy to what the rural
community needs' (Personal Interview, TW08. November 2005). He also connected
social development with community development in bridging the digital divide. The
spirit of digital divide policy in social development is illustrated in the policy I am going
to present in section 8.3.
8.2.2.3 International Standing of Taiwan
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Taiwanese government has made efforts to
participate in international activities via providing non-official diplomatic assistance to
less developed countries in order to improve its poor international status and foreign
relationships. In the 2000 APEC, the Taiwanese representatives submitted a proposal
entided 'Transforming the Digital Divide to Digital opportunity', which was taken to be
a successful programme. As far as Taiwan's current diplomatic situation is concerned,
APEC is one of the few international organisations that Taiwan can officially participate
in and share experiences with leaders from other countries. Additionally, because APEC
particularly focuses on economic issues, Taiwan can avoid sensitive political blockage
and present its technological and economic performances in front of other Asian
countries. Therefore, in this sense, the meaning of the 'digital divide' is not only a
national issue awaiting the policy to tackle it, but it is also a means for Taiwan to gain
international presence.
8.3 Case Study: Digital Opportunity Centre (DOC)
8.3.1 Introduction to DOC
The proposal of DOC was raised in APEC in 2002. It is based on the premise that
connectivity and direct access to information will lead to empowerment, capacity
building and development (Bailur, 2007). The advocates committed tremendous
resources to develop rural community information access centres in terms of rural
information kiosks and telecentres that provide access and training to ICT users as a
direct conduit to the information society (Aalami and Pal, 2005). This explains why
telecentres and DOC are functioning and implemented in rural and remote areas.
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In Taiwan, the project of 'bridging the digital divide' is inspired by the idea of
collaboration between relevant official agencies to build a united one. The DOC project
was not included in the e-Taiwan programme when the e-Taiwan programme was drafted
in 2002. Only after the NICI directive community proposed the completed Bridging the
Digital Divide—a Dour-Year Project was it put under the e-Taiwan programme in 2004. The
Computer Centre of MOE was assigned to take responsibility for developing DOC in
remote areas, which project is entitled, Plan of Creating Digital Opportunity for Kemote
A.rea.i(' In this plan, 'DOC is an avenue which provides local people with computers
and Internet access. It is hoped that by means of the provision of computers and the
Internet, people living in remote villages can have the convenience of connecting to
cities and furthermore, to the whole world'.77 The target groups that this project aims
particularly to help are those situated in remote areas.
8.3.2 Technology-Oriented Participants Involved in the Implementation of DOC
The goal of the e-Taiwan programme is connected to the ministries that participate in
policy-making and implementation. The ministries involved in digital divide policy to a
very large extent are concerned with technological development and economic
development, and the staff has technological backgrounds. This explains why the
implementation of DOC has focused on physical access. In the current section, I
provide evidence of the scientific and technological backgrounds and concerns of the
ministries involved in digital divide policy implementation. In section 8.3.3, I will then
go on to outline how this focus on technology access has generated debates between
policy-makers.
8.3.2.1 NICI
As I described previously, building Taiwan as an e-country is the main task undertaken
by NICI. Under the umbrella plan of e-Taiwan, bridging the digital divide is one of the
main tasks NICI is in charge of. Three years after the foundation of NICI, in 2004 the
former committee 'The Instruction Committee for Bridging the Digital Divide' was
dismissed and replaced with the 'e-Taiwan Office' under NICI.
Under the structure of NICI, the 'e-Taiwan Office' is composed of forty members,
eighty percent of the staff is on secondment from other institutes and organisations,
76 (chuang tsaopien shiang shu wei chi hut tui tung chi hud)
77 DOC brochure published by Ministry of Education, accessible on http://itaiwan.moe.gov.tw/
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such as National Science Council (NSC), Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI)
and III; most of the staff are from III. The educational backgrounds of most staff are
purely science and technology based,™ as one reflects the institutes or organisations
with which they are affiliated.
NSC was established in 1959 and led by a Minister and three Deputy Ministers. The
Council is presently the highest government agency responsible for promoting the
development of science and technology, which is one of the main tasks of NSC. Apart
from this main task, NSC also contributes to the support of academic research and the
development of science parks.79
The other organisation, ITRI, founded in 1973, has the following responsibilities—1) to
engage in applied research and technical services to accelerate the industrial
development of Taiwan; 2) to develop key, compatible, forward-looking technologies to
meet industrial needs and strengthen industrial competitiveness; 3) to disseminate
research results to the industrial sector in a timely and appropriate manner, in
accordance with the principles of fairness and openness; 4) to foster the technological
development of small and medium-sized businesses, and cultivate industrial
technological human resources for the benefit of the nation.
8.3.2.2 III
III and NICI to a very large extent can be considered as a twin mechanism, because
most staff of NICI is recruited from III. The employees' backgrounds of III may have
crucial influences on the implementation of digital divide policy. It also reveals one of
the reasons why digital divide policy focuses on technology access. According to Ill's
website, it shows that III is a huge body with nearly 1,500 professionals for promoting
Taiwan's informatisation and half of them have science and technology backgrounds
(34% with ICT, 10% with Electronic Engineering, and 6% with other Engineering), and
29% with business management (see Figure 8.4).
78 Personal Interview, Jia-Shih Yang, on secondment from NSC.










Figure 8.4 Ill's Employees' Educational backgrounds by Discipline (Source: III official website,
http://www.iii.org.twl etiglish/about_employee.asp)
8.3.2.3 Computer Centre of MQE
Through the history of the development of the Internet in Taiwan, MOE has occupied
a central role in the promotion of computer- and Internet-relevant training programmes
in all-level schools. The Computer Centre was established in August 1982 on the
approval of the Executive Yuan. It comprises four divisions—education and training,
research and development, data processing, and research services. At first, its main tasks
were to promote the computerization of MOE administration, improve administrative
efficiency, and raise work quality, which were the internal focus of Computer Centre of
MOE.
Over time, the Centre's responsibilities have been increased and adjusted. In February
2005, the Centre was reorganised and changed into six divisions—information
education, digital infrastructure, information systems, digital learning, digital resources,
and information management. After many years of development in conjunction with the
evolution of public information systems, the centre now serves the MOE, its affiliated
agencies, and schools of all levels. From computerisation of administrative affairs,
promotion of information education and web learning, to the establishment of campus,
inter-school, international networks, the Centre has established an integrated
information service system of comprehensive education administration and an academic
R&D environment.
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One of the missions of this Centre is building and developing 'Digital Opportunity
Centres' (DOC) to bridge the digital divide between rural and urban regions. Other
missions include narrowing the digital divide between urban and rural primary and
secondary schools, enriching educational resources of primary and secondary schools in
remote areas; training and running college and university e-service volunteer groups;
enriching digital teaching resources of primary and secondary schools in remote areas;
and training teachers from remote areas and offshore islands via e-learning.80
8.3.3 Debates between Actors
In Chapter 2, I have discussed the term 'interpretive communities' from Yanow (2000).
Yanow divided the interpretive communities into policy-makers, implementers, and
users. Here, I refer to this term but make revision to analyse the policy-makers in digital
divide policy in Taiwan. I categorise it into three groups: the policy-makers with top
positions in the government, the policy implementers, and the academic researchers
who conducted digital divide reports for the government's reference when making
policy at different levels. These groups of actors have all debated the development and
implementation of digital divide policy. I will present these debates with the storylines
they frame.
8.3.3.1 Debates on Digital Divide Discourses
Human Rights on the Digital Divide Discourse bj Top Officials and Tolicy-Makers
When the e-Taiwan programme was developed in 2002, policy discourses do not suggest
any connection between the digital divide and human rights. It is after the WSIS in 2003,
that 'human rights' discourse on bridging the digital divide was developed and soon
spread to top governmental officials in Taiwan. Here, the influence from the
international context is clear. At present, two main enthusiasts are promoting this idea.
One is the deputy-director of III, Huang Guo-jun,81 and the other is the vice-President
Lu Hsiu-lien. Both of their 'Human Rights' perspectives on the digital divide were
80 http://english.moe.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=579&ctNode=363
81 This seems contradictory to the background and position of III in bridging the digital divide via
promoting access to technologies, since the deputy-director of III has different opinions about digital
divide policy implementation from his colleagues. However, there does exist debates inside III. The
current deputy-director of III has educational backgrounds both in science and social science, and has
adopted a more philosophical perspective on the way of bridging the digital divide. His background
explains his quick adoption of the new idea from WSIS 2003. This observation arose during the course
of data collection.
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informed by the idea proposed in the 2003 WSIS, which connected Human Rights to
the digital divide. With the appropriation of Human Rights discourse to the issue of the
digital divide, Lu was able to connect her longstanding support for human rights with
the digital divide issue. In a public speech, she stated that:
ICT should be exploited as a 'social equaliser' that enhances the social
fairness and social inclusiveness towards a better society, not the other way
around. It is emphasised that the 'digital divide' is not just a technological
problem, but also a social one. It needs to be resolved by grass-root social
movements. The goal of these joint efforts by the domestic and
international communities is to achieve an inclusive e-society of full
e-readiness with citizens of advanced network literacy, to realise (digital)
human rights for all. (Vice-President, Lu Hsiu-lien, 2004, on the annual
conference of Democratic Pacific Union)82
The twentieth century is an era of digitalisation. Technology has become the
prime productive force and information is the driving power for the new
economy. With the coming of the knowledge-based economy, digital
property has surpassed all traditional resources and accelerates the uneven
development between the North and the South Therefore, bridging the
digital divide will enable all peoples, races, nationalities, gender, religions and
etc. with equal opportunities to access information. This is the realisation of
'digital human rights' (Vice President, Lu Hsiu-lien, 2004, Annual
Conference of Democratic Pacific Union).
With the Internet occupying people's daily lives, the government now emphasises
'information rights', which is a similar idea to the right to work, to freedom, etc.
promoted in the past. When the government prioritises 'human rights', it will no longer
judge things from a cost-benefit perspective, but will adopt a more open and
harmonised perspective to include every citizen into the information society (Director
of RDEC, Yei Jun-rong, 31/10/2005, United Daily).
Why do we have to pay attention to the issue of the digital divide? In terms
of the political and economic conflicts taking place internationally or locally,
the uneven development between the North and South, East and West,
originated with the industrial revolution. While human beings' productive
force was emancipated by the industrial revolution, negative results also
followed. Nowadays, the information revolution has brought about similar
uneven development to that of the industrial revolution'.
82 The manuscript of this speech was drafted by the then Deputy Director of III, Huang Guo-jun
(Personal Interview, TW07. November 2005).
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Debates between Researchers and Implementers
Additionally, from my interviews with people in NICI drafting the e-Taiwan programme
and researchers who conducted the surveys, there exist different views concerning the
definition of the digital divide as well as the implementation of digital divide policy.
Officials in NICI explain:
We defined the digital divide as 'who is willing to use ICTs, but cannot.
At this current stage, we are mainly concerned with "access". Under this
definition, dropouts are not counted in'. (Personal Interview, TW02.
March 2005)
However, this definition from NICI attracted criticism from some researchers
responsible for digital divide reports. They regard the digital divide as a literacy problem,
and they argue that physical access now in Taiwan is not the main cause of the digital
divide. As an interviewee said,
Our survey found that sixty percent83 of Taiwanese households are now
connected to the Internet. Access to technology' is not the issue in
Taiwan, but 'literacy' is. That is so-called 'Internet literacy'. (Personal
Interview, TW01. March 2005)
This interviewee continued to complain about the 'misunderstanding' of the digital
divide by technocratic officials, saying how his proposed project to address human and
skill aspects was declined. He said,
We drafted a project, proposing to look at Internet literacy in terms of
the dimensions of attitude, skill, knowledge, and identification.
However, this proposal was turned down by technocratic officials.
They are simply concerned about how to build more infrastructures.
(Personal Interview, TW01. March 2005)
After outlining disagreement about the interpretation of the digital divide between
those working in NICI, the interviewee who conducted the 2002 Digital Divide Report
shared his/her observations on the digital divide in Taiwan, and proposed the concept
'information agent' for gaining a better understanding of the digital divide. S/He said,
83 This interviewee conducted the 2002 Digital Divide Report. The data s/he provided indicated the
household Internet penetration rate in 2001. According to the latest report published in 2006, the
household Internet penetration rate has risen up to 70%.
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Currently in Taiwan, the concept of the digital divide needs to be focused
on 'technology for what?' rather than access anymore. That is, the
relationship between the Internet and its convenience for daily life.
According to our survey, some respondents reported that they did not use
the Internet on their own; but they intended to ask their children to book
train tickets online for them. This is the idea of an 'information agent' we
developed. In this case, should the parents who do not use the Internet on
their own but do benefit from the Internet be counted into the
phenomenon of the digital divide? Our concern is that, if we address the
digital divide from the angle of 'technology for what', then they should not
be counted in. Therefore, we suggested the idea 'information agent' when
making and implementing the digital divide policy. (Personal Interview,
TW01. March 2005)
The concept of 'information agent' was invented in the UK only a few years ago. For
example, Stewart (2002) found that one of the reasons that people do not adopt ICTs is
they can rely on others to gain access to the information and services it provided. From
the above extract, it is shown that the interviewee (the researcher who conducted the
digital divide reports) had noticed the phenomenon in non-adoption of the Internet in
Taiwan. However, when I passed on the above critique to respondents working for the
government, s/he defended the government's position and gave feedback as follows,
In fact, there are still some backward areas in Taiwan, where 'the
access to technology' still bothers them. For example, the aboriginals
always complained to us that they had no broadband to connect to the
Internet. We did try our best to help them via cooperation with
private operators; however the expensive cost was unaffordable either
for the aboriginals or private operators. As a matter of fact, the
difficulty we are suffering from now is not merely the infrastructures,
but the over complicated software. (Personal Interview, TW02. March
2005)
8.3.3.2 Debates on Implementation of DOC
The community ICT centres, either in the name of telecentres or DOC, are
administered by different ministries. Because of this, debates arose between the
different ministeries concerning implementation and resource allocation. As described
previously, debates about how to deal with the digital divide emerged from the divergent
opinions on the interpretation of the digital divide and its relationship to 'development'.
Two kinds of community ICT centres are currently administrated in Taiwan. One is
activated in terms of telecentres by RDEC, as I described in Chapter 7 when
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introducing the digital divide policy participants; and the other is DOC. The history of
DOC in Taiwan may be divided into two stages in terms of the institute/ministry in
charge of the implementation. Before the official digital divide policy was made in 2003,
the building and implementation of DOC was the responsibility of III. After 2003
when WSIS was held, high-ranking governmental officials were impressed by the appeal
of WSIS, therefore digital divide policy was officially made by the government. Since
then the divergent expectations of the way DOC should be managed have led to
disagreements between ministries/agencies.
Since the digital divide policy was formalised by the Taiwanese government in 2003, the
responsibility for building and maintaining the DOC has been transferred to MOE. The
decision to transfer this responsibility was made because MOE provides the funding. As
mentioned above, the Taiwanese government did not provide a special pool of money
for implementing this policy. The result is that MOE which did have money/resources
to allocate has the power to decide the direction and method of bridging the digital
divide between rural and urban areas.
The DOC programme is under the supervision of NICI technically, however, the real
power of implementation is held in the hands of MOE, the ministry with money to
implement this policy. This tricky relationship between policy supervisor and policy
practitioner may create a point of conflict between participants in this policy and
consequently impacts on implementation. Additionally, although most of the staff in
NICI is recruited from III, with scientific and technological backgrounds, the deputy
director with a background in science and social sciences has different ideas on the
implementation of digital divide policy.
The interviewee, the Deputy Director of NICI, expressed his complaints about this
policy saying that,
Although the policy was made immediately after approval by the President,
there was no special budget allocated for this policy. The budget was
squeezed out from limited budget of the ministries that are assigned to be
responsible for the policy. It made the ministries unhappy with this because
the budget was extremely tight. In this case, without an added budget to
implement this policy, it will have no effects at all. (Personal Interview, TW07.
November 2005)
This interviewee pointed out the key difficulty in implementing this policy—where is
the money going to come from. Figure 8.5 shows that the money was going straight to
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the implementers, and MOE was having more budget than other ministries in bridging
the digital divide. This concern further relates to another key point that which ministry
has the power to decide the method of implementation. This may also partly answer the
question I will ask later about why the discourses of the digital divide have diversified
and advanced in parallel to those of international organisations, but yet implementation
in Taiwan is still concentrated on the stage of technology access. I will return to this
enquiry later.
This approach focusing on 'access to technology' has been criticised for two reasons.
One is an over-emphasis on technology provision; the other is about the
post-procurement issue, e.g. maintenance. Regarding the first criticism, one interview
said:
The method of MOE bridging the digital divide is similar to the policy of
'extending domestic demand'.84 MOE is just like a cash machine to benefit
those involved in DOC. However, they have no idea of what the digital
divide is; let alone how to bridge the digital divide. (Personal Interview,
TW07. November 2005)
Regarding the second critique, another interviewee mentioned:
Maintenance is another problem which needs to be addressed. As far as the
digital divide is concerned, the computer firms play an important role.
Because our policy is focusing on technology access, we need technology,
here the computers, to give people in remote areas access. As I know, the
private computer firms are very willing to assist this policy. They donated
second-hand computers or out-of-fashion computers. However, after
checking all those donated computers, only half of them were found to be
workable. The expenditure required for maintenance is a crucial issue.
(Personal Interview, TW01. March 2005)
This second criticism reveals that the policy predominandy focuses on the basic physical
access, therefore the implementers are mainly concern about the provision of basic
equipment, even though the computers donated by the computer firms are not properly
working.
84 During the period of the Asia Crisis taking place in the later 1990s, the Taiwanese government adopted
the idea of the economist Keynes to overcome the economic difficulties. His theory asserts that more
public spending will stimulate more domestic demand. As a result, the domestic economic performance
will be improved. This approach later became a joke between policymakers in Taiwan because the
government asked each ministry to propose a new development plan to spend expenditure, which
eventually turned out to be a money-spending competition. Nowadays, when policy-makers mention this
term, they for most of the time use it in an irony way.
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Ministry Note
Ministry of Education By 2004, the government provided subsidy for telecommunication
connection for schools in remote areas. However, it was spread over
and hidden in other items than 'bridging the digital divide'.
From 2005 onward, an official huge amount of national expenditure
was targeted to bridge the digital divide, i.e. US$ 78 million in 2005.
Ministry of Economic Affairs There was no national budget on bridging the digital divide by 2004.
In 2005, a budget itemed 'Bridge the Digital Divide in Industries' was
announced, US $2.25 million.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs A secret budget, which is used to subsidise less developed countries in
bridging the digital divide, and hidden in the subsidy of those less
developed countries. The amount is not huge.
Figure 8.5 National Expenditure on Bridging the Digital Divide by Responsible Ministries (Source:
NICI, data collectedfrompersonal interview on 03/16/2005)
8.3.4 Gap between Policy Discourse, Policy Texts and Policy Implementation
In the above sub-section, the debates between policy-makers were revealed. This
subsection deals with the gap between policy discourse, policy texts and policy
implementation. First of all, as mentioned above, the framework of human rights
appears in the public speech by high-ranking officials. However, in investigating the
policy text, the human rights framework is not present yet. Here, a gap between policy
discourse and policy text is emerging. As the debates discussed earlier highlight, it is
found that the current debate on the digital divide still centres on over-emphasising the
provision of technology to citizens.
Secondly, another gap is found between the policy texts and their implementation.
According to the definition of the digital divide in this project, the digital divide is
assumed to be 'a social phenomenon stemming from information technology
development. It is the differences between those who have the ability of using
computers and the Internet and those who do not'. 83 It further explains that these
differences are socially embodied in difficulties in accessing the information, rare
educational opportunities and job opportunities, low income, etc.
85 The official proposal of Bridging the Digital Divide between Rural and Urban Areas, 2005: 2, conducted by
MOE.
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The aim of this project is to complete 168 DOCs within four years during 2005 and
2008. It emphasises the following four dimensions, which encompass a range of
methods to bridge the digital divide. These range from technology access to literacy,
from cultural development to economic development. According to the brochure of
this project, it states the following goals:86
a. Infrastructures: Providing remote areas and minorities with Internet
connections; promoting Internet penetration rates to bridge the digital
divide.
b. Digital Competence: Equipping residents in remote areas, minorities
and aboriginals with digital literacy and competence, and improving
the educational and economic environment in remote areas to provide
human resources.
c. Culture Literacy: Equipping residents in remote areas with digital
technologies; helping them to develop local culture, digital culture and
digital communication to transmit culture and promote sustainable
development.
d. Digital Economy: Assisting residents in remote areas to promote their
ability to utilise information; promoting and developing industries with
local characteristics to vitalise local economies.
However, the policy implementers implicidy indicate the digital divide as 'physical access
to the Internet'. Below is the example:
[...] the unbalanced development of information technology and the
Internet brings the digital divide. The divide between rural and urban areas
is widening. According to the survey conducted last year, the Internet
connection rate of urban areas is three times the rural areas, which indicates
the marginalisation of the remote areas (UDNNews, 2005).
Another example of the practical implementation is as follows:
We built DOC either in the computer lab of the middle schools or in the
community centre. Additionally, we have some private donors to lend us a
room for setting up DOC. Regarding the management of DOC, we asked
every citizen to sign their names, the duration they used the computer and
for what reason they used it. This is also part of the evaluation to make sure
DOC is for best practice.87 (Personal Interview, TW05, March 2005)
86 The brochure was collected during the course of the interview.
87 Bailor (2007) synthesizes three key issues around the design of public Internet access—sustainability,
impacts and best practice.
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This shows that a shifting agenda exists between policy formation and its
implementation. During the policy formation, the goal includes more than technology
access, however, people involved in implementation also need to address issues as
confronted by users. This may provide one of the explanations as to why the
implementation of digital divide policy focuses on technology access.
The other reason may be stemming from the implementers. Although NICI is
responsible for digital divide policy-making, the Computer Centre of MOE is in charge
of implementing this policy. The deputy-director of NICI, as an agency technically
supervising MOE in implementation, in practice has no power to decide policy
implementation. Here, power means the allocation of budget. NICI as a task force is
responsible for policy-making. However the central government does not have a special
budget for bridging the digital divide, and the budget for bridging the digital divide is
allocated in an individual ministry. Therefore, without real power in controlling budget,
NICI has only the administrative power to coordinate the digital divide policy-making
when there are different opinions in the implementation of digital divide policy from
some NICI officers. This may explain why there is gap between policy text and policy
implementation.
8.4 Taiwan's Participation in ADOC Project: Promoting Taiwan's
International Standing
The ADOC programme serves as an example that embodies the aforementioned
discourse 'international standing of Taiwan' in section 8.2. To seize the opportunity for
Taiwan's national presence and participation in international/regional occasions, the
delegate of Taiwan, Lee Yuan-tseh, proposed an APEC Digital Opportunity Centre
(ADOC) Programme at the 2003 APEC Leaders' Meeting. The proposal was approved in
the Meeting, and the Taiwanese government subsequently proposed a detailed plan to
activate this programme, which is called 'Telecentre Development Programme'. ADOC
'will serve as a platform for examining digital opportunities and policy positions among
APEC member economies to expand digital capability and skills'.88
Concerning the ministries in charge of the ADOC project, it implies that this digital
divide policy was driven by political interests. The ADOC programme was initially
drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then implemented with the Ministry of
88 'The Establishment of the APEC Digital Opportunity Centre (ADOC)', Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation, proposed by Chinese Taipei. Senior Officials Meeting I, Santiago, Chile, 03/03/2004.
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Economic Affairs. Drawing on its fruitful experience in carrying out e-government,
RDEC also participated in the ADOC programme in terms of taking the responsibility
for implementing the 'Telecentre Development Programme' from April 2004 onwards,
which was an 18-month programme. According to the programme, the priority was to
train officials in developing countries who are in charge of e-government policy.
Afterwards, RDEC was assisting these well-trained officials to build telecentres in their
countries. Thus far, RDEC has already assisted six countries to carry out ADOC
programmes by training over 8000 information experts for these six countries—Chile,
Indonesia, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, and
Vietnam. The budget of this programme is about US $2.6 million per year, which is also
provided by the Taiwanese government.
Why is the Taiwanese government happy to spend time and money on those developing
countries? The answer is apparent for the Taiwanese people, as stated by the Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yang Tzu-pao that' the proposal of ADOC not only wins
friendship from APEC member states, but also upgrades Taiwan's reputation' (website
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs). He described ADOC as 'a from-zero-to-hero
programme, which does not spend much money but will result in great achievement'
(NSC website).89
8.5 Conclusion
Interpretative policy research indicates that the discourse of policy problems will impact
policy-making and implementation. This implies that policy-making and implementation
occur in accordance with the discursive framing of policy problems. However, this
approach does not acknowledge that in some cases policy actions may occur in the
absence of already framed policy discourses.
The finding of this section shows although the Taiwanese government initiated an
official digital divide policy in 2003, actions had already been taken to bridge the digital
divide from the early 1990s. This finding further shows that although the Taiwanese
government had noticed this issue, it was not until the term was popularised worldwide
that their determination to address it was enforced. This shows that policy discourses
always build on prior internal discourses/traditions. They necessarily involve a
combination of existing/emerging, internal/external discourses. There will however
89 http:/ /www.nsc.gov.tw/techl /ct.asp?xltem=0951120005&ctNode::::591&lang=C. accessed on
02/07/2007.
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have been earlier discourses in the policy communities that emphasised the goals of ICT
adoption and uptake. In this respect, inclusion initiatives emerged from preceding
national discourses prior to WSIS.
Moreover, the Taiwanese government made its official digital divide policy as soon as
the 2003 WSIS was held. This speedy adoption from the international organisation
demonstrated that the concern of the digital divide from the WSIS is corresponding to
that of the Taiwanese government. In addition to this, the Taiwanese government is
seizing this opportunity to strengthen its international standing.
In this chapter, I presented the understanding of the digital divide by the policy-makers
from their very early stage of involvement in the digital divide policy. There is a
spectrum of understanding of the digital divide amongst policy-makers. On the one
hand, it is shown that there exists confusion concerning what the digital divide is. On
the other, interview data also shows that some policy-makers do embrace recent
alternative frameworks on bridging the digital divide, i.e. human rights, even though this
perspective is still in its infant stage in spite of being hody debated in the two-phased
WSIS.
Additionally, the data shows that there is a debate between policy-makers, implementers
and academics on the understanding and interpretation of the digital divide. Simply put,
policy-makers and academics are concerned to map out generic goals and visions whilst
policy implementers—usually at the lower level—must engage with practical user
problems. Therefore, unlike academics, implementers do not pose a comprehensive map
of frameworks on the digital divide, they proceed by developing specific policies and
initiatives within the realm of their own institutional remit. Then they learn from other
countries. There is also an issue that what counts as success may differ between
policy-makers (policy that was seen as successful) and academia (theory that was seen as
successful). This may be the reason why the interviewees are divided into three groups
and have debates when expressing their understanding of the digital divide.
The way of understanding and interpreting the digital divide subsequently has impacts
on the method of policy implementation. This has resulted in another debate between
policy-makers. However this can be seen as the continuation of the debates between
those doing policy implementation and those doing surveys. The debates between
different participant ministries/institutes stem from regarding the digital divide as
merely a technological divide or as the result of deeper social inequalities (e.g. inequality
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inherited from industrial society). In Taiwan's case, the former view seems to dominate
policy implementation despite the fact that the latter view, e.g. 'human rights' is
promoted by the Vice-President Lu. This also relates to the ownership of resources for
the implementation of digital divide policy. This finding shows that the interpretive
approach does not exclude the possibility that there are discourses that are not being
initiated in policy making.
In this chapter, I also mentioned the ADOC project despite the fact that it is not
directly related to bridging the digital divide within Taiwan. However, the ADOC
project exemplifies the impacts of discursive frameworks on policy-making and
implementation. Since Taiwan is keen to improve its national presence in international
organisations, ADOC is a rare opportunity, and the Taiwanese government is pleased to
fund less developed countries in their attempts to bridge the digital divide. In this case,
the digital divide for Taiwan is not only an issue pertinent to national development or
human rights, but a political metaphor representing the possibility of gaining




This chapter attempts to compare and analyse the development of digital divide policy
in China and Taiwan as was described in the empirical chapters. Since the concept of
both external and internal contexts is highlighted in this thesis, this comparison will
examine the impact of each on digital divide policy-making in the case countries. It is
assumed that similarities could be found in comparing the cases of China and Taiwan
under the same external contexts (especially international policy discourses on the digital
divide). Moreover, the similarities could also be found when considering certain
challenges facing China and Taiwan, e.g. economic interests. However, when the local
contextual factors are taken into consideration, e.g. respective political and economic
contexts in China and Taiwan, a greater variation between these two settings may be
expected.
Following this strategy of comparison, section 9.1 evidences how contexts matter in
digital divide policy via provision of two figures (see Figure 9.1 and 9.2) showing the
flow of initiatives from international to national levels. Regarding this international
context, I provide an overview of dimensions of comparison for this chapter (see
Figure 9.3), which divides the comparison into five facets—national contexts, policy
formation models, framings of the digital divide, actors, and policy outcomes. Each
facet will be analysed in one single section. Section 9.6 concludes this chapter.
9.1 Contexts Matter
This section analyses how contexts, at both international and national levels, matter in
digital divide policy-making in China and Taiwan. It firstly documents external
influences on China's and Taiwan's digital divide policy development by examining the
temporal flow of initiatives and policy discourses. Secondly, it analyses (using specific
examples) how China's and Taiwan's digital divide policy, was inspired by their respective
indigenous contexts.
9.1.1 External Influences on China's and Taiwan's Digital Divide Policy Development
9.1.1.1 Documentation via the Temporal Flow of Initiatives
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According to the findings of the empirical chapters, those international initiatives and
discourses that relate to the digital divide and to digital divide policy have a direct impact
on China and Taiwan's digital divide policy development. Exogenous factors provoked
the Chinese and Taiwanese governments to address the issue of the digital divide and
make the specific digital divide policies that this research investigates. Figure 9.1
provides an external top-down model to present this influence. As mentioned in
Chapter 4, competition concerning ICTs from the US and EU has fostered an
exogenous context for China and Taiwan to develop their respective national
Nil/Information Society initiatives. Additionally, the initiatives originating from the
Nil/Information Society in developed countries in the mid-1990s, not only made the
Chinese government fear that they would lose again in the information era, but also
gave it a chance to catch up with advanced countries.
Regarding the impacts that international initiatives have on China and Taiwan, Figure
9.2 (synthesised from Chapter 4, 6, and 8) conveys the temporal flow of initiatives. It
presents the timetable of initiatives (NII/GII, IS/GIS, DD) from international level
(US, EU and the international organisations) during the early 1990s to 2005 to national
level (China and Taiwan), from which we can see the top-down succession of policies
from global to national levels.
First of all, China and Taiwan followed the Nil initiative soon after the US and EU
embarked on their information infrastructure programmes in 1993/4. China began its
Nil in terms of 'Golden Projects' (see Chapter 1 and 4) in 1996 and Taiwan in 1994
(see Chapter 4). This shows the process of convergence, arising perhaps through
mimicry of policies developed in other countries and through alignment of views
(Williams, 1999: 11). In terms of the goals of these initiatives, they 'seem to be united in
their resort to arguments about the competitive necessity of not being left behind in the
technological competition' (Williams, 1999: 11).
After the US published its first digital divide report in 1995 and attracted the attention
of international organisations, individual countries (in my research China and Taiwan)
also turned their attention to the digital divide. The Chinese government coined a
Chinese term equivalent to the digital divide in English in 1998, and a series of relevant
policies to bridge the digital divide have been developed since then. The Taiwanese
government also developed related policy to bridge the digital divide, and from 2003
onwards, official digital divide policy (i.e. policy titled with the term 'Digital Divide') has
been implemented. Secondly, policy-makers practise social learning via a number of
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channels—personal communications with elite experts from other countries in
global/regional conferences, emailing after conferences; looking at the policy texts on
other countries' websites regarding the issues at stake. Thus, international projected
ideas of WSIS etc. can flow to national policy-makers.
9.1.1.2 Documenting the Flow of Discourses
Regarding the impacts that international initiatives have on China and Taiwan, the
findings show that the perceived importance of ICTs for economic regeneration and
competitive advantage is reflected in numerous pronouncements of politicians and
policy-makers (Loader, 1998) in China and Taiwan.
The concepts of the development of Nil, Information Society and Global Information
Society, along with the succeeding initiatives held by international organisations on the
digital divide, provides some continuity with the relationship that is believed to exist
between ICTs and 'development' (a term which will be analysed in section 9.3.1.2). The
logical causality resides in the idea that ICTs have the potential to aid development;
therefore, failing to utilise ICTs will hinder development. The 'digital divide', in this
context, needs to be bridged to facilitate development. Beneath this idea lies a deeply
held faith in the ability of ICTs to change society, which echoes arguments I have
characterised as 'technological determinism', as critically discussed by STS (see Chapter
2). However, this is not to suggest that the policy-makers should not prioritise
development but the assumed linear relationship between technology and development
needs to be considered more carefully. Taking this view of the relationship between
technology and development for granted ignores the insights of STS, which has shown
that technology is socially shaped.
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Nil/Information Age ► Information Society
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Globalizing Digital Divide Discourses (1998 onwards)
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9.1.2 Digital Divide Policy Inspired within Indigenous Contexts
In cross-national comparisons, nationally contextual variation always forms a large part
of the explanation (Tilly and Goodin, 2006). In this section, with the combination of
empirical and theoretical concerns already provided in the earlier chapters, brief
accounts are provided of national contexts in China and in Taiwan based on Chapter
5-8 in order to offer a map (see Figure 9.3) for comparison in the following sections.
9.1.2.1 China's National Context
As far as the indigenous context is concerned, political and economic concerns and
China's socialist tradition provides an explanation for the way in which digital divide
policy has developed. Indigenous pressures stem from a historical context in which
China has lagged behind advanced countries , and the geographically and politically
produced regional disparity between western and eastern/coastal areas, which has
exacerbated China's unbalanced economic development between regions (see Chapter
5).
It is within these national and international contexts that the Chinese government has
devoted attention to the development of informatisation software since the Sixth
Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) and telecommunications service since the Ninth Five-Year
Plan (1996-2000) onwards. The building of telecommunications infrastructures began
much earlier under the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) (Shen, 1999). The focus on the
development of ICTs also arose because of three relevant beliefs. First of all, with the
discourse TCT for development', 'officials recognise that telecommunications facilitate
economic growth and are central to the modernisation ambitions of the Chinese
government' (Yu et al., 2004: 721). Secondly, since 'the digital divide is a barrier to
development' (see Chapter 6), removing this barrier via using telecommunications will
facilitate development. Thirdly, bridging the domestic digital divide can prevent China's
lagging behind advanced countries and bridge its divide with other countries, i.e.
bringing the international divide via reducing the domestic divide. Therefore, the
Chinese government is geared towards bridging the divide between rural and urban
areas. In tackling this issue, the Chinese government reshuffled the telecommunication
sectors, which took place earlier (in the first half of the 1990s) than the first
reorganisations of governmental sectors in 1998.
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9.1.2.2 Taiwan's Context
Taiwan was equally under-developed in 1948 but followed a very different economic and
political trajectory from China. Though part of an overlapping prior history, Taiwan is
sharply different from China in terms of the size of its territory and population,
economic and social development, foreign relationships, etc. Though economic
development in Taiwan occurred earlier than in China, Taiwan faces its own unique
difficulties in dealing with the digital divide; the issue of the digital divide exists in every
country, no matter how developed it is. The disparity of development between different
regions still poses a challenge to the Taiwanese government in the information era.
However, the motivation of the Taiwanese government in making digital divide policy
not only lies in the perceived phenomenon of the digital divide, but also stems from
other concerns. First of all, concern about economic growth was foremost when the
government made the e-Taiwan programme, which is part of its digital divide policy. The
power shift in 2000 also contributed to the making of digital divide policy, giving the
new ruling party DPP a chance to lead Taiwan in overcoming the botdeneck of
economic transition from an industrialised economy to an informatisation economy.
This new government is facing economic pressure that has resulted from the growing
number of Taiwanese manufacturers relocating to China. Thirdly, the political structure
of the international stage provides Taiwan with an incentive to take action in
international organisations. China has prevented Taiwan from entering some
international organisations (e.g. the UN), so the Taiwanese government is keen to find
shelter where it can, via its highly developed technology (its listing as one of the Asian
Four Little Tigers provides evidence for this) and help less developed countries to
eliminate poverty and tackle the digital divide. The project of ADOC described in
chapter 6 exemplifies this goal.
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9.2 Policy Formation Model
Figure 9.4 below seeks to summarise China and Taiwan's digital divide policy formation
models, although it may not present a complete picture due to limited number/range of
interviewees. Based on the available data, the figure shows that China's digital divide
policy development is a centralised model because, as mentioned in Chapter 6, from
naming to policy implementation, the government has played the crucial role. The
Taiwanese model is less centralized because the government only just created a digital
divide policy in 2003, following an action taken by a non-government organization (III)
in the 1990s.
Centralised DD Policy Model: China Cess-CentralisedDD Policy Model: Taiwan
Figure 9.4 Comparison of China's and Taiwan's Internal Digital Divide Policy-Making Models
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However, if the international context is also included in the comparison of China and
Taiwan, they present a more similar policy model in digital divide policy making. They
are both influenced by exterior contexts, e.g. Nil/Information Society and thereafter
the digital divide framings from the US, EU, and international organisations, which
shows that they are influenced in a top-down manner by more developed countries.
9.3 Framing the Policy Problem
This section deals with how the policy problem is framed at the national level. Section
9.3.1 compares the framing process. Section 9.3.2 analyses the dominant perspective on
the digital divide—technology-driven perspective.
9.3.1 Framing Process—Domestication
9.3.1.1 Differences in the Process of Naming the 'Digital Divide'
Chapter 6 showed that China has taken a centralised approach to naming the 'digital
divide'. Chapter 6 also provided a detailed description of the process of defining the
digital divide, including how a Chinese term was chosen to indicate the phenomenon of
the divide, and who participated in the process. Most importantly, the process displayed
the Chinese government's determination to tackle the digital divide. The Chinese
government is ideologically committed to equality; however it is currently also extremely
concerned with economic growth. The process also elucidates how a definition of a
policy problem in an authoritarian country occurs via a centralised process.
In contrast, the case of Taiwan represents a less centralised process in defining the
digital divide. As presented in Chapter 8, the process of defining the digital divide and
policy-making in Taiwan has been somewhat different from that in China. The first
difference comes from the acquisition of the term in Chinese. As mentioned above, the
Chinese government held a meeting to choose a Chinese term for the divide, and
adopted a centralised path in making policy. In contrast, the phenomenon of the digital
divide in Taiwan was first perceived by a non-government organisation, III, and the
Taiwanese government did not provide an official Chinese term in making the policy.
On the contrary, the definition was fostered and revised via III and research reports by
the civil society, i.e. academic researchers.
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9.3.1.2 First Level of Domestication: Linguistic Appropriation—Choosing Different
Chinese Terms for the Digital Divide
The term 'digital divide', for both China and Taiwan, is imported from outside their
countries. In dealing with a foreign term and a novel concept for policy-makers, China
and Taiwan focus on different aspects. In China, policy-makers spent considerable time
in deciding on a Chinese term to name the digital divide (see Chapter 6), but there was
very little debate within the policy-makers about the meaning of the term. In contrast,
Taiwan did not make efforts to find a unified Chinese term for this issue, but followed
what III used to name the digital divide in terms of shu mi luo cha in Chinese. However,
in Taiwan, a heated debate has developed between actors concerning the meanings of
the digital divide (for a detailed analysis, see section 9.3.4).
In China, the government selected the Chinese term 'shu %i honggou' from several others
to indicate this disparity embedded in the Chinese context. The Chinese term 'hong gad
is used as a metaphor as discussed in Chapter 6, to indicate an unbridgeable gap
between a divided area. The Chinese government adopted this translation to symbolise
the current phenomenon of the national digital divide in China. In Taiwan, 'shu mi luo
cha' is used as the translation of the digital divide to indicate a 'difference' between
groups in adoption of the ICTs. This difference is not unbridgeable, but a figurative
difference between groups. These two Chinese terms reveal how huge the divide is in
policy-makers' minds. The one used in China indicates that this is a very big gap that
may be very difficult to bridge; the one used in Taiwan reveals the existence of a
difference between groups, but does not indicate that the gap is huge or that it may not
easily be bridged.
However, the consideration (in China) and debates (in Taiwan) on the naming and
definition of the digital divide have centred on the 'divide' without questioning the term
'digital'. This implies that they both take for granted that the 'digital divide is a technical
issue' (Gunkel, 2003; Warschauer, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; van Dijk, 2005). Furthermore,
'people framing the digital divide as a technological problem suggests that access to the
technology concerned is able to fix existing social problems, among them problems of
social inequality, democracy, freedom, social relationships, and community building (van
Dijk, 2005: 5).
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9.3.1.3 Second Level of Domestication: Fit it to National Policy Discourses
Expectations of ICTr in China and Taiwan
a. National Competitiveness and leapfrogging
Concern within advanced countries has tended to be directed towards the perceived
need to avoid falling behind the countries whose economic development is driven by the
development of ICTs (Loader, 1998). Less developed countries have the same worries.
Therefore, politicians often use the rhetoric of global economic competition to
legitimatise, either privately or publicly, the state's intervention in the issue of the digital
divide (Servon, 2002). In China's and Taiwan's cases, this rhetorical strategy is also
employed in terms of 'national competitiveness' according to their respective national
contexts.
As mentioned in the previous section on contexts, the Chinese government is keen to
catch up with and leapfrog advanced countries in the era of the information revolution
by grasping the opportunities created by ICTs. Thus, calls not to lose again in the third
industrial revolution are clear in the speeches of national leaders (see Chapter 6) and in
the interviews that I conducted with policy-makers. For Taiwan, the idea of national
competition via the development of ICTs is presented in terms of Taiwan's becoming
the Asia-Pacific Digital Centre. Although China and Taiwan seem to have different goals
in bridging the digital divide, they do have a similar hope, which is presenting and
showing their advanced ICTs development to the outside world.
In Chapter 4, I discussed how the meaning of 'ICT for development' has changed over
time in global organizations from emphasising economic development (nation-centred)
to human development (people-centred). However, in this research, it is found that both
China and Taiwan prioritise economic development in their goal of bridging the digital
divide. Particularly in China, the digital divide is regarded as a barrier to economic
development, and ICTs are taken as a tool to realise leapfrogging development, and to
help China win the race in the third industrialisation.
b. Social InclusionI Human Rights
The framings of social inclusion/human rights were not mentioned by the Chinese
interviewees during my fieldwork. In contrast, as shown in the empirical findings from
235
the Taiwanese case in Chapter 8, the framings by the interviewees of the digital divide in
Taiwan included social inclusion and human rights. Additionally, 'social inclusion' is
recurrendy indicated in the policy texts, interviews and digital divide reports when ICTs
are mentioned in relation to creating an information society in Taiwan. An emerging
framework of 'human rights', which gained popularity internationally from the
two-phased WSIS summits in 2003 and 2005, has attracted attention from high-ranking
officials, including the Vice President Lu Hsiu-lien. As mentioned in Chapter 8, she gave
a speech at an international occasion arguing that digital rights should be combined with
the concept of human rights—an issue she has promoted for many years. However, the
novel conceptualisation of the digital divide as an offence to human rights is still in its
infant stages. Two of my interviewees, who are doing policy implementation instead of
policy-making, also doubted whether this concern could be enforced in law or
implemented in policy. This is related to the discussion of the gap between policy
discourses, policy formation and policy implementation, which will be discussed in a
later section.
9.3.1.4 Third Level of Domestication: Fit to the National Settings
Digital Divide as a Metaphor
As Fischer observes, macro discourses constitute the 'residua' of a society's or a group's
collective memory (Fischer, 2003: 75). The digital divide serves this end 'primarily in the
form of stories that can be taken as the engrams basic to our modes of thinking and
action' (Fischer, 2003: 75). The digital divide in my two case countries has perhaps
served as a metaphor for national development, although the definition of national
development differs in relation to their stages of development. Since the divide can be
measured using many mechanisms, it can be considered to some extent as an 'artificial'
social concept. However, this is not to deny the reality of the divide. Rather, what I am
arguing is that the digital divide as a metaphor can be interpreted in diverse ways
depending on the context in which it is considered.
The digital divide as a metaphor in China and in Taiwan has different implications. In
China, the digital divide is described as a barrier to national development, preventing
China from winning the race in 'the third industrialisation'. Additionally, the digital
divide is related to regional inequality, alongside other existing social inequalities.
Accordingly, the phenomenon of the digital divide in China plays a crucial role not only
as a stumbling block to China's leapfrogging in the global economy, but also as a
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hindrance to building an equal society between regions. Furthermore, when the digital
divide becomes a policy issue, the political interest in the digital divide can be seen as an
attempt to divert attention from long existing, but unsetded social inequalities.
The framing of the digital divide also refers to the existing discourses on the
relationship between science/technology and society, which is the 'contextuality'
mentioned in Chapter 2. In the case of China, Deng Xiaoping's two slogans 'science and
technology are productive forces' and 'Science and technology are the first productive
forces' manifest the close relationship invoked between science/technology and
development and the expectation of China's leapfrogging with technological
development. The spirit of these two slogans further influences the digital divide
discourse which emphasises the vital role which ICTs play in social change and calls for
the digital divide to be bridged in order to fully utilise ICTs to catch up with developed
countries.
The digital divide is also mainly regarded as a regional policy issue in Taiwan. However,
for Taiwan, the digital divide as a metaphor serves a different function. As a successful
player in a global economy, the phenomenon of the digital divide in Taiwan is relatively
much less severe than that in China. However, Taiwan has an alternative way of utilising
this metaphor. The political pressures facing Taiwan, especially the ruling party DPP, are
twofold. One is to create/build a harmonised society within Taiwan, to balance
development between rural and urban regions. The other is to utilise the opportunity to
help other less developed countries in bridging the digital divide as part of a broader
international relations strategy, aimed at overcoming Taiwan's weak international
standing. These pressures are reflected in the way in which the digital divide has been
framed in Taiwan.
9.3.2 Dominant Perspective—A Technology-Driven Perspective
These two settings have something in common in the way that they have framed the
digital divide, and these similarities are coherent with the international context,
unfolding within entrenched discourses of a technology-driven perspective.
Policy-makers in both countries over-emphasise the optimistic side of ICTs, and take
the pessimistic side to be non-existent. This echoes what Jasanoff claims about
discussions of technology and development, 'although both celebratory and critical
accounts of science and technology claim considerable empirical ballast, it is the former
that have exercised disproportionate influence on thinking about development' (Jasanoff,
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2002: 259).
9.3.2.1 A Technology-Driven Perspective
The way in which the digital divide is interpreted in the two case countries represents a
technology-driven perspective, which explicitly regards technology as driver of social
change. It cannot be denied that technologies do have effects. However, the problem is
that in these two countries, physical access is taken as a symbol of development. In
China, the technology-driven rhetoric is presented in storylines such as 'leapfrogging',
'national competitiveness', and 'catch-up via Industrialisation supported by
Informatisation' (see Chapter 6). These all suggest that ICTs will play the role of
helping China to win the 'Third Industrialisation' (Hu, 2002). However, for example, the
'leapfrogging' discourse ignores the fact that technological change and social
development are mutually shaped, i.e. co-produced; and that development, either
technological or social, is continuous, not leapfrogged (Jasanoff, 2002). The
technology-driven perspective is also already evident in Taiwan's e-Taiwan programme.
Moreover, both in China and Taiwan, 'informatisation' is taken as the next stage after
industrialisation, i.e. China emphasises the phase 'The Third Industrialisation' to develop
its 'informatisation'; Taiwan emphasises the importance of informatisation to its
international standing. Mueller and Tan regard this perspective in their analysis as
'technocratic vision' (Mueller and Tan, 1997: 14). In the era of industrialisation, heavy
and light industries are driving economic development. In the informatisation era, 'a
new fixation on information takes the place of the older fixation on industrialisation'
(Mueller and Tan, 1997: 14), with the belief that 'economies can modernise and develop
by implementing advanced information technology—that is, the technology itself
causes development and growth' (Mueller and Tan, 1997: 14).
9.3.2.2 A Digitally Optimistic Perspective
As Litan and Niskanen state in regard to digitally optimistic perspective, it is 'a key
theme of the optimistic scenario is that speeding up the diffusion of digital
technology—is to be valued not for its own sake but for the benefits it can bring to all
users, including nondigital businesses and consumers' (Litan and Niskanen, 1998: 5). 'It
presumes that many of the potential roadblocks to electronic commerce and other
digital developments will be overcome, but at the same time it is not euphoric because
we do not presume that the projected changes will occur overnight' (Litan and Niskanen,
1998: 5).
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The technologies are not value-neutral but will have both beneficial and disadvantageous
consequences (Loader, 1998). However, policymakers tend to emphasise the beneficial
side of the technologies and promote the usage of technologies. For example, 'a key
scenario is that speeding up the diffusion of digital technologies—notably the use of
computers and the Internet—is to be valued not for its own sake but for the benefits it
can bring to all users, including non-digital businesses and consumers' (Litan and
Niskanen, 1998: 5).
9.3.2.3 'Digital Divide' Implies Necessity and Eagerness for Adoption of Digital
Technologies
The efforts made in these two settings to bridge the digital divide manifest the notion
that digital technologies are necessities for human society. The policy rhetoric and first-
and second-hand interviews highlight the importance of telecommunications
technologies that will bring not only a novel technological device to daily lives but, more
importantly, will produce information flowing on the Internet and the knowledge
produced by access to and use of the Internet. To some extent, this means of
understanding and framing the issue of the digital divide in China and Taiwan can be
said to represent the implicit conceptualisation of how ICTs (and the Internet in
particular), can contribute to 'development'. Both China and Taiwan frame the digital
divide as a barrier to 'development', even though the definition of this term
'development' varies in the two settings with their different concerns. Without a doubt,
the new ICTs do bring improvements to people's.lives. However, it is also vital to put
the implicit negative side into perspective. For instance, whether online access leads to
other forms of access being withdrawn, e.g. will phone boxes disappear with the uptake
of mobile phones? Additionally, arguments about the necessity/desirability of ICTs turn
non-adopters or dropouts into a problem, which obscures the complexity of why some
people do not use the Internet. This overly optimistic perspective also follows the logic
of the technology-driven perspective in supposing that the Internet will automatically
drive social development, and ignores the fact that technology and society are mutually
shaped.
9.4 Actors
This section compares the actors of digital divide policy-making in China and Taiwan. I
am interested to analyse which actors are involved, directly and indirectiy, their
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background and orientations and how they are configured together. Firstly, it analyses
the division of labour between actors. Secondly, it compares the backgrounds of actors.
Finally, it raises an observation that both in China and Taiwan the public is missing in
digital divide policy-making.
9.4.1 Division of Labour between Actors
I have identified three categories of participants who play different roles in digital divide
policy-making in a broad sense. One of them is placed in charge of policy-making in a
narrow sense; that is they are drafting policy but not actually involved in policy
implementation. The second group encompasses those ministries/institutes that are
taking responsibility for policy implementation. The third group, i.e. the group of
researchers, including researchers from public policy bodies and from academia, takes a
peripheral position in the policy-making process in a broader sense, and is in charge of
conducting surveys on the digital divide in order to provide references for
policy-makers.
As far as the first group is concerned, in China, the issue of the digital divide has
received attention from the committee who are making Five-Year Plans but no task
force has been assigned to tackle the digital divide. In Taiwan, the government has
established a task force to be in charge of drafting digital divide policy. In pursuing
national development and economic growth, these two governments are taking the
digital divide as a crucial policy problem to tackle. Their concerns are represented by the
broad range of ministries that are included in policy implementation.
The second group, in both China and Taiwan, holds the real power to implement digital
divide policy. Here, 'power' means the resources and finances to implement the policy.
The authority is shifted from the high-ranking policy-makers to lower-level
implementers. The reason resides in the available budget. In China, Mil is playing this
significant role; while in Taiwan, MOE now plays this role in bridging the digital divide
in remote areas. These groups are officially designated as being the lead authorities. The
institutions placed in charge of implementing digital divide policy also reflect the stage
of ICT penetration in each country. In the findings of this comparative study, we can
see a trajectory in digital divide policy-making. For a country that lacks a high
penetration rate nationwide, the focus of policy-making will be on the provision of
technology, and the institution to be placed in charged of digital divide policy will be
more technology-driven. As soon as ICT penetration is not the main concern, the focus
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of policy-making will transfer to the acquisition of skills, or literacy, and the institution
that is in placed in charge of digital divide policy will be less technology-driven. As
China is at an earlier stage of ICT development than Taiwan, Mil (China) is particularly
focusing on the provision of technology at this moment, and MOE (Taiwan) is
extending its concerns to more social aspects of provision, although its policies could
be critiqued for continuing to focus on technological access.
In traditional policy research, the definition of policy-makers generally refers to the first
of the above categories, and is sometimes extended to the second one. However, in this
thesis, I found that the role of researchers who conduct surveys on the digital divide
cannot be ignored since they play a crucial role in setting up the variables, which
policy-makers use in developing policy. It is clear from the first official digital divide
surveys from the US that variables are important in digital divide policy because they
indicate who may be the target citizens that the policy should be aimed at. It is shown in
this thesis that in Taiwan, this group is mainly composed of academic or professional
researchers, however in China Mil, a government institution CNNIC, takes this
responsibility.
9.4.2 Background of Actors—Technocratic / Utilitarianism
In this section, 'actors' is used in the narrow sense to refer to those involved in
policy-making and policy implementation. Drawing upon the analytical framework in
Chapter 2, I discuss how the dominant framing of the digital divide helped support
substantially different legislative and administrative arrangements in each national
context Qasanoff, 2005). Fischer also states, 'problems and the policies designed to deal
with social problems are important determinants of which actors will have the authority
and power to deal with the issues they raise' (Fischer, 2003: 62). As Baumgartner and
Jones (1983, cited in Fischer, 2003: 62) point out, when a policy is presented as dealing
with a technical problem, professional experts will tend to dominate the
decision-making process. This also happens in China and in Taiwan in dealing with
digital divide policy. According to the findings in Chapter 6 and 8, the institutions that
are placed in charge of digital divide policy present a technology-centred approach. This
bias towards physical access to hardware may be rooted in the educational background
of the personnel who are involved in policy-making and implementation, as well as
from the task of the institute. For example, in China, it is clearly stated on Mil's official
website that it is responsible for the building and development of ICTs infrastructure.
The interviewees that are responsible for the policy implementation and digital divide
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reports also have technology-centred educational backgrounds, one holding a PhD
degree in engineering and the other holding a masters degree in computer science
(Personal Interviews, CH 03. April 2005; CHI3, September 2006). In Taiwan, as
evidenced in Chapter 7, around 60% of III, the institute responsible for the digital
divide policy, have technology-centred educational backgrounds. Therefore, it is not
surprising that digital divide policy both in China and Taiwan focuses on the
infrastructures. This tendency can be also explained via what Shen and Williams (2005)
criticise as 'utilitarianism' in relation to China and Taiwan and perhaps also other East
Asian States, which refers to a 'narrow focus adopted of technical specialism in science
and engineering at the expense of social, policy and managerial expertise, often
associated with an elitist approach' (Shen and Williams, 2005: 198).
9.4.3 The Public Is Missing
Existing literature reviewed in Chapter 2 includes users/the public amongst the
interpretive communities of policies (Yanow, 2000). However, my research found that
this group is missing in the digital divide policy-making process in both China and
Taiwan. This may be linked to the aforementioned 'technocratic/utilitarian' approach.
Although digital divide policy implementation targets the users/the public, in my
research the people living in the rural areas in China and in Taiwan, (i.e. the target
'public') are not audible in the policy-making process. Instead people are just given the
technical equipment and programmes which the government or sponsors have allocated
according to their own imagination of what these 'have-nots' need. This may lead to
undesirable outcomes that 'exclude a large part of the population from educational, job,
health, and other benefits of the information society' (Shen and Willilams, 2005: 212).
For China, the reasons that the public is missing from digital divide policy-making may
be explained as follows. First of all, the issue of the digital divide at this stage in China
has much to do with the unbalanced development of infrastructures between regions,
which means that technical issues have been seen as the first priority for the rural
regions in China. With this concern, bridging the digital divide is easily regarded as the
responsibility of technical experts. This reason can be further traced back to China's
attitude toward technology for development. Since the economic reforms in 1978,
science and technology have been regarded as a driving force for economic
development that has led China toward modernisation. Therefore for the Chinese
government, technological development is largely conceived as a strategic issue linked to
economic development, rather than to broader social programmes or goals. Within this
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concern, the position of technological specialists in the field of science and technology
is highly respected and means that China tends toward elitism/meritocracy (Shen &
Williams, 2005: 209). Secondly, as one of my interviewees in China complained, 'for the
people living in rural regions, maintaining three meals for every day is their only concern.
For them, ICTs become a luxury beyond their imagination' (Personal Interview, CHOI.
April 2005).
For Taiwan, the explanations provided by policy-makers as to why the public is absent in
digital divide policy-making overlap with the case of China. I was told that for 'people
living in rural regions, earning a daily living is the first priority and therefore, lay persons
who are on the receiving end of digital divide policy may not be interested in and may
exclude themselves from this policy' (Personal Interview, TW02. March 2005).
Additionally, a capitalist approach in developing ICTs and bridging the digital divide
(Hung, 2004) may account for the missing public in Taiwan's digital divide policy. This
can be evidenced by looking at that who is invited to the Civil Advisory Committee of
NICI. According to the identities of members in this Advisory Committee, I find that
only those holding positions of CEOs, chairman, or president are in the list of the
committee, and lay persons and the public are missing.
9.5 Policy Outcome
This section compares the outcomes of digital divide policy in China and in Taiwan.
Reflecting on the national contexts, the findings show that China and Taiwan at present
have different foci of policy implementation. Secondly, it is found that both countries
focus on bridging the regional divide.
9.5.1 Different Foci of Policy Implementation in China and in Taiwan
That China and Taiwan have different foci of policy implementation mirrors their
respective developmental contexts of ICTs. In 2006, China's population was 13.2 billion
and its per capita GDP was US $7,800 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2007), which
compared to Taiwan's population of 23 million and per capita GDP of US $16,471
(DGBAS, 2007). China has a large developing economy, while Taiwan has a small and
high-income economy. These differences certainly influence the objects of digital divide
policy in these two settings.
In bridging the digital divide, China's development seems to be a successful story and
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perhaps a model for other developing countries (Harwit, 2004). According to the latest
statistics, it has more than 367 million fixed line connections, and about 137 million
Internet users.90 Nationally, there are some 27.79 fixed telephone lines per 100
inhabitants, 34.83 mobile cellular subscribers per 100 inhabitants, up from 0.2 phones
per 100 in 1980 (Harwit, 2004).
However, within China, the regional disparity in telephone access has caused a split
between haves and have-nots. For example, in 2006, the top five provinces of fixed
telephone users were located in the eastern region, such as Guangdong, Jiangsu, and
Zhejiang. Teledensity rates range from more than 70 phones per 100 citizens in
cosmopolitan cities like Shenzhen, to tens of thousands of rural villages without a
single telephone (Harwit, 2004). As a result, the Chinese government has begun to pay
more attention to Curt Cun Tong Dianhua, the policy that aimed to connect all
administrative villages to the landline network, and eventually achieved this policy goal
by the end of 2006.
In contrast to China, Taiwan is a small island with a high density population, and the
current policy goal is to get all citizens to connect to the Internet, especially those living
in rural areas, as Taiwan's household telephone penetration rate is 97.6% (DGBAS,
2006).
9.5.2 Both Focusing on the Regional Divide
This research finds that both China's and Taiwan's digital divide policy focuses on
bridging regional divides, although other dimensions of the divide have also been
mentioned in the digital divide reports. This may be explained, in the first place, by their
national contexts. Concerning the national contexts discussed in Chapter 5 and 7,
geographical disparity is obvious both in China and in Taiwan. Secondly, it is assumed
by policy-makers that there is a close relationship between the adoption of
telecommunications and national economic growth. Therefore, if regional economic
disparities are reduced as the result of bridging the regional digital divide, overall the
national growth rate will be raised, because there is a greater economic development in
all regions.
90 Mil official website.




In this chapter, I have compared the national contexts, the framing of the digital divide,
and the participant ministries in charge of policy-making and implementation in China
and Taiwan. I located these elements in a broader international context because the Nil
initiatives from the US and the 'information society' initiative from the EU that emerged
in its wake have spread to other advanced countries and developing countries, and have
played an important role in the subsequent framing of the digital divide and digital
divide policy-making and implementation.
It is found that the framing of Nil and the 'information society' lead to the digital
divide being defined as a particular kind of problem, almost exclusively framed in terms
of its implications for national competitiveness and economic growth. This discourse
relies upon ideas such as technology-driven perspective, digital optimism, necessity of
ICTs, and so forth. However, when 'national context' is also included in the analysis, it
can be seen that China and Taiwan have defined these 'macro discourses' slighdy
differently. This reflects on the one hand, the impacts of international context and a
broader set of ideas available to actors in both national settings; and on other hand, the
influences of distinct national contexts. The comparison also shows that not only is the
interpretation of the digital divide affected by national contexts, but that the participant
ministries and policy outcomes are as well. Furthermore, the comparison shows that the
discourses of the digital divide in both settings are related to determinist accounts; and
both emphasise infrastructures, particularly in the initial stages.
The effects of contexts on the framing of the digital divide and digital divide policy can
also be shown in another way. We can present the impacts of contexts by showing why
some framings appearing in a common international context are found in one setting
but not in another. For example, the framing of the digital divide as a human rights
issue appears in Taiwan but not in China. This is because in China, a discourse of
'human rights' is absent from existing policy discourses, e.g. it is not a framing which is
familiar in Chinese culture.
With regard to ministries in charge of digital divide policy, we can see similarities
between China and Taiwan, both of which recruit staff with backgrounds in science and
technology to be responsible for digital divide policy. This to some extent resonates with
the macro framing of the digital divide at an international level. The obvious difference
between China and Taiwan in terms of the participants is that China places digital divide
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policy within a broader national development policy and has no independent steering
committee directing digital divide policy. In contrast, Taiwan founded an independent
committee to deal with digital divide policy in 2003.
Policy outcomes also relate to national contexts, and are influenced by the framing of
the digital divide. For China, uneven provision of infrastructures stands as the policy
priority, thus Cun Cun Tong Dianhua policy at this stage firmly focuses on physical access
in terms of telephony, and then to the Internet. In Taiwan, since its household
telephone penetration rate is 97%, the policy focus is on access to the Internet.




Chapter 10 serves to provide an overall review and discussion of this research, linking
empirical observations to research questions and my theoretical framework. It is divided
into the following sections. Section 10.1 provides an overview of digital divide
policy-making in China and Taiwan; then restates each research question and provides
the answer via synthesising the main empirical findings. Section 10.2 pinpoints the
contributions of this thesis to theory in relation to epistemology, to the combination of
STS and policy research, and to digital divide policy-making. Section 10.3 elucidates the
contributions to policy-making while Section 10.4 discusses the limitations of
methodology and the applicability of theory. Section 10.5 provides some insights for
future research.
10.1 An Overview of this Research and Empirical Findings
This research has investigated the relationship between discourses, context and policy
process in policy-making. Theoretically, it is inspired by the central questions of how
policy problems become defined as well as how policy responses are subsequently used
to solve these problems. Adopting an interpretive approach, it has emphasised the
importance of discourse and context in the policy-making process (while recognising
that the relationship between these two elements is complex). Empirically, this research
has been motivated by the observation that existing literature on digital divide
policy-making has focused on developed countries, and that developing countries has
been neglected. Given these theoretical and empirical inspirations, this study uses
specific illustrations to examine how two developing countries—China and
Taiwan—managed to make their own digital divide policy.
10.1.1 An Overview of Digital Divide Policy-Making in China and Taiwan
This study has been inspired by a number of key research questions about how has the
conception of the digital divide been transferred from its original social and economic
context in the industrialised world to developing countries, such as China and Taiwan? It
has focused upon how the broad social and economic contexts in a specific country, in
this research, China and Taiwan, have shaped digital divide policy? In attempt to assess
the relevance of global digital divide discourses for developing countries, the study
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particularly highlighted the crucial role of contexts. 'Context' in policy research is
important because it is 'the entire context of events which may have an impact upon the
future problems of policy' (Lasswell, 1951: 4). The findings of this research do support
this assumption, but they indicate a more complex process. The international context set
up from the early 1990s to 2005, provides a point of reference for national digital divide
framings, but not all of the globalising digital divide discourses are integrated into the
national levels. Rather, it depends on the national contexts within which national digital
divide policies are embedded. When investigating how China and Taiwan adopted
globalising digital divide discourses, the concept of domestication was applied to
examine how national policy-makers translate the term 'digital divide' into a Chinese one
(the first level of domestication—linguistic domestication), how the digital divide is
translated into policy discourses (the second level of domestication) and how these
framings are interwoven with national contexts (the third level of domestication). This
research also found that the framings are closely related to the actors who are involved
in the policy-making process and further impact on the policy outcomes.
However, while the above provides a general summary of this research, one of the most
crucial findings is that digital divide policy-making is a dynamic and complex process
interwoven with contexts, discourses, actors and outcomes. Figure 10.1 seeks to capture
some of this complexity by summarising the main findings in terms of four elements
discussed in the empirical chapters. Each box corresponds to the research questions
raised in Chapter 1. This figure highlights four elements—contexts, framings, actors,
and outcomes—in digital divide policy-making, but does not imply a linear relationship.
Instead, it serves to represent an analytical framework developed in Figure 2.2. I will
now re-examine my research questions, and will go on to answer them in the next
subsection.
Since context in policy research is important, and the 'meaning of any detail depends
upon its relation to the whole context of what it is a part' (Lasswell, 1976: 218), the first
research question I raised in Chapter 1 is:
KOI. Policy Definition--How is the digital divide framed as a problem that needs to be solved
within the international and national context? How is the digital divide framed internationally during
the period 1990 to 2005, and how does this relate to the discursive framings of digital divide
policy-making in China and Taiwan?
This research located the root of digital divide discourses in advanced countries (i.e. the
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US and EU), and found that these discourses were subsequendy taken up by
international organisations during the period between 1990 and 2005. Within advanced
countries and international organisations, national competitiveness and economic
development became the main concerns in the NII/IS and GII/GS initiatives. These
concerns subsequently made contributions to digital divide discourses and gradually
developed into five globalising digital divide discourses. In this research, these discourses
serve as the international context from which national digital divide framings in China
and Taiwan are selectively adopted. My study examined how these globalising digital
divide discourses are domesticated by China and Taiwan (Chapter 6 and 8).
Apart from the international context, national contexts may provide a unique
environment for an individual country to make their own digital divide policy. National
contexts also equip the researcher with resources to scrutinise the dissimilarities between
China and Taiwan. Therefore national contexts were investigated in Chapter 5 (for
China) and Chapter 7 (for Taiwan).
In addition to framing the digital divide both nationally and internationally, the next
research question asks: who are the actors in digital divide policy-making in these case
policies?
RQ2. Actors and Outcomes—Which ministries/ institutesparticipate in policy-making, Cun Cun
Tong in China and Digital Opportunity Centre/APEC Digital Opportunity Centre in Taiwan?
After these elements—context, policy framings, participants—are unpacked, the next
step is to conduct a comparison, dealing with the convergences and divergences in
digital divide policy-making in China and Taiwan. Therefore, my third research question
is:
RQ3. Comparison-Where do similarities/divergences occur between digital divide polity in China
and Taiwan? How does this relate to international/national contexts?
In the next section, I will provide the findings to answer these research questions, and
link them to the analytical framework produced in Chapter 2.
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[RQ3—Ch9]
Figure 10.1 Overview of DigitalDivide Folicy-Making in China and Taiwan
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10.1.2 An Interpretive Approach to Digital Divide Policy
In Chapter 1, I argued that an interpretive approach could elucidate how the issue of
digital divide policy-making is embedded within both national and international contexts,
and that this approach could thus open another window to scrutinise the issue from a
more critical perspective. In Chapter 2, I provided an interesting finding by showing
how and what conditions contexts matter in digital divide policy-making. I will now use
my findings to unpack the complex role played by context in the way that digital divide
discourses flow from international organisation (from the early 1990s to 2005) to China
and Taiwan, and how they are domesticated in these two settings. This discussion will be
based around the answers to my original research questions.
10.1.2.1 Domestication of Digital Divide Discourses by China and Taiwan
In this research, I used the concept 'domestication' to reveal how policy-makers in both
China and Taiwan selectively take up the term 'digital divide' by picking a Chinese term
(the first level of domestication), fitting it into policy discourses (the second level of
domestication), and fitting it with national contexts (the third level of domestication). I
demonstrated that in the course of policy-making, global/universal discourses have to
be matched with local settings, and that they are always altered in the local
policy-making process. Therefore, the next questions to be dealt with are: How are
global digital divide discourses framed, and how are they domesticated by China and
Taiwan?
RQ: How is the issue of the digital divideframed internationally during theperiod 1990 to 2005?
Concepts such as contextuality (Lesswell, 1951, 1976) and co-production (Jasanoff, 2005)
suggest that context is of great importance in policy-making. For this reason, this
research went back to the early 1990s to look for the trajectory of the term and concept
of the digital divide (Chapter 1 and Chapter 4). In Chapter 4, I found that NII/IS
initiatives impacted on the globalising digital divide discourses, and these further
influenced the interpretation of the digital divide both in China and Taiwan to a large
extent. After a selective synthesis, I categorised five digital divide discourses: national
competitiveness, ICT for development, social inclusion, social capital, and human rights,
which serve as the international context for this research. Figure 10.2 presents
globalising digital divide framings along with the levels of the divide and relevant
international organisations.
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RQ: How does the international context relate to the discursiveframings of digital dividepolity-making
in China and Taiwan? How is the digital dividepolityframed at the national level?
However, these globalising digital divide discourses may not direcdy flow and be used in
individual countries. A selective uptake and implementation takes place in terms of
national domestication. According to the empirical findings, domestication is activated
at three levels. The first level is linguistic domestication. With regard to linguistic
domestication, China selected shu fr hong gou (a huge digital divide) to fit it into its
national context in relation to its longstanding uneven national development, while
Taiwan chose shu wei lou cha which does not suggest that the gap is huge but rather that it
is different in degree. As far as policy discourses are concerned, both China and Taiwan
take a technology-driven perspective on policy discourses. As discussed previously, this
is one of the five discourses I discussed and synthesised in Chapter 4. I found that this
technology-driven perspective was interwoven with the desire for economic
development, which is overwhelmingly used in China's policy discourses in terms of
'national competitiveness' and 'ICT for development'.
However, not all of the globalising digital divide discourses are appropriated in China
and Taiwan. In China's case, the interviewees rarely mention the framing of 'human
rights', which was raised in the 2003 WSIS and became used in Taiwan. In Taiwan's case,
high-ranking officials adopt the idea of human rights; however, this does not indicate
that this framing leads in a straightforward manner to policy formation, here DOC
within the e-Taiwan programme. This signals the complexity of the relationship between
contexts and policy discourses, which can be explained in terms of national contexts.
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One approach to investigate how digital divide policy is framed is through identifying
the storylines in the policy process. Storylines play the role of rationalising
policy-making (Ntesje, 2002: 280). They are employed in framing via claims-making,
myths, and boundary-setting. When we locate the social meanings of the Internet within
these national contexts, we find that both international and national contexts influence
the interpretation of the Internet in the case countries. That ICT can facilitate 'national
competitiveness' and 'leapfrogging' is one of the recurrent storylines in Chinese digital
divide policy discourses, which plays the role of rationalising digital divide
policy-making in terms of its emphasis on nation-centred than people-centred
development. This resonates with China's developmental context as discussed in
Chapter 1 and 5, i.e. that China is eager to win the race in the third industrialisation
since it has lost the previous two. In Taiwan, ICTs are also taken as a tool for national
competition/economic growth, which is similar to the expectations of ICTs in China.
In Taiwan, the framing has extended the goal to social development/community
development as far as the Digital Opportunity Centre (DOC) programme is concerned.
After 2003, since the WSIS summits promoted human rights in relation to the
consideration of the digital divide, 'human rights' have surfaced in the media coverage
and in a speech given by the Vice President Lu Hsiu-lien. However, in spite of slight
differences in the framing of the Internet by China and Taiwan, the crucial issue is that
the policy discourses of both settings are based on the belief that the Internet has the
ultimate power to change society, and as a result both countries construct the Internet as
a necessity for society.
In Chapter 4, I argued that at the international level, the digital divide is
interwoven/cross-referenced with the frameworks of national development/economic
development, inequality/inclusion; social capital/technological capital, and human rights.
In Chapter 6 and 8, the national digital divide discourses were shown to resonate with
those emerging from international contexts. However, the findings also show that, as we
look at the national levels, the frameworks of the digital divide deduced from the
international-level discourses do not completely fit into individual countries. In other
words, respective national contexts do play a crucial role in framing national digital
divide discourse.
To sum up, this research shows that the framing of the digital divide in both China and
Taiwan is a technology and economy-driven policy in that it is included in national plans
for economic growth in both countries. In China, digital divide policy is made by the
leading committee in charge of Five-Year Plans, and the policy is integrated in a wider
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policy project, e.g. Go West, Construction of Socialist New Villages, which is part of the
whole project. In Taiwan, DOC/ADOC is integrated into e-Taiwan, which is also part of
the national plan Challenge 2008. Overall, both of these national development plans are
targeted at national economic growth.
10.1.2.2 Dynamics of Actors in Digital Divide Policy
Rj2■' Which ministries/ institutesparticipate in digital dividepolicy-making?
Another relevant issue to policy-making is the actors and the manner of their
invlovement. Chapter 2 discussed the concept of actors in policy-making, e.g. Sabatier's
'advocacy coalition' (1988), Hajer's 'discourse coalition' (1995), Yanow's 'interpretive
communities' (2000). This research drew on strengths of each of these concepts to
observe and analyse the actors in digital divide policy-making in China and Taiwan. For
instance, Sabatier's extended list of actors makes me aware of the role played by
researchers in policy-making; Hajer's emphasis on policy discourses made by actors
provides insights to scrutinise the discursive dimension in policy-making; Yanow's
categorisation of three groups of actors clarifies the composition of actors involved in
policy-making (I replaced this third group 'users' with 'researchers' for analytical
convenience, because the public is missing in digital divide policy-making). However,
none of these concepts can precisely represent the actors in digital divide policy-making
in China and Taiwan. The reasons for this will be elaborated in the following discussion
in which I will compare the differences between these concepts and analyse the actors
involved in digital divide policy-making in China and Taiwan.
First of all, I discuss the composition of actors suggested by these concepts, in
particular that of an 'advocacy coalition' and that of a 'discourse coalition'. In addition
to these two concepts, the elitist model is included for comparison because this study
finds that it may be much more helpful than the other two to explain the Chinese case.
In the elitist model, access to policy-making is restricted (March, 1998: 5). Actors are
composed by a group of core elite. In an 'advocacy coalition', actors are derived from a
dispersed elite—a dispersed array tied by linkage to action and policy. In a 'discourse
coalition', the actors are highly dispersed, and anyone can be linked in a
discourse/framing. In this sense, the composition of actors in China's digital divide
policy-making might perhaps seem to conform to that in policy network theory. The
high-ranking government policy-makers are responsible for policy framing and
policy-making. And technocratic administrators are in charge of policy implementation.
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There is an absence of openness to a wider public. Even though people from academia
are involved in policy-making, as for example, illustrated by some ot my interviewees,
these individuals also hold crucial positions in the central government. Additionally,
there are the researchers who conduct digital divide policy that are affiliated with MIL
In comparison, Taiwan's case presents a more open arena with regard to the
composition of the actors involved in policy-making. Apart from the governmental
officials, a non-government organisation is involved in problem framing and
policy-making. Academic researchers are in charge of digital divide reports. However, a
similarity between China and Taiwan is the absence of the public in digital divide
policy-making.
Secondly, I discuss the concept of ideas/beliefs/framings in advocacy coalitions, and
discourse coalitions. The concept of advocacy coalitions argues that each coalition is
tightly linked to a core belief and action; the boundaries between coalitions can be
clearly drawn. In contrast, the idea of discourse coalitions emphasises that the
boundaries between coalitions are fluid. Actors are linked by discourses instead of by a
core belief and action. In China's case, and drawing upon the interviews I conducted
with interviewees holding government positions, digital divide policy-making presents a
highly centralised model. The tight relationship between actors presents a core value in
utilising informatisation to steer economic growth and national competitiveness. There
are hardly any other visible coalitions in the course of policy-making—there is little
scope for public articulation of competing programmes of action, and policies, once
determined upon, are presented as consensual and final. The actors I interviewed are
composed of a technocracy that is driven by the desire for national competitiveness and
economic development. In contrast, in Taiwan, the policy-making process demonstrates
openness to a non-government organisation and to academic researchers. As a result,
the more diverse array of framings described earlier are able to emerge.
Overall, the big difference in the composition of actors I interviewed and involved in
the policy-making process between China (Cun Cun Tong) and Taiwan (DOC/ADOC) is
the degree of openness in the policy system. As can be observed in this research, those
government actors who are involved in China's digital divide policy-making are generally
the technical elite who possess a common internalised belief that economic growth and
national competitiveness can be reached via the adoption of ICTs.
When we attempt to investigate this centralised, largely-closed policy system in China,
we need to consider certain epistemological issues. In particular, it is difficult to observe
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the roles of broader discourse communities in China. Although from the literature
available concerning the wider influence in policy making (Wang, 2008), potentially
broader discourse communities must play a role in shaping the broader views of
decision-makers and their trusted experts, the fact that policy deliberations primarily
occur behind closed doors makes it impossible in most circumstances to direcdy
observe the influence of broader discourses. It was clear, for example, that the Chinese
government is rather sensitive about matters of uneven economic development and its
potential impacts on public responses. This leads on to further a methodological issues
that I will discuss in section 10.4.
In spite of the differences highlighted by the above comparison, this research found
that the actors I interviewed and played in China's Cun Cun Tong policy and Taiwan's
DOC/ADOC programme can be separated into three groups. The first group is
composed of high-ranking officials who are in charge of policy-making, drafting policy
but not actually doing policy implementation. The second group is composed of
ministerial-level officials who take responsibility for policy implementation. The third
group is composed of researchers who conduct digital divide reports, both researchers
within the ministry and academic researchers included. Each of these groups plays a
central role in the digital divide policy process at different stages.
Figure 10.3 presents the actors in these two specific digital divide policies. It is found
that, in China, high-ranking officials play central roles in framing and policy-making,
with Mil taking responsibility for policy implementation. An interesting point that this
figure aims to highlight is that, while the digital divide is a relevant concern to many
ministries, Mil eventually gained an exclusive role in policy implementation. The reason
for this power shift is on the grounds of the official authority and administrative power
which Mil commands. In Taiwan, digital divide framing was emerging before the official
government policy was made in 2003. In this country, it is top-ranking policy-makers
that play central roles at the policy-making stage, while the Computer Centre of MOE is
in charge of policy implementation, because this ministry possesses the financial
resources required for implementation. However, criticisms have been made of this
situation because other actors argue that MOE pays more attention to physical access




10.1.2.3 Comparison between China and Taiwan
RQ: Where do similaritiesI divergences occur between digital dividepolicy in China and Taiwan? How
does this relate to international/national contexts?
In this research, I introduced Bennett's concept 'convergence' (1991a, 1991b, 1992, 1997)
to scrutinise the causes of policy convergences (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.5). Here I will
answer this question with the consideration of contexts. This research demonstrated
that international and national contexts matter in digital divide policy-making. Policy
similarities can be explained by both the international context and local context.
International policy discourses provide commonly available intellectual resources,
whereas similarities in local contexts, for example a shared technocratic tradition in
China and Taiwan, explain the technical focus in the digital divide policy of both
countries. Additionally, local contextual factors are key in explaining diversity. The
international and national contexts also impact the participants who are involved in
digital divide policy-making. For example the technocratic tradition of China and
Taiwan is a factor underpinning the choice of policy participants with science and
technology backgrounds. These participants then learn and exchange experiences from
international organisations and other countries through international conferences,
official policy websites, and personal contacts.
Thirdly, the findings show a similar (influenced by the international context), and also
different (influenced by their national contexts) policy process model in China and
Taiwan. It is clear that both China and Taiwan have shown a top-down policy process in
that their digital divide policies are influenced by the international context in terms of
policy discourses and policy initiatives. They both integrate their own national contexts
to develop their national digital divide policies, which allow them to influence their
position in the international community. In the case of China, it is eager to show its
capacity to not lag behind advanced countries and that it will not lose in the third
industrial revolution. In the case of Taiwan, it also seizes the opportunity to present
itself as a capable/independent country in international organisations. Therefore, for
China and Taiwan, digital divide policy is not merely a policy to solve national problems
but also a symbol to improve their standings in the global community.
Notwithstanding, there is difference between these national digital divide policy-making
models. Looking at the process of national digital divide policy-making, it is found that
China takes a centralised process to make policy. The policy-makers decided the Chinese
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term to indicate the phenomenon of the digital divide, made the policy for bridging the
digital divide, and adopted a political means to recruit telecommunication operators to
implement the policy. By contrast, although the Taiwanese case also demonstrates a
centralised model in digital divide policy-making, it also presents a more open approach
to include non-government actors, and especially academic researchers. For example, the
project of bridging the digital divide was developed by the civil society body, III, and
then gained attention from the government; and it is academic researchers that conduct
digital divide reports, instead of researchers affiliated with the government.
10.1.3 Relationship between Policy Discourses and Policy Implementation
This subsection deals first of all with the complexity of policy discourses, and secondly,
with the gap between policy formation and implementation.
10.1.3.1 The Complexity of Policy Discourses
The term 'digital divide' and its meanings were novel for some policy-makers in China
and Taiwan. However, the phenomenon of the so-called 'digital divide' has not
developed solely from international discourses, as policy-makers in both administrations
already have related ideas such as an 'information gap' in their minds even before this
term was coined and imported from the US (following a series of "Falling through the Net
reports published in the mid-1990s). In Taiwan, they had even implemented the
programme to build telecentres before the terminology 'digital divide' had been used in
policy discourses. For example, before the 2003 WSIS, the non-government
organisation, III, had taken actions to reduce the digital divide in the 1990s, and RDEC
had embarked on building telecentres from 1999 onwards. However, it was not until the
2003 WSIS that the Taiwanese government had an official digital divide policy. The
answer perhaps can be found from the literature on social learning in policy that I
discussed in Chapter 2, and this is supported by the findings from Chapter 6 and 8.
Through policy learning, the issue at stake that had not attracted widespread attention
either in the media coverage or in the policy field prior to the US's series of digital
divide reports now gained widespread popularity.
Consider this further. After this term was coined in the US, it was promptly
appropriated into policy actions in Taiwan, e.g. Ill's efforts to promote computer use
and RDEC's building of telecentres. However, because the term 'digital divide' did not
appear in policy texts until 2003, when the first official digital divide policy was drafted,
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these earlier actions cannot be interpreted in terms of the compelling rhetoric of digital
divide discourse. Instead, it is possible that Taiwan's prompt actions following the US
reports occurred because the phenomenon that these reports described resonated with
the existing and emerging priorities of Taiwan's policy-makers. It is also possible that
Taiwan wanted to prove something to international organizations by addressing this
issue quickly. This assumption is supported by the findings which reveal that policy
discourse works at the level of representation as well as impacting direcdy on actions
taken. It is found that policy discourse targets different audiences. For example, Taiwan's
digital divide policy-makers draw on the idea of human rights to frame the digital divide.
This framing aims to show the external audience that Taiwan respects human rights.
This observation is evidenced by the fact that the Vice President Lu Hsiu-lien promoted
'digital rights' at an international occasion when addressing a speech to an audience
from outside Taiwan. However, as far as actual policy texts are concerned, this framing
is not included at present.
10.1.3.2 Gap between Policy Formation and Implementation
In the above section, I presented the important role of context, showing the impacts of
international and national contexts on the development of China and Taiwan's specific
digital divide policies. Here, I am still arguing that the context is significant in
policy-making, but focusing on the national context. I also justify my argument in
another way that, without corresponding national contexts, the international framings
may not be carried into the policy development and implementation. Taking Taiwan's
case as an example, a high-ranking official in charge of digital divide policy promoted
the idea of 'human rights' to frame the digital divide, however, this idea has not become
embodied in policy-making and implementation. In considering why this has occurred, a
range of potential factors can be identified. First of all, resource allocation may decide
which ministry/institute has power in implementation. For example, the interviewee
complained that due to the allocation of the governmental budget, it is the staff in the
Computer Centre of MOE that conduct policy implementation. Secondly, discourses
need to be related to specific institutional contexts and practices in which they can be
meaningfully stated and understood (Hajer, 1995; Fischer, 2003: 90). In Taiwan's case,
the gap between policy framing and implementation may be explained by the fact that
the idea of a relationship between human rights and the digital divide is still in its infant
stages, since this idea was first raised in the 2003 WSIS, and there is an absence of a
corresponding legal system to embody this idea in Taiwan. Thirdly, as mentioned above,
it depends on who the target audience is that the discourse/framing aims to reach. In
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Taiwan's case, one of the enthusiastic officials, the Vice President Lu Hsiu-lien,
promoted this idea in a public speech to representatives from other Asian countries.
This was not an occasion for national policy-making, and the target audience was not
the people of Taiwan. In this highly political occasion, she may have just seised the
chance to advertise her long-promoted idea—human rights, by linking the global topic
'digital divide' to 'human rights', and presenting this to the participants from other
countries. In this case, mentioning human rights in connection with the digital divide is
no guarantee that this idea would be seriously considered in policy-making and
implementation.
10.2 Contributions to Theory
10.2.1 Contribution to Research on the Digital Divide and Digital Divide Policy
This research provides an alternative approach to investigate the issue of the digital
divide as well as digital divide policy-making. The existing literature on the digital divide
is predominantly concerned with the dimensions of the divide (e.g. Servon, 2002;
Mossberger, Tolbert, and Stansbury, 2003; Loader, 1998), be it cross-national or national.
The common assumption behind the research mentioned above is that the digital divide
can be identified and measured via ever-proliferating variables. However, it ignores a
fundamental issue, which is how the digital divide is defined and interpreted. Some
research, notably Robbins and Courtright (2002), has addressed the digital divide from
an interpretive perspective. However, they only mentioned the framing process of the
digital divide. They never move forward to stages of policy formation and
implementation. In addition, their research was based on the US, which did not consider
the issue of framing the digital divide in less developed countries. This thesis provides
an alternative perspective to look at the interpretation of the digital divide within both
international and national contexts in two developing countries. As I have shown above,
the phenomenon of the digital divide is not novel, but it is the international and national
contexts that foster this phenomenon as a policy problem. This is exactly what
interpretive policy research hopes to investigate. In meeting this end, I developed an
interpretive policy research rationale, and traced the history of digital divide policy in
China and Taiwan to investigate how the digital divide is interpreted within international
and domestic contexts. Therefore, epistemologically, this rationale shifts the concerns
from a realist to an interpretive view of knowledge on the digital divide.
Continuing the above-mentioned shift of epistemology, the second contribution to
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theory stems from the combination of STS and Interpretive Policy Research literature.
As revealed in Chapter 1, the literature on the digital divide and policy research is
scattered in separate fields, and lacks an effective integration. Additionally, STS literature
that is useful in giving insights in integrating 'contexts' (e.g. Social Shaping of
Technology, SST) and providing analytical concepts (e.g. technological
determinism/interpretive flexibility) that address the framing of the digital divide has
been long neglected in the digital divide literature. Therefore, this thesis takes the
initiative to combine these two previously separated fields into an interpretive rationale
to develop an analytical framework, which is a good example of the effectiveness of
interdisciplinary inquiry as well as useful for theorising digital divide policy-making in
developing countries.
Thirdly, the concept of 'domestication' is developed in this research to analyse how the
English term 'digital divide' is translated and fitted into China's and Taiwan's digital
divide policy discourses as well as their national contexts. Sorensen (1996) and Brosveet
and Sorensen (2000) apply the idea of 'domestication' to explore the national
appropriation of technology discourses. Their discussion suggests that policy actors
would selectively appropriate generic messages about the social implications of
technology and about technology policy, and reinterpret these according to their own
individual and national perspectives, priorities, and contexts. The subsequent PRECEPT
working paper (Graham et al., 2008) further develops the concept of domestication (and
the related concept of appropriation) from Sorensen (1996) and Brosveet and Sorensen
(2000) in exploring the uptake and evolution of the concept of BPR. It analyses how a
concept is selectively taken up out of one context and is transformed within a different
context. However, it ignores linguistic domestication in the process of domesticating a
concept in a different language context. For example, how do non-English speaking
countries choose a term with their langaues in order to indicate the concept in question?
This thesis draws upon the current development of the idea of domestication and
further develops three levels of domestication in terms of 1) linguistic appropriation; 2)
fit to national policy discourse; 3) fit to the national setting, e.g. social and economic
context. For the first level of domestication, as discussed in Chapter 6, China serves as a
representative case in that the high-ranking officers discussed and finally selected one
Chinese term amongst three to translate to the English term 'digital divide'. When
Sorensen (1996) and Brosveet and Sorensen (2000) developed the concept
'domestication', what they considered is how a concept is carried and changed from one
setting to another, e.g. non-linguistic translation. However, they did not consider
linguistic translation. English or European researchers have overlooked this level of
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domestication because of the broad accessibility of their mutual language. Overall, the
three levels of domestication complement and operationalise the use of 'domestication'
for future research, particularly that which is conducted in non-English speaking
countries.
Finally, as far as the digital divide policy in developing countries is concerned, this
research makes a contribution in terms of drawing out the digital divide policy model(s)
in China and Taiwan. This research shows a generic centralised model of national digital
divide policy-making, but with a slight difference when considering national contexts.
Moreover, I also map out the architecture of digital divide policy at the national level,
and this provides a blueprint for future research in digital divide policy-making in these
countries.
10.2.2 The Contribution to Policy Research
10.2.2.1 How Does Context Affect Policy?
First of all, it is widely recognised that 'context' is important in policy-making. However,
unless we identify the ways in which context impinges on the content, process and
outcomes of policy-making, it remains something of a 'slippery concept' (Jasanoff, 2005:
22). This research identified the components of international and national contexts that
impact on digital divide policy-making (Chapter 4, 5, and 7), which will be useful in
further research on this topic.
Secondly, this research supports the notion from STS and interpretive policy research
that context is of great importance in shaping both technology and policy-making (see
Chapter 2). Some researchers have further noticed that the definition of the digital
divide conceived by policy-makers has a significant part to play in subsequent
policymaking (e.g. Servon, 2002). In this thesis I have demonstrated the important role
that contexts play in digital divide policy-making, which shows that the policy process is
an historical process shaped by contexts, both global (e.g. international digital divide
discourses and initiatives) and local (national policy-making processes, policy-making
traditions and styles, and local exigencies).
Adoption of an interpretive approach can help because 'the analyst is to show whether
particular definitions "homogenise" a problem, that is, render the problem
understandable by situating it in a wider social frame, or whether definitions lead to a
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"heterogenisation" that opens up established discursive categories and hence the
possibility of new courses of action' (Fischer, 2003: 85). This thesis reveals that the
framings of the digital divide in China and Taiwan are to some extent similar or
coherent with those from the US and international organisations. For example, both
China and Taiwan adopted the framings of national competitiveness and national
growth in digital divide policy-making. Particularly in China, the digital divide has been
homogenised as an issue of physical access, and any action taken by the government
(Cun Cun Tong policy, for example) is the provision of landlines for each village. Other
global digital divide framings, e.g. social inclusion, social capital and human rights are
absent in digital divide policy-making.
10.2.2.2 What is the Relationship between Policy Discourses and Policy Formation?
Interpretive policy research emphasises the important role played by discourses/framing
in policy-making. The findings in my research conform to this proposition. They
provide ample evidence that discourse does matter in China's and Taiwan's digital divide
policy-making, Cun Cun Tong in China and DOC/ADOC in Taiwan. For example, China
overwhelmingly frames the digital divide as a barrier to national competitiveness and
economic growth, which has further reduced around a technocratic framing of the
policy around provision of physical access, without mentioning skill, literacy, etc.
However, discourse sometimes matters, but sometimes does not (Schmidt and Radaelli,
2004: 184) in the explanation of policy-making. Or to be more precise, its influence on
policy outcomes seems to vary between cases. Action may also be taken in the absence
of framing of a policy problem. In addition to the findings shown above, my research
also finds that relationship between discourses and policy-making is not straightforward
and linear as some interpretations of discursive shaping might imply. For example,
Taiwan had already embarked on relevant digital divide policy when the term 'digital
divide' was coined from the US in the mid-1990s. Ill, a non-governmental institute, had
taken action to bridge the digital divide in the 1990s, and later a governmental agency
RDEC built community telecentres in 1999. Both III and RHEC began to bridge the
digital divide before the government formulated the official digital divide policy in 2003.
This reveals that the Taiwanese government was doing digital divide policy before this
term was in use globally in policy-making. Taiwan's case shows that some inclusion
strategies arose within domestic departments in advance of alignment with international
digital divide discourses, as a result of pre-existing concerns within the national policy
settings.
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10.2.2.3 Gap between Policy Formation and Policy Implementation
This thesis finds that there is another gap between policy formation and policy
implementation, the exploration of which reveals the complexity of policy discourses.
For example, some policy texts were found to emphasise social development, whereas
the implementation predominantly centres on the equipment of infrastructures. In
Taiwan, the framing of the need to bridge the digital divide in policy texts touches upon
the issue of social development. However, the priority of digital divide policy is on
national economic development in terms of the provision of computers and physical
access. It seems that this gap may be primarily due to the resource allocation between
the actors involved. In order to consider this idea further, it is first necessary to identify
the actors in digital divide policy-making.
Interpretive policy research emphasises the role of actors from the perspective of the
interpretive community, which pays attention to how the policy problem is interpreted
by actors. This approach undoubtedly expands the role of policy-makers to the
interpretive aspect, be it in the early stage or middle stage of policy-making and policy
implementation. Yanow (2000) identifies at least three communities of meanings:
policy-makers, implementing agency personnel, and affected citizens or clients. This
research conforms to Yanow's identification of the first two communities, but replaces
the third community with researchers that are delegated to conduct digital divide reports.
Furthermore, although the actors in China and Taiwan can be categorised into these
three groups, they have slightly different configurations. The first group I identify in this
research refers to those with high-ranking governmental positions, who are shaping and
deciding policy priorities. In China, this group is identified as those making national
development policy where digital divide policy is included. In Taiwan, this group is
identified as NICI, which is responsible for the national technology plan. However,
before NICI had taken responsibility for official digital divide policy-making, the
non-government organisation III had contributed to the issue of bridging the digital
divide. The second group refers to those ministries/institutes in charge of policy
implementation. In China, it is Mil; in Taiwan, it is the Computer Centre of MOE.
According to the findings, actors in this level to some extent have more practical power
in policy implementation because they have financial advantages. The third group
participating in digital divide policy is those researchers in charge of conducting digital
divide reports. In China, these researchers are affiliated with Mil, while in Taiwan these
researchers are from academia. Overall, the configuration of actors in Taiwan reveals
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openness to input from academia and other non-state actors. My analysis demonstrates
that the process of digital divide policy-making involves a complex group of actors,
which suggests that in further research, the delineation of actors according to the roles
they play may be necessary and helpful in developing a thorough understanding of the
policy process.
However, regarding the identification of these three communities, question could be
raised about how I identified them, and whether anybody was left out? Were there
invisible actors in the digital divide policy-making? This is related to the methodological
limitation that I was unable to observe 'civil society behind closed doors'. I will
reconsider and answer this question in section 10.4.1.
10.3 Providing Reflexivity for Policy Making
This thesis adopts an interpretive policy research approach to touch upon a currently
worldwide popular topic 'the digital divide', and focuses on how the definition of the
policy problem impacts subsequent policymaking. The findings suggest that 'the way in
which a particular problem is defined leads to a specific policy solution' (Servon, 2002:
6). However, there may be different ways to resolve a problem, e.g. redefine the problem
in terms of what the government can achieve, or assert that the problem has been
resolved. Some policies are geared towards political goals, e.g. winning consent.
There are many steps and gaps between the various stages in the policy cycles—from
problem definition to policy formation to policy implementation to policy outcomes.
Not all policies can be readily adopted; it depends on how politically doable they are.
Furthermore, not all policies have desired outcomes, it depends how amenable the
problem is to political resolution.
The findings in this thesis show that both China and Taiwan to some extent managed to
influence the framing of the digital divide as well as making and implementing digital
divide policy in ways that are specific to their particular contexts. Since the governments
have the power to do this, policy-makers could also seise this opportunity to make
alternative framings and policies. As the findings show, these two settings take the digital
divide as a technological issue and make digital divide policy for economic growth and
the improvement of international standing. I am not criticising this framing; as shown in
Chapter 4 and 9, it is unavoidable both because it seems to be an international trend and
because at their current developmental stages with their historical views of technology,
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these framings have important material implications both for China and Taiwan.
However, since the governments are heavily involved in framing the digital divide as well
as making and implementing digital divide polices, the policy-makers do have
opportunities to make alternative framings. The findings show that currendy in Taiwan,
a few politicians have learned and begun to recruit alternative framings of the digital
divide, i.e. human rights, even though this framing is still at an infant stage in the policy¬
making process. But this framing appears to be being employed for an external audience,
and is not central to policy implementation. Also, from the discussion in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 9, I found that framings can influence policy outcomes. Therefore, alternative
framings may help expand the policy vision, and help developing countries not only
catch up with advanced countries in terms of national economic growth and
competition regarding ICTs, but help all individuals to make use of ICTs in a way that
has relevance and benefits for their own lives.
10.4 Applicability of Theory and Limitations of Methodology
10.4.1 Applicability of Theory
This research intended to borrow two key analytical concepts—storylines and discourse
coalitions—from Hajer's discourse analysis. The intent was to analyse digital divide
policy-making in China and Taiwan, and to investigate Cun Cun Tong policy and
DOC/ADOC programming. However, since Hajer's theory is developed from a more
open society such as exists in Europe and the UK, some reflections must be made
concerning the applicability of Hajer's theory in a less open society.
Hajer's discourse analysis is situated in a more open society, e.g. EU and UK; this
context (wherein the theory developed) undoubtedly recruited a broader range of actors
in the policy debate. This presents a deficiency when applying discourse coalitions in the
analysis of empirical data, particulary in the case of China. China is still undergoing a
rather closed policy making process. Thus, the actors I identified as being involved in
making discourse regarding the digital divide and the interviewees I recruited from
amongst these in the course of the fieldwork may present a rather incomplete picture —
and less complete than the scholarly literature would indicate as being ultimately
desirable, (though I have tried my best to overcome this deficiency). Based on the
available data collected and analysed, in the case of China, the actors present to be
composed by a technocratic elite group. A diversity of discourse coalitions seems not
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observable at this moment in time.
This deficiency may direct our attention to the other concept I explored: storylines. It
raises some concens as to its applicability. In Hajer's theory, storylines are used to
delineate different coalitions. As discussed above, since the discourse coalitions are not
readily observable in the Chinese policy-making systems, the concept of storylines may
encounter certain difficulties when it comes to practical application. In this research,
however, the concept of the storyline is taken as a useful mechanism for analysis.
Drawing upon Hajer's conceptualisation (1995: 56), the storyline 'is a generative sort of
narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning
to specific or social phenomenon.' Following this definition, storylines such as national
competitiveness, national growth, etc., are indeed well applied in the framing of the
digital divide and consequently support the digital divide policies which have been made,
e.g. Cun Cun Tong in China. Therefore, I use Hajer's concept of storylines to explore
changes to the digital divide policy as it travels to China and Taiwan and is subsequently
implemented in these two case countries (even though I cannot use it to explain the
mechanism by which discourse coalitions operate: I was unable to observe these).
By contrast, discourse coalitions in Taiwan are emerging among the interviewees and the
storylines for framing the digital divide are extending across a much broader range of
issues, including everything from national growth to human rights. Different storylines
are surfacing in the policy discourses, even though they are not embodied in
policy-making and implementation.
As mentioned above, Hajer's theory seems to have limited applicability in a less open
society, and may not be fully tested in my research. However, adopting the concept of
domestication for analysis, the processes of discursive transformation can be observed
even in contexts where I am unable to observe the influence of a discourse coalition. In
addition, it does not go against either the epistemology of social construction or the
analytical framework of interpretive policy research to say that the way a policy problem
is interpreted has significant impact on the subsequent policy-making and any resulting
implementation within different contexts.
10.4.2 Limitations of Methodology
The limited applicability of Hajer's theory is embodied in the research design of this
research. The limitations of methodology in this thesis result primarily from the black
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box of China's policy process. As described in Chapter 3, it was very difficult to make
appointments with my interviewees. Some areas of decision-making remain closed off.
Although the scholarly literature on China's political process mentions a wider influence
on policy making, the voices outside the Chinese government are not available in my
current research. As a result, and thanks to the snowballing method, most of my limited
numbers of interviewees were elite policy officials. The weakness of public participation,
e.g. public contestation of policies in plural media and policy fora, makes it harder to
track discursive processes. I am aware that this methodological limitation may impact on
the findings. For example, the digital divide is defined by the limited range of
interviewees within the government who have acess to technology policy-making.
These limitations are compounded by the amount of time available and by budgetary
restrictions. In addition, the adoption of a comparative study to investigate the digital
divide policy process also produces another methodological issue. Here, I discuss these
limitations and suggest possible directions for future research.
First of all, I had access to a limited number of interviewees overall and to a much
narrower range of actors in China than in Taiwan. This raises concerns about whether a
small sample of interviews may result in problems such as the absence of key
constituencies, the lack of diversity (Ritchie, Lewis, and Elam, 2003: 85), or the creation
of some bias for research. However, although the number of interviews is limited, I am
relatively confident that I did include important figures within the government in digital
divide policy-making. This is because I used a snowballing strategy to locate my
interviewees, as shown in Chapter 3. I am also aware that adopting a snowballing
method may have its methodological limitations, e.g. restricting the interviewees mainly
to those who are holding positions within the government.
As far as differential access to interviewees in my case countries is concerned, there is
no intrinsic difficulty in talking to people outside the government in China. However,
due closed modes of policy deliberation in China, it is difficult for the researcher to
trace the existence or operation of wider networks of influence beyond government
circles. Another reason for the narrower pool of interviewees in the case of China is
that the digital divide policy in China is still in its infant stages, and there was no given
policy map to follow before I conducted this research and drew one (Chapter 6).
Additionally, Chinese policy-makers are conservative and cautious about accepting
interviews, and Chinese academics were very sensitive to the questions the interviewer
asked, especially because the interviewer was from Taiwan, which for them raises
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national security concerns. These constraints limit the findings in this research as they
only present a subsection of policymaker opinions. This limitation can hopefully be
addressed in the future when the policy-making process in China becomes a more open
one.
Nevertheless, a small sample of interviews can also work in qualitative research if
purposive sampling has taken place (Ritchie, Lewis, and Elam, 2003: 85). As mentioned
before, the policy-makers in this research are categorised into three groups through the
strategy of snowballing. I did locate the key interviewees within the government for this
research, all of whom gave first-hand information that complemented those policy
documents I had investigated prior to entering the field. However, purposive sample
raises a further question about whether and how the process of purposive sampling may
shape research findings. Therefore, it must be highlighted that the findings of this
research will only represent opinions from these three groups of interviewees; limited
access and certain time/financial pressures prevented a more extensive examination.
However, I have attempted to grapple with these practical difficulties and to give a
comprehensive account of the process as far as is possible.
The second limitation of this thesis also comes from the research choices I made
throughout. I used newspapers to secure second-hand interviews in order to overcome
the fact that some important government officials were not available for personal
interviews. I did not make analysis of media coverage in the digital divide divide a
primary methodology. This points to trade-offs in the research choices taken. Other
methodologies, e.g. content analysis, might have had certain advantages—allowing me to
track discourse coalitions outside official government circles. However, in the case of
China, and for digital divide policy where there has been little evidence of public
controversy, there were limitations in the value of published sources. I opted for
discourse analysis based upon detailed qualitative methods, i.e. interviews because of my
interest in understanding the framing process. This undoubtedly brought problems and
limitations with it, as I discussed in my earliest paragraphs. However, there is no ideal
research design, and in this case the practical constraints were not insignificant. Future
work could certainly address other methodologies in order to offset these weaknesses.
The third crucial limitation of this thesis is that doing a comparative study confronts the
researchers with difficulties in the depth and precision of data analysis. As Stake argues,
'focusing on comparison detracts from the intensity of single case description and thus
can lead to less precision' (Stake, 2000, cited in Ritchie, Lewis and Elam, 2003: 50). This
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limitation may be reflected in my analysis. However, the aim of this research is to
understand nadonal digital divide policy-making in developing countries, and it is
necessary to include at least two settings to understand their similarities and
dissimilarities, and to sacrifice some details which are not essential for comparison.
A related issue that needs to be raised here is how to conduct international comparative
research, i.e. how to actually compare two policy nexuses in different states? This issue
can be discussed in terms of the purpose of doing a comparative study. In theory, the
purpose of the comparison is to develop, test, and refine the existing theory (Hopkin,
2002: 249). Therefore, there are existing variables for comparison. However, the
purpose of comparison in this research was not to test an existing theory, but to try and
build a policy model for digital divide policy-making in the developing countries via
qualitative comparative research — primarily because there is no existing digital divide
policy-making model to be tested. To meet this end, the case number cannot be larger
than two or three cases (Hopkin, 2002). In practice, the researcher needs to have a
comprehensive understanding of the case countries, and needs to then look for
elements that explain the similarities and differences between cases. For example, in this
study I lay out the selective international context (the earlier 1990s to 2005) for China
and Taiwan in order to understand their similarities; I also pinpoint their respective
national contexts in order to account for both similarities and dissimilarities. In so doing,
digital divide policy-making models are created for both settings. These models provide
a point of reference for future research.
10.5 Suggestions for Future Research
As a developing country with rapid economic development and a huge population,
China is a rather unique case for investigating the policy process in bridging the digital
divide. Therefore, for future research, the specific lesson learnt in this study is the need
to adopt multiple methods to overcome the difficulties of access, i.e. doing thorough
documentary research before entering the field in China. According to the experience
from western academia, following China's reform policy in 1978, it 'became possible to
interview Chinese officials systematically in different ministries and research institutes'
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988: 19). The 'sources became more readily available, data
improved and fieldwork and interviews with those working in China became possible'
(Saich, 2004: 233). With the advent of information technology in China, researchers can
get access to resources much more conveniently than before, e.g. via government official
websites (Fravel, 2000). According to my own experience, official governmental
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websites do provide considerable help before entering the field. In addition, Mil
Ministers' official email-boxes91 serve as another useful channel for getting access to
sources. However, personal contacts are the most important resource when doing
research in China. Afterwards, using the snowballing strategy can make it easier to locate
additional interviewees. Apart from the specific suggestions for doing research in China,
three broader suggestions for doing digital divide policy research are revealed below.
Firstiy, as new research in this field, this thesis makes an important contribution by
drawing on the data collected in order to map out the architecture of digital divide
policy at the national level. However, in bridging the digital divide, local level
governments contribute much in implementation. Research on local level governments
could adopt a bottom-up perspective to scrutinise the implementation of digital divide
policy. Additionally, researching local level government may provide more detailed
insights into the policy process via the examination of local contexts, e.g. political and
economic contexts, local culture, and the phenomenon of the digital divide, etc. Thus,
future research could build on this mapping and examine policy-making at more micro
levels within the case countries, for example the provincial levels in China.
Secondly, the research ends up with a more restricted range of interviewees than I had
hoped for. This research focuses on policy-makers that have positions of power in
making and implementing digital divide policy. The findings provide an approach that
centres upon policy elites to understanding digital divide policy-making. In future
research, alternative approach may be interesting to investigate how people outside the
government interpret digital divide policy and how this impinges upon the deliberations
of policy-makers. Moreover, interviews could also be conducted with those citizens
living in remote areas who represent the targets of digital divide policy.
Thirdly, this research set up a time span of the international organizations and events
concerning the issue of the digital divide from early 1990 to 2005. However, the debate
surrounding the digital divide and relevant policies to bridge that divide will be an
ongoing global issue. The future research can expand the timeframe and look at these
issues within a wider time period, investigating how they have impacted on digital divide
policy making in individual countries.
91 Mil's official website provides the mechanism called 'Minister's Email Box' to answer enquires from
the public. The Minister will not answer the questions himself. They are delegated to the staff that is in
charge of the issues in question. I have located my data via this channel when I encountered follow-up
questions to ask after the fieldwork.
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Fourthly, both in China and in Taiwan, digital divide policy is a novel policy field that
has only emerged for one decade or so. In this brief time period it is difficult to assess
the impacts of the policy which has been developed. Over a longer period, it may be
possible to observe framings of policy problems, and the subsequent policy-making and
policy outcomes in a more comprehensive manner.
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